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General Introduction 
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1. Chapter One: General Introduction 
1.1. Essays on Capital Structure, Risk Management, and Performance 
Improving economic, environmental, and social sustainability is a major goal in 
agriculture (European Commission, 2017). The face of farming has changed dramatically over 
the last decades, and the key factors influencing farm performance thus require due attention. 
Changes include: new demand for land use, globalization, competition in the world markets, 
the rise in volatility in all agricultural commodity markets resulting in a higher volatility in 
farm income compared to that in other industries, heavy dependency on debt to achieve further 
growth, continued reforms of agricultural policies, a sharp decline in the number of farms in 
the developed world, and environmental concerns (Berkhout and van Bruchem, 2015; Burns, 
Tulman and Harris, 2015). Furthermore, specialization increasingly makes farmers dependent 
on market prices, as specialization often means less diversification at the farm level; hence the 
natural hedge at farm level is decreasing (Pennings et al., 2017). 
In addition to these trends (and partly caused by above-mentioned changes), a variation 
in the level of farm competitiveness is observed; some farms consistently perform better 
(worse) than others. This variation in performance and persistence raises several questions: do 
the same farms always exhibit high (low) performance? and are these differences in 
performance systematic or random? It is important to answer these questions to understand 
future farm competitiveness and the drivers of this heterogeneity in performance. Farm capital 
structure and risk management lie at the heart this quest.  
Capital-structure and risk-management choices are key decisions that a farmer has to 
make. Their importance stems from the effects that they have on profitability and financial 
sustainability. For a long time, the capital structure and risk management decisions were 
thought solely to be affected by farm-internal factors. Recent literature shows, however, that 
external factors may also have a significant influence on these decisions (Skevas, Wu and 
Guan, 2018). Hence, there is no doubt that studying the determinants of capital structure and 
risk management decisions and consequently their impact on the long-run profitability of farms 
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is of great importance to farms, lenders, and policy-makers. Interestingly, the report by the 
Agricultural Market Task Force of the European Union also underlined that the main focus 
areas after 2020 are improving the market outcomes for farmers, supporting the uptake of 
integrated risk management tool such as futures market, developing measures to facilitate 
access to finance, and ensuring the economic viability and competitiveness of farmers 
(Veerman et al., 2016). 
In this thesis1, I aim to provide a better understanding of the dynamics of farm business 
from three different but complementary perspectives. First, I will examine the determinants of 
farm target capital structure and speed of adjustment, i.e. the speed at which farms adjust their 
leverage ratio toward the target in a given period of time. In addition, I will examine whether 
the existing corporate finance capital structure theories, particularly the pecking order and 
signaling theory, explain leverage dynamics. Second, I will examine the presence of farm risk-
balancing behavior as an integrated risk-management tool while accounting for unobserved 
(latent) heterogeneity. Finally, I will estimate the degree and drivers of farm profitability and 
abnormal profit persistence, and I will seek to explain why persistence levels differ across farm 
types using the well-established theory of the Resource-Based View (RBV). Figure 1.1 shows 
the synthesis of the three essays in the thesis. 
                                                 
1 Thesis and dissertation are used interchangeably. 
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Figure 1.1: Farm capital structure, risk management, and performance 
1.2. Capital Structure in Farm Businesses 
Modigliani and Miller (1958) show that, under the strict assumption of a perfect market, 
firm value is independent of the way the firm is financed. In reality, however, market frictions 
do exist, and many theories have been proposed in the literature to explain the choice of 
corporate financing source in light of the potential costs associated with each source (Graham, 
Leary and Roberts, 2015; Myers, 1984; Rajan and Zingales, 1995; Titman and Wessels, 1988). 
They include agency costs, information asymmetry costs, transaction costs and bankruptcy 
costs (Graham and Leary, 2011). Using these theories, previous studies have identified the 
determinants of firm capital structure decision making. These factors include, but not limited 
to, asset structure, earnings volatility, size, growth opportunities and profitability (Frank and 
Goyal, 2009; Graham, Leary and Roberts, 2015; Rajan and Zingales, 1995; Titman and 
Wessels, 1988).  
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Previous studies, however, almost exclusively focused on the capital structure decision 
making of corporations. As a consequence, very little is known about the financing behavior 
of farm businesses, and it is simply assumed that the general theories of the corporate capital 
structure are applicable across sectors and industries, including farming.  
This assumption may not hold for farm businesses, however, given that they are 
characterized by a number of specific circumstances, including dependency on government 
support in order to stabilize income; the seasonal nature of production, leading to mismatches 
in cash inflow and outflow; different legal forms, whereby sole proprietorship is the 
predominant legal form; and limited access to equity markets. Further, unlike corporate firms 
that rely on external professional management, farm businesses have small decision-making 
units that consist of the owners or their family members and perhaps a few external advisors 
(Pennings et al., 2004; Pennings and Leuthold, 2000). These unique characteristics of the 
farming sector are expected to lead to different patterns of capital structure decision making. 
This makes it interesting to answer the question of whether the relationships predicted by 
existing corporate finance theories still hold true for farm businesses. 
In addition, capital structure decisions by agricultural farms became an issue of interest 
as farms started becoming more market-oriented (Nurmet, 2011) and are influenced by factors 
such as expected net income, risk level, and lenders’ attitudes towards risk. Also, the 
management of the capital structure influences farm performance in terms of profit, financial 
risk, and survival. Thus, to make informed decisions about farm viability, farms themselves, 
as well as lenders and policy analysists, need information about the financial structure of farms, 
and how farmers balance risk through their choice of capital structure and changes to that 
structure. 
A farm’s capital structure is inevitably linked to its performance: absence of sufficient 
financial resources threatens long-term farm viability while working capital is an important 
element in making the necessary investments in innovation, processing infrastructure, and 
production inputs to optimize output, improve quality, reduce costs, and gain efficiencies over 
time (Zhengfei and Lansink, 2006). Changes in a farm’s production structure affect its capital 
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structure by either tying up capital as farm production capacity increases or freeing up capital 
as it decreases. Consequently, investigating the speed of adjustment to the target leverage ratio 
is important in understanding the agility of farms in adapting to changing production and 
finance structures.  
Farm financing behavior and capital structure decisions also have important 
implications for the return and stability of lenders and financial institutions (Nenu et al., 2018; 
Agarwal, 2013). Farms do not typically have access to large equity markets: they rely on debt 
financing, mostly bank loans, as external funding sources (Katchova, 2005). Consequently, 
those farms are dependent on banks, whose credit supplies are affected by the state of the 
economy. Farms that are exposed to business risks, such as weather conditions, market price 
volatility or other external factors, see their financing resources dwindle. Note that operating 
farm revenues tend to decline in times of financial downturns as banks grant fewer credits in 
order to adjust their own liquidity (Cornett et al., 2011). In 2016, for example, Rabobank, a 
popular bank among Dutch farmers, with nearly 92.3 Billion Euro in outstanding loans to 
agricultural businesses, announced that one-third of its dairy farm customers were having 
trouble to pay back the principal and accumulated interests on their loans (CBS, 2017). In such 
situations, farms are forced to rely on internally generated funds, such as retained earnings, to 
cover their financial needs. 
It is relevant to examine whether corporate finance theories such as the pecking order 
and signaling theory (Graham, Leary and Roberts, 2015; Myers, 1984; Rajan and Zingales, 
1995; Titman and Wessels, 1988) can explain financial decision making in farm businesses. 
The pecking order theory entails that firms have two sources of funding: internal and external. 
The cost gap between internal and external funding, attributed to asymmetric information and 
agency costs, makes firms prefer internal financing (Byoun, 2008; Frank and Goyal, 2003). 
Whenever external funding is required, firms will issue debt and convertible bonds rather than 
equity. The signaling theory states that managers have better information about their firms and 
motives to transfer this information to potential investors and lenders through ‘signals’. These 
signals include, but are not limited to, investment, profitability, leverage, asset accumulation, 
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and repurchasing of outstanding stocks (Graham, Leary and Roberts, 2015). The applicability 
of these theories in a corporate setting is not uncontested, however. Both rely on the assumption 
that a company has two external financing options: debt and equity. The pecking order theory, 
for instance, may not hold in more complex corporate capital structure settings, e.g., when a 
firm chooses between straight and convertible debts, or in the event of an agency problem 
between a shareholder and a manager. The signaling theory, on the other hand, suffers from 
the abundance of financial tactics and ways to access capital markets in a corporate finance 
setting, which complicates the measurement and identification of the signaling effect (Frank 
and Goyal, 2007). 
Farm businesses are less prone to these challenges and provide an interesting 
background for investigating how these corporate finance theories explain capital structure 
decision making because: (1) often, there are only two financing options: retained earnings 
(internal) and debt (external), (2) the facts that sole proprietorship is the predominant legal 
form2 and farms have limited access to the capital market minimize the agency problem, and 
(3) farms have very few financial tactics, such as leverage and profit, to use as signals, which 
makes identification of the signaling effects easier.  
Studies that use these theories to examine the financing behavior of farm business are 
scant, however, despite abundant supportive evidence for their applicability in the corporate 
finance literature. In an attempt to fill this gap, chapter 2 examines the applicability of corporate 
finance theories to farm businesses, the determinants of farm target capital structure decisions, 
and the adjustment speed towards the target capital structure.  
1.3. Risk Management in Agriculture 
The unpredictable forces of nature make risk an inherent feature of the agricultural 
sector. Imperfect information by farmers about the price of inputs and outputs and the weather 
                                                 
2 According to Lowder, Skoet and Raney (2016), family farms constitute about 75% of global farming. 
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conditions also make farm competitiveness uncertain in the future. The major risks in 
agriculture are commonly classified as business and financial risks (Barry et al., 2012).  
Business risk can be defined as the variability in the operating net income of a farm 
(Escalante and Barry, 2003). The most common farm business risks are production (yield), 
price, institutional, technological, and personal risks. Yield risk occurs due to uncontrollable 
events such as excessive (lack of) rainfall, extreme temperatures, insect infestations, and 
diseases (Hardaker et al., 2015). Price risk reflects risks associated with changes in the output 
or input prices. The prices of the most purchased farm inputs, i.e. seeds, fertilizer, pesticides, 
and machines, and most sold farm outputs, i.e. milk, tomatoes, and cut flowers, are not known 
in advance. Thus, farmers are increasingly exposed to price-making forces in unpredictable 
markets (Pennings et al., 2017). Risks ensuing from changes in agricultural policies and 
regulations are categorized as institutional risks (Barry et al., 2012). Technology also plays a 
key role in production risk in farming, in the sense that certain technological practices may 
become outdated (Harwood et al., 1999). Personal risks, e.g. divorce, illness or the death of the 
operator or a family member affect the survival chances of the farm (Meuwissen, 2008). 
Financial risk, on the other hand, is the risk that arises, often, from debt financing. 
Farms borrow money from banks and other lending institutions to purchase farming equipment, 
land and livestock (Hardaker et al., 2015). The use of borrowed funds means that a portion of 
the returns from the farm business must be reserved for making debt and interest payments. 
Farms with higher levels of leverage, i.e. more external debt, will earn less money from farming 
activities, especially when the interest rate on their loans is very high.  
Financial risk in farming is thus mostly caused by uncertainty related to interest rates, 
changes in the value of assets used as collateral, and changes in cash flows allocated to repaying 
debt (Langemeier, 2016). In addition, financial risks may also be caused by increased input 
costs, excessive borrowing, higher cash demand for family needs, and lack of adequate cash or 
credit reserves (Turvey and Kong, 2009). The sources of financial risk and their levels of 
severity include a size element. Unlike smaller farmers, larger farmers are more likely to 
possess collateral and have more experience with keeping detailed accounting records, both of 
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which are often required by lending institutions for credit risk evaluation. This makes the 
process of obtaining loans cheaper for larger farms than for smaller farms (Reynolds-Allie, 
Fields and Rainey, 2013). 
The above discussion shows that risks are unavoidable and are at the heart of the major 
decisions taken by farmers. Dealing with such risks, i.e., risk management, is getting more and 
more important, not only for individual farmers but also throughout the supply chain. Risk 
management involves selecting suitable strategies to reduce risk exposure in the farm 
operation, building a farm’s risk-bearing capacities, and transferring risks to a third party that 
is better equipped to handle this risk exposure (Harwood et al., 1999). Since there are multiple 
sources of business and financial risk involved, a comprehensive strategy that integrates 
production, marketing, and financial responses will reduce risk more effectively than a series 
of separate and individual responses (Barry et al., 2012). It is important to note, however, that 
good risk management does not necessarily equate the total elimination of risk. Rather, it means 
containing the risk at a level that the business is willing and able to bear (Ifft, Kuethe and 
Morehart, 2015).  
Currently, farms have different types of risk-management instruments at their disposal. 
These instruments include insurance, diversification, off-farm employment, mutual funds, 
saving accounts, futures market, ad-hoc payments, and other fiscal measures (Falco et al., 
2014; Organisation for Economic and Development, 2011). However, the low uptake of these 
various tools by farmers remains one of the major challenges in understanding and designing 
adequate risk-management tools at a farm level (Cordier, 2015; Finger and El Benni, 2014). 
Risk-management tools in agriculture are commonly categorized into two approaches: sharing 
risks with others and taking measures within the farm (Hardaker et al., 2015). While the first 
approach mostly concerns insurance schemes, the risk-balancing theory may present an 
interesting alternative, though under-investigated in the risk-management literature, to the 
already existing integrated risk-management strategies that form part of the second approach 
of taking measures within the farm.  
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Risk-balancing in farming is defined as the adjustments to the financial and business 
risks in response to changes to the existing optimal total risk level following an exogenous 
shock (Escalante and Barry, 2003; Gabriel and Baker, 1980). The risk-balancing hypothesis 
establishes a link between the level of business risk, financial risk and an optimal level of total 
risk (de Mey et al., 2014). Farms whose levels of business risk have been affected by exogenous 
shocks will aim for an optimal (constant) level of total risk by adjusting their leverage 
(financial) positions. Any increase in business risk can be offset by a decrease in leverage.  
Contrary to these exogenous shocks, endogenous decisions or actions taken by farmers, 
such as adopting new production technology or innovation, might decrease the level of business 
risk, allowing farms to increase their financial risk exposure by taking out more loans in an 
effort to maintain a constant level of total risk (Ifft, Kuethe and Morehart, 2015). The simple 
strategy suggested by the risk-balancing hypothesis is that farms with high business risks will 
abstain from assuming additional financial obligations, so as to reduce their financial risk 
exposure. Conversely, farms may opt to take out additional loans, i.e. create a higher leverage 
ratio, as their business risk exposure decreases. The underlying motivation of farms is always 
risk-balancing, i.e. to restore the total risk to the optimal level, i.e. the level before the 
disruption by the exogenous shock(s) (Featherstone et al., 1988).  
The risk-balancing hypothesis is well established in agricultural economics and finance 
literature. Its insightfulness has inspired many extensions since its introduction by Gabriel and 
Baker in 1980. Using the risk-balancing framework, Collins (1985), Featherstone et al. (1988), 
Escalante and Barry (2003), and, more recently, Uzea et al. (2014), de Mey et al. (2014), de 
Mey et al. (2016) and Bampasidou, Mishra and Moss (2017) all provided evidence of risk-
balancing by farms.  
Very few studies, however, have examined the determinants of risk-balancing behavior. 
This might partly be explained by the lack of comprehensive farm-level longitudinal 
accounting data to assert the risk-balancing behavior of farms in the long-term. Most 
importantly, however, the risk-balancing literature does not account, yet, for the (unobserved) 
heterogeneity of risk balancers.  
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Most previous studies in the risk-balancing literature focus on specific farm types (e.g., 
dairy, cash grains or livestock farms), age or region, rather than explicitly addressing farm type 
as a mere unit of interest, thus implying that all farms sharing the same observed characteristics 
follow the same decision-making process. This has led to the assumption that farms within 
these groups are homogenous. Farm heterogeneity may, however, originate from several 
sources within these supposedly homogenous farm types, such as: (a) different farming 
motivations, (b) different external production conditions, (c) other factors such as managerial 
capacity, risk perception, and risk tolerance (Trujillo-Barrera, Pennings and Hofenk, 2016). To 
the best of the author’s knowledge, no previous study to date explicitly accounts for the 
heterogeneity of risk-balancing farm behavior. This thesis aims to address this gap. 
Chapter three tests the presence of farm risk-balancing behavior while accounting for 
the unobserved heterogeneity among risk balancers. The effect of unobserved heterogeneity is 
explicitly modeled by a latent mixture regression model, which classifies farms into segments, 
whereby their risk-balancing responses to the selected explanatory variables are identical 
within each segment but different across segments. Note that the term unobserved 
heterogeneity posits two interrelated ideas (Pennings and Garcia, 2010): the first notion is that 
not all farm operators respond similarly to a given change in the determinants of risk-balancing, 
but rather that there may be segments of farm operators who behave in similar ways. The 
second notion is that prior to the analysis, it is not possible to observe these segments directly. 
1.4. The Dynamics of Farm Profitability 
Farm profitability has been in the spotlight in recent years because income volatility 
has been higher in farming than in other industries (Sol, Isabel and Alberto, 2016) and because 
of major socioeconomic changes. In addition to these changes, a variation in the level of farm 
profitability can be observed; some farms consistently perform better (worse) than others 
(Mishra, Wilson and Williams, 2009).  
Several models have been developed to explain the occurrence of variations in sustained 
competitive advantage across seemingly similar firms and industries. The Structure Conduct 
Performance (SCP), the Market-Based View (MBV) and the Resource-Based View (RBV) are 
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the predominant models (McGahan and Porter, 2003). The central premise of the SCP is that 
performance that deviates from the norm is determined by the competitive dynamics and 
structure of the industry. These can be assessed by analyzing elements such as barriers to entry 
and exit, product differentiation, the number of competitors, and the number of buyers and 
sellers, which help determine how firms behave and perform, i.e. gain and sustain competitive 
advantages (Porter, 2008).  
The MBV is an extension of the SCP and argues that superior performance is 
determined not only by industry structure but also by employing market-positioning strategies, 
e.g. low cost/product differentiation, in the target market segments help to earn and sustain 
superior performance (Wiggins and Ruefli, 2002). The MBV stresses that firms devise their 
strategies based on a market analysis of the industry. Recently, the focus in the literature has 
shifted from industry structure to a firm’s internal resources and capabilities (Furrer et al., 
2008). This shift has made the Resource-Based View (RBV) the leading model for analyzing 
sustained superior performance. A central premise of the RBV is that firms compete and choose 
strategies based on their material, financial and human resources and their capabilities (Grant, 
1991). Competitive advantage can be achieved and sustained by developing and owning 
resources that are scarce, valuable, non-substitutable and inimitable (Barney, 2001). Resources 
that sustain competitive advantage will also generate superior economic performance that will 
persist over time. Long-run profitability and the persistence of this profit have been used as 
indicators of a sustained competitive advantage (Porter, 2008). 
Since the contributions by Mueller (1977), a considerable amount of literature has been 
published on variations in firm profitability and its persistence in the manufacturing and service 
sectors (Goddard et al., 2011). Empirical facts from these studies give rise to two main research 
directions in the so-called ‘persistence literature’: identifying the level of analysis (whether 
firm, corporate, industry, and country level) and examining the time dependence of profit rates.  
Findings in the first direction show a wide consensus regarding the existence of 
significant firm and industry effects on performance persistence. Schumacher and Boland 
(2005) found that profits are generally more persistent within an industry than within any 
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specific corporation. Kambhampati (1995) studied the intensity of competition in India from a 
developing-country perspective and found that above average profitability persisted in a large 
number of industries. Data from the Turkish banking sector, on the other hand, revealed that 
the long-run mean profit rate was very close to zero, implying the convergence of profit to the 
norm. Goddard et al. (2011) also tested for the persistence of profit using bank-level data from 
65 developing and developed countries, finding that developed countries show a slightly higher 
persistence in profit than developing countries. Findings in the second direction suggest that 
only very few studies on the time dependence of profit rates can confirm the existence of a 
convergence process toward the mean profit rate (Carhart, 1997).  
Even though findings from the manufacturing and service sectors are of great 
importance in understanding the notion behind the dynamics of long-run profitability, these 
conclusions cannot directly be applied to the agriculture sector because of its unique 
characteristics. Zhengfei and Lansink (2006) and Huirne (2003) noted that the agriculture 
sector is unique in that (a) production processes are seasonal; (b) input-output processes are 
often sequential (not simultaneous); (c) farms are exposed to uncertainty associated with the 
nature of production, such as variability of rainfall, the presence of pests and diseases that will 
determine the risk of partial or total loss of produce; and (d) farm produce is mostly perishable. 
Given these unique challenges, it would be interesting to gain a better understanding of the 
characteristics of persistently well-performing farms, the tangible and intangible resources 
acquired by these farms, the potential for further improvement of well-performing farms, or 
their ability to maintain their position relative to others, and the challenges that other farm 
businesses face on their way to performing similarly.  
There are studies in the agricultural economics literature that address the determinants 
of farm profitability and sustained competitive advantage in the long-run (see, e.g., Griffin, 
Ibendahl and Stabel, 2018; Langemeier and DeLano, 1999). Studies that address the 
intersection of the two, i.e. the determinants and the persistence of farm profit, are nevertheless 
lacking. This thesis aims to contribute to filling that gap. Given the vast body of literature on 
farm profitability and efficiency dynamics, the next logical question to ask is whether farms 
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that are performing well (poorly) compared to other farms during one period will continue to 
outperform (lag behind) the others  
Although a useful starting point, previous studies all have their limitations: they pay 
only nominal attention to documenting persistence determinants and apply mostly non-
parametric persistence measures, such as rank correlations and contingency tables. Aimed at 
filling these gaps, chapter 4 attempts to (a) find evidence of persistent farm performance 
explained by readily observable data; (b) ascertain whether significant differences in 
performance can be documented for a large group of farms over time across different farming 
systems; and (c) identify the main factors that account for variations in long-run profitability 
and its persistence. 
1.5. Objectives and Research Questions 
The general purpose of this dissertation is to contribute to the ongoing debate on farm 
competitiveness. This thesis aims to achieve an understanding of the dynamics of farm business 
from the perspectives of capital structure, risk management, and profitability, specifically 
where further theoretical reflections are needed and where the empirical evidence is scarce and 
inconclusive. Figure 3 summarizes the research objectives and questions in each chapter. 
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Figure 1.2. Research objectives and questions 
1.6. Data 
This thesis is based on the accounting data from farms that participated in the Dutch 
Farm Accountancy Data Network (FADN) between 2001 and 2015. FADN is an annual survey 
of commercial farms in the European Union (EU) and collects detailed structural and 
accountancy data on EU farms. The Dutch FADN is compiled and maintained by the 
Wageningen Economic Research-WUR (formerly known as the Dutch Agricultural Economics 
Research Institute, LEI).  
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The Dutch FADN sample was randomly selected using disproportional stratified 
sampling from the farm census. Economic size and farm type are the stratification criteria. 
Stratified random sampling ensures the inclusion of farms from all groups with different 
characteristics. Disproportional sampling entails that farms have different chances of being 
included in the sample. Farms from relatively homogenous groups have a smaller chance as a 
reliable conclusion can be reached based on few observations. This ensures the proper 
representation of all groups.  
The agricultural census provides the sampling frame for selecting farms to be included 
in the FADN. The type of farming and economic size are used to assign farms to the strata. 
Only farms with a standard output exceeding EUR 25,000 are included in the sampling frame. 
The number of farms to be included in the Dutch FADN sample is determined for each stratum 
and depends on the economic importance of a sector, the number of farms in a stratum, the 
policy relevance of a group and the heterogeneity of the farms (Meer, Veen and Vrolijk, 2013: 
p.7). 
The dataset used in this thesis is of high quality in that (a) the samples are representative 
of 80% of the farms and more than 90% of production in the Netherlands, and (b) it allows for 
the separate estimation of farm types for comparison purposes due to the harmonized data-
collection procedure, i.e. the bookkeeping principles and sample selection plans are identical 
for all farm types in the Netherlands, and similar to those in other European countries 
participating in the FADN.  
1.7. Methodology and Main Results 
This thesis uses multiple research methodologies. Chapter 2 quantifies the determinants 
of the target capital structure as well as the speed of adjustment to it. Recent literature 
emphasizes the use of dynamic panel techniques, such as the generalized method of moments 
(GMM), due to their robust results compared to other approaches (Roodman, 2009).  Arellano 
and Bond (1991) proposed a Difference General Methods Moment (Difference GMM). In this 
approach, regression equations are expressed in terms of their first difference and endogenous 
variables are instrumented using lags of their own levels. It allows for the specification of the 
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endogenous variables and involves first differencing that removes the time-invariant farm-
specific effects. This approach has limitations, however, as the correlation between the first 
difference and the lagged levels may be weak. To address this limitation, Arellano and Bover 
(1995) developed an improved estimator known as the ‘Level GMM’, which expresses 
regressions in levels and endogenous instruments in terms of their lagged differences. Finally, 
Blundell and Bond (1998) combined both approaches to construct a system of equations known 
as the ‘System GMM’. It combines the sets of moments from the difference and level equations 
into instrument-endogenous variables.  
The System GMM is particularly suitable for this thesis because (Flannery and Hankins, 
2013; Roodman, 2015): (a) it has better asymptotic and finite sample properties; (b) it uses 
difference equations for instrument-endogenous regressors, so that they are also able to handle 
time-invariant, farm-specific attributes, e.g. heterogeneity and endogeneity; and (c) it is well-
suited to handling datasets with large numbers of cross-sections, N, and small numbers of 
available periods, T. Chapter 2 thus specifies an integrated dynamic partial adjustment model 
based on Blundell and Bond's (1998) System-GMM estimation.  
The results from the System-GMM estimation suggest that the signaling behavior in 
the farm-lender relationship fits the pecking order theory in explaining the leverage ratio of 
farm businesses. The most robust findings are that farm leverage is negatively related to profit, 
supporting the pecking order theory. In addition, consistent with the signaling theory, I find 
that farm leverage is positively related to asset tangibility and growth opportunity. All farm 
types use their growth opportunities to effectively send signals to facilitate their access to 
credit. Farm profitability, asset tangibility, risk, growth opportunity, and size significantly 
determine farm capital structure. The speed of adjustment to the target leverage ratio ranges 
from 11.4% to 64% and varies by farm type. This variation is mainly attributed to the difference 
in adjustment costs, and the result further confirms the existence of dynamics in the farm capital 
structure decision. 
Chapter three provides farm-level empirical support for the risk-balancing behavior of 
farmers. In order to examine whether farms exhibit risk-balancing behavior, a fixed-effects 
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panel-regression model is used, where the financial risk is regressed on one-year lagged 
business risk and selected farm characteristics. Estimating the panel fixed-effects regression 
model is econometrically challenging as some of the explanatory variables are potentially 
endogenous. Thus, estimating the parameters with the standard OLS estimator may lead to 
inconsistency and bias (Greene, 2003).  
An instrumental variable approach is a common practice when accounting for 
endogeneity. Consequently, the System-GMM estimation is used as an ‘internal’ instrument 
approach. In addition, a logit panel model is estimated to identify the determinants (drivers) of 
farm risk-balancing behavior. Finally, in chapter three, I explicitly account for latent 
heterogeneity using a latent-class logit mixture model (Pennings and Garcia, 2010; Wedel and 
Kamakura, 2012). Using the iterative Expectation-Maximization (EM) algorithm, the model 
simultaneously identifies segments based on the influence of the selected explanatory variables 
and estimates the effects of these variables on farm risk-balancing behavior for each identified 
segment.  
The results show that over half of the farms exhibited risk-balancing behavior between 
2001 and 2015, implying that farms make strategic adjustments by taking more (less) debt in 
response to a decrease (increase) in business risk. Results from the fixed-effects regression 
show evidence of farm risk-balancing behavior: there is a negative relationship between the 
lagged farm business risk levels and current financial risk. The logit panel regression suggests 
that the extent of risk-balancing behavior differs across farm types and that farm characteristics 
such as farm size, profitability, and participation in government support programs determine 
farm risk-balancing behavior.  
The estimates from the latent mixture regression model suggest the presence of multiple 
segments, and farm profitability, total risk, leverage, age, size, and diversification are the 
factors related to farm risk-balancing behavior. Interestingly, these factors are found not to be 
equally important across farms, i.e., segments. Assuming homogeneity in farms’ responses and 
estimating a pooled model or a priori classifying farms based on farm type yields a poor fit and 
may lead to the false conclusion that only size, profit, subsidy, and investment are the 
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determinants of the likelihood of engaging in farm risk-balancing. The existing heterogeneity 
at segment level appears to have been masked at aggregate farm-type level. These masking 
effects are prominent for the factors that are part of the risk-balancing hypothesis, such as farm 
leverage and total risk exposure. The advantage of expressly accounting for unobserved 
heterogeneity becomes apparent from the presence of different farm types in each segment: 
each of the three identified segments contains dairy, field-crop, horticulture, and livestock 
farms in varying proportions.  
In chapter four, I use a quantile panel regression to estimate the effects of farm 
characteristics at different points of the profitability distribution. Quantile regression estimates 
are considered robust relative to the traditional OLS estimator for a number of reasons: they 
place less weight on outliers, and are robust to departures from normality (Koenker, 2004). In 
addition, they avoid the restrictive assumption that the error terms are identically distributed at 
all points of the conditional distribution. Avoiding this assumption allows these estimates to 
capture farm heterogeneity, in that the slope parameters can vary at different quantiles of the 
distributions of farm profitability. Note that a dynamic panel model has been specified to 
empirically examine the effect of farm characteristics on profit persistence.  
Results from the quantile regression show that working capital, labor productivity and 
investment are associated with profitability, regardless of farm type. These findings suggest 
that, in an environment where farms don’t have regular income from agricultural products, 
working capital is important for them to have the flexibility and capacity to adapt to changing 
circumstances. On the other hand, leverage and capital intensity show negative effects on farm 
profitability, meaning that farms that already exhibit high leverage levels face more cash-flow 
constraints in their operation due to high financing costs. Estimates using the dynamic panel 
model provide strong evidence that there is a significant degree of abnormal profit persistence, 
with variations between farm types. I also find that abnormal profit persistence is responsive 
to farm characteristics such as risk exposure, investment, capital intensity, leverage, working 
capital, and diversification. Evidently, farm working capital has a significant, positive effect 
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on abnormal profitability. The next section briefly discusses the Dutch agriculture sector as the 
research context.  
1.8. Research Context: the Dutch Agriculture Sector 
The Dutch agriculture sector accounts for 1.5% of the country’s economy, 20% of the country's 
total export value, and 2.5% of employment. The Netherlands realizes 8% of total European 
agricultural production on only 1.6% of the cultivated land surface in Europe (CBS, 2017).  
Following the trend in the developed world, the number of farms has been decreasing 
since the 1950s (see figure 1.3).  
 
Figure 1.3: Farm holdings (in thousands) in the Netherlands (1950-2017) 
Source: CBS (2017) 
In 2017, for instance, the Dutch farm sector lost 23 farms every single day (CBS, 2017). 
Between 2000 and 2014, the number of agricultural holdings significantly decreased from 
101,550 to 65,500 farms, representing a 35.5% decline and exceeding the average EU decline. 
The combined effects of economic, political and technological factors were the main causes of 
this decrease (Berkhout and van Bruchem, 2015). Statistics Netherlands (CBS, 2017) reported 
that the value of agricultural production of the Dutch farming sector increased ten-fold between 
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1950 and 2017. Intensification and scaling-up accounted for this strong growth in both 
agricultural output and productivity.  
From a financing perspective, more than two-thirds of the balance sheet total of Dutch 
farms is financed with equity capital (Berkhout, 2017). Until 2007 the long-term liabilities of 
agricultural and horticultural holdings rose faster than their total balance sheet value, leading 
to a decrease in solvency (measured as the ratio of total debt to equity) during that period. After 
2007, average solvency remained reasonably stable at around 68%. From a risk-management 
perspective, it is important for farms to possess an adequate financial buffer to absorb 
fluctuations in income.  
At a macro level, as an EU Member State, the Dutch agriculture sector is also affected 
by the European Common Agricultural Policy (CAP), which was introduced in 1957. The 
European CAP for 2014-2020 was implemented in 2014, with its main goal to achieve a more 
sustainable development of the agricultural sector (Eurostat, 2015). The starting point is to 
make farmers less dependent on subsidy payments, induce them to innovate and increase 
efficiency and competitiveness (European-Commission, 2017).  All in all, Dutch agriculture is 
characterized by highly educated farmers, large-scale capital-intensive farming, export 
orientation, increasing input and output price volatility resulting in low-profit margins, and 
strong competition. These characteristics provide an interesting context for studying the capital 
structure, risk management and profitably of Dutch farm businesses.  
1.9. Contribution 
By empirically examining the dynamics of farm businesses through three independent 
but complementary studies on farm capital structure, risk management, and profitability, this 
thesis contributes to the literature in the following ways:  
First, it examines the applicability of corporate finance capital structure theories, i.e. 
the pecking order and signaling theory, to farming. The results in this dissertation show that 
farm profit and earnings volatility (negative sign), and growth opportunity and asset tangibility 
(positive sign) significantly explain farm capital structure, suggesting that the pecking and 
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signaling theories from corporate finance theory can be applied to farming. The results provide 
a better understanding of the farm financing decision by inferring that: (a) asset tangibility on 
the farm balance sheet significantly decreases the costs of financial distress due to easier 
valuation by lenders, which in turn is beneficial for external financing; (b) internal financing 
alone is insufficient for farms that are faced with many profitable, i.e. growth-enhancing, 
investment opportunities, leading to higher leverage ratios for these farms, (c) more profitable 
farms should prefer internal financing of their investments to achieve a lower leverage ratio 
and thus avoid the cost of financial distress and the risk of bankruptcy due to higher interest 
risk, and (d) more volatile farms should lower their leverage ratios since earnings volatility 
raises the expected costs of financial distress. Increased earnings volatility leads to more 
investment uncertainty among lenders and outside investors due to an increase in information 
asymmetry. The affected farms will suffer from adverse selection as external debt financing 
will force them to allocate a major portion of their retained earnings, if any, to repaying the 
loan, thus increasing the level of farm financial distress. Following the general idea of the 
pecking order theory, retained earnings (internal financing) should be the favored form of 
financing for farms with high earnings volatility. Also note that the results for the determinants 
of farm capital structure do not seem to follow one single theory, while showing variation 
across farm types. In addition, I will present findings in the context of the European agricultural 
policy and market. While extreme price volatility occasionally occurred in world commodity 
markets, the European market was protected by the prevailing Common Agricultural Policy 
(CAP). However, since the year 2000, major policy changes in Europe, such as the CAP 
reforms and trade liberalization, have linked the European agricultural sector to the global 
market. The results provide a better understanding of capital structure in the farming business 
in Europe in general and in the Netherlands in particular.  
Second, the effects of selected farm characteristics on farm risk-balancing behavior 
cannot a priori be assumed equal for all farms. Hence, I explicitly model the effects of 
unobserved heterogeneity using a latent mixture regression model, which classifies farms into 
segments, in which their risk-balancing response to the selected explanatory variables is 
identical within each segment but different across segments. This thesis thus offers a greater 
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understanding of the interdependence of financial and business risks and the implications for 
farms and public policy makers while accounting for unobserved heterogeneity in the decision-
making process. 
Third, the thesis extends the application of the sustained competitive advantage 
framework to the agricultural sector by examining the presence and persistence of long-run 
farm profitability. Investigating the determinants of long-run farm profitability and presence 
of profit persistence provides insights for producers and policy-makers by identifying resources 
to acquire and develop and strategies that producers can use to improve their farm's economic 
viability. The result should also provide interesting insights into how farm performance has 
evolved over time.  
Fourth, the panel structure of the data and the advancement of the dynamic panel 
System General Method of Moments (System-GMM) estimator in recent years allow for the 
disentanglement of the endogeneity issue by explicitly specifying predetermined endogenous 
variables and using their lag structures as valid instruments. Arellano and Bond (1991) 
proposed General Methods Moment (GMM) estimation as ‘internal’ instruments approach. 
This approach allows for the specification of the endogenous variables and involves first 
differencing that removes the time-invariant, farm-specific effects. In addition, the use of a 
dynamic panel model is also crucial as static models fail to capture the dynamics of farm capital 
structure and performance.  
Finally, although the relationships between farm performance, capital structure, and 
risk management have been the focus of academic research in the field of agricultural 
economics and finance, most studies have relied on cross-sectional datasets. However, due to 
the inherently uncertain nature of the agricultural process and the vulnerability of farm business 
to irregularities caused by uncontrollable factors, longitudinal research is believed to be the 
proper way to examine the dynamics of farming. This thesis aims to fill the longitudinal 
information gap by examining a panel of 1500 farms over a 15 year period. In addition, and 
contrary to previous studies that focus on a single farm type, this thesis considers four farm 
types: dairy, livestock, field crop, and horticulture farms. As a result, it analyzes a larger 
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segment of the farm sector and offers a better understanding of the interdependence between 
financial and business risks and capital structure and the implications for farm performance. 
1.10. Thesis Organization 
This thesis is organized into five chapters. The first chapter provides a general 
introduction to the three essays discussed in this dissertation and presented in chapter 2, chapter 
3 and chapter 4, respectively. The three essays are related to the general theme of farm business 
dynamics. These chapters can also stand alone, however, with each topic addressing a different 
component of the general theme. Chapter two analyses the applicability of corporate finance 
theories in farm businesses, the determinants of farm target capital structure decisions, and the 
adjustment speed towards the target capital structure. Chapter three studies the extent and the 
drivers of risk-balancing behavior at farm level by explicitly accounting for unobserved 
heterogeneity. Chapter four examines the existence and drivers of long-run farm profitability 
and abnormal profit persistence (See Figures 1.1 and 1.2). The thesis concludes with final 
remarks in chapter five. There is a summary of the empirical findings, followed by research 
implications, and finally, the chapter summarizes the limitations of the thesis and suggests new 
avenues for future research. 
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Chapter-2 
Dynamic Target Capital Structure 
and Speed of Adjustment in Farm 
Business 
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2. Chapter Two: Dynamic Target Capital 
Structure and Speed of Adjustment in 
Farm Business3 
2.1. Abstract 
This paper quantifies the determinants and speed of adjustment to the target capital 
structure for a panel of 1500 Dutch farms over the years 2001 to 2015. Using the Blundell 
and Bond (1998) System-GMM estimator, the results show that farm profitability, 
earnings volatility, asset tangibility and growth opportunity are important determinants of 
leverage. Leverage is highly persistent, i.e., the average adjustment speed is relatively 
slow, with variations among farm types. This variation is mainly attributed to the 
difference in adjustment costs. Further, we show that the pecking order and signaling 
theories explain these leverage dynamics.  
 
Keywords: Farm business, System-GMM estimator, speed of adjustment, and target 
capital structure. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
3 This chapter is published as Aderajew, T. Trujillo-Barrera, A. and Pennings, J.M.E. 
(2018). Dynamic target capital structure and speed of adjustment in farm business. 
European Review of Agricultural Economics (https://doi.org/10.1093/erae/jby035) 
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2.2. Introduction 
A question often asked in the literature is whether firms set a target capital structure 
and adjust to it regularly. Although research in corporate finance has focused on explaining 
the determinants of target capital structure and speed of adjustment, less attention has been 
paid to understanding the financing behavior of farm businesses. 
The farming business is characterized by a number of specific circumstances, 
including: (1) dependency on government subsidies to stabilize income (Zhengfei and 
Oude Lansink, 2006); (2) the seasonal nature of production, leading to mismatches in cash 
inflow and outflow; (3) different legal forms, whereby sole proprietorship is the 
predominant form, meaning that debt has a larger disciplinary power when running a farm; 
and (4) limited access to equity markets. Further, unlike corporate firms that rely on 
external professional management, farm businesses have a small decision-making unit that 
consists of the owner or family members. These unique characteristics of the farming 
sector lead to different patterns of capital structure decision making.  
The management of the capital structure influences farm performance in terms of 
profit, financial risk, and survival. Changes in a farm’s production structure affect its 
capital structure by either tying up capital when farm production capacity increases or 
freeing up capital when it decreases. Hence, measuring the speed of adjustment is 
important to understanding the agility of farms in adapting to changing production and 
finance structures. Farm financing behavior and capital structure decisions also have an 
important implication for the return and stability of lenders and financial institutions. In 
2016, for example, Rabobank, a popular bank among Dutch farmers with nearly 92.3 
Billion Euro in outstanding loans to agricultural businesses, announced that one-third of 
its dairy farm customers were in financial difficulty (CBS, 2017).  
It is also relevant to examine whether the existing corporate finance theories (e.g., 
pecking order and signaling) account for the relationship between target capital structure 
and the speed of adjustment in the farming business. These theories rely on the assumption 
that a company has two external financing choices: debt and equity. Note that the pecking 
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order theory may not hold in more complex corporate capital structure settings, for 
example when a firm chooses between straight and convertible debts or, in the event of an 
agency problem, between a shareholder and a manager (Zhao, Katchova and Barry, 2004). 
In addition, the presence of many financial tactics and easy access to capital markets make 
the measurement and identification of the signaling effect difficult in a corporate finance 
setting. Farm businesses are less prone to these criticisms and provide an interesting 
background for testing how these corporate finance theories explain capital structure 
decision making because: (1) often, there are two financing options: retained earnings 
(internal) and debt (external), (2) the facts that sole proprietorship is the predominant legal 
form and farms have limited access to the capital market minimize the agency problem,4 
and (3) farms have very few financial tactics, such as leverage and profit, to use as signals, 
which makes identification of the signaling effects easier.  
In this paper, we analyze the determinants of farm target capital structure decisions, 
the adjustment speed towards the target capital structure, and examine whether the pecking 
order and signaling theories help explain farm financing decisions. Few studies have 
attempted to test the applicability of corporate finance theories to agriculture. Using five–
year panel data (1990-1994), Barry, Bierlen and Sotomayor (2000) tested whether internal 
funds are preferred over the use of short and long-term sources of capital (i.e., the 
applicability of the pecking order theory) and examined whether farms adjust their level 
of debt, equity, and leasing towards an optimal structure. Zhao, Barry and Katchova (2008) 
have also shown that farm businesses depend on their size and operation records as 
financing signals, unlike corporate firms who can choose high leverage as a signaling tool 
to facilitate investment. 
Building on previous literature, particularly extending Barry, Bierlen and 
Sotomayor (2000), we aim to contribute to the literature in several ways: We present 
findings in the context of the European policy and market. While extreme price volatility 
                                                 
4 According to Lowder, Skoet and Raney (2016), family farms operate about 75% of the world’s agriculture. 
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occasionally occurred in world commodity markets, the European market was protected 
by the prevailing Common Agricultural Policy (CAP). However, since the year 2000, 
major policy changes in Europe, such as the CAP reforms and trade liberalization, have 
linked the European agricultural sector to the global market.  
We cover the period 2001-2015, which includes the financial crisis of 2007/2008, 
and we consider four farm types: dairy, field crop, horticulture, and livestock farms, to 
provide a better understanding of the farming business in Europe in general and the 
Netherlands in particular. In addition, the period of analysis allows us to examine the 
capital structure decision-making process during the financial crisis and whether the 
theories stand the test of time. The panel structure of our data and the advancement of the 
dynamic panel System General Method of Moments (System-GMM) estimator in recent 
years enable us to disentangle the endogeneity issue by explicitly specifying 
predetermined endogenous variables and using their lag structures as valid instruments.  
Finally, it is worth noting that most of the empirical studies in the literature5 use 
observed leverage as a proxy for optimal leverage and static capital structure models 
(Fama and French, 2002; Iliev and Welch, 2010). Using observed leverage instead of 
optimal leverage is problematic due to the presence of adjustment costs. Static capital 
structure models cannot capture the dynamic adjustments in leverage ratios (Graham, 
Leary and Roberts, 2015). Hence, to account for dynamics and adjustment cost in the 
capital structure, we use a dynamic partial adjustment model.  
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows: The next section provides a 
theoretical review and conceptual framework; Section 3 motivates and explains the 
empirical strategy, followed by a description of the variables and data used; Section 4 
reports our main empirical results, and Section 5 concludes.  
                                                 
5 For a detailed review of the literature, please see Graham and Leary (2011). 
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2.3. Theoretical Background  
2.3.1. Theories of Capital Structure and the Farm Sector 
Different theories6 have been used in corporate finance literature to explain firms’ 
capital structure decisions, including the pecking order theory (Myers, 1984; Myers and 
Majluf, 1984), signaling theory (Ross, 1977), trade-off theory (Miller, 1977), agency 
theory (Jensen and Meckling, 1976), and market-timing theory (Baker and Wurgler, 2002). 
Corporate businesses are the focus of the literature; however, farm businesses are 
fundamentally different from corporations, which results in different decision-making 
patterns. Hence, few of these theories can be applied directly in an agricultural setting. In 
this paper, we focus on the pecking order and signaling theories.  
The pecking order theory entails that firms have two sources of funding: internal 
and external. The cost gap between internal and external funds, attributed to asymmetric 
information and agency costs, makes firms prefer internal to external financing (Frank and 
Goyal, 2009). Whenever external funding is required, firms will issue debt and convertible 
bonds before issuing equity. Meanwhile, the signaling theory states that managers have 
better information about their firm and a motive to transfer this information to potential 
investors and lenders using signals. These signals include, but are not limited to, 
investment, profitability, leverage, asset accumulation, and repurchasing of outstanding 
stocks (Graham, Leary and Roberts, 2015). 
Studies on the applicability of these theories in explaining the financing behavior 
of farm businesses are scant. Barry, Bierlen and Sotomayor (2000) studied the financial 
structure of farm businesses under imperfect capital markets. They find support for the 
pecking order theory and report a strong relationship between cash flow and farm debt, 
whereby a strong cash flow leads crop farms to increase investments, pay off debts, and 
refrain from additional borrowing. A weak cash flow, on the other hand, is related to lower 
                                                 
6 For a thorough review of theories on capital structure, please see (Graham, Leary and Roberts, 2015). 
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investments and higher borrowing. Zhao, Katchova and Barry (2004) also examined the 
applicability of capital structure theories to the farming business. Using cross-sectional 
time-series data from the Illinois Farm Business Farm Management (FBFM), they have 
shown that farm businesses rely on their size and operation records as financing signals, 
unlike corporate firms, which can choose high leverage as a signaling tool to facilitate 
investment.  
 Studies in the literature are often cross sectional (Escalante and Barry, 2003; 
Featherstone et al., 2005; Nurmet, 2011). While cross-section studies are appropriate 
during periods of stable financial conditions, evidence on the stability of leverage is 
inconclusive (DeAngelo and Roll, 2015; Lemmon, Roberts and Zender, 2008) and remains 
largely an empirical question. Further, cross-section studies fail to capture the effects of 
the business cycle and time-varying farm characteristics on leverage. Farm growth 
opportunity, for example, is an important leverage determinant, capturing the information 
asymmetry in the lender-borrower relationship (Zhao, Barry and Katchova, 2008). Growth 
opportunities are known to vary over the years due to changes in the business cycle and 
even differences across farm types. In addition, an optimal capital structure decision is a 
long-term concept with a long-run impact on the survival and success of agricultural firms. 
As a result, empirical studies using a longitudinal research design are preferred. 
2.3.2. Determinants of Farm Businesses’ Capital Structure 
Farm capital structure, defined as the way in which a farm finances its investment 
through some combination of debt and equity, has been extensively studied over the years. 
Since farm businesses have limited access to equity markets, leverage is often used as a 
proxy for farm capital structure. The literature on the determinants of the leverage 
decisions of farm businesses is wide ranging. Major factors include ownership (Zhengfei 
and Oude Lansink, 2006), profitability, financing costs (Zhao, Katchova and Barry, 2004), 
asset tangibility, economies of scale, wealth, risk attitude, adjustment costs (Barry, Bierlen 
and Sotomayor, 2000), farm risk-management strategies (Katchova, 2005), credit 
constraints, and government payments (Featherstone et al., 2005). Building on the pecking 
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order and signaling theories and on previous literature, we include the following 
determinants: 
Farm profitability: According to the pecking order theory, farms prefer financing 
new investments out of retained earnings rather than through borrowing; they only issue 
debt when retained earnings are insufficient (Frank and Goyal, 2009; Graham, Leary and 
Roberts, 2015). The more profitable the farm, the greater the availability of internal capital 
should be. Therefore, we expect a negative relationship between profitability and leverage. 
On the other hand, the signaling theory suggests a positive relationship, since lenders are 
more willing to lend to profitable farms (Featherstone et al., 2005; Zhao, Barry and 
Katchova, 2008).  
Asset tangibility: Due to the high vulnerability of the agricultural sector to 
systematic and unsystematic risks, lenders prefer farms with assets as collateral to back up 
their loans. Tangible fixed assets are pledgeable and easier to liquidate in case of 
bankruptcy, thereby reducing the cost of financial distress (Chang and Dasgupta, 2009; 
Halling, Yu and Zechner, 2016). Also, farms with more tangible assets are more 
recognizable to lenders, leading to less information asymmetry (Getzmann, Lang and 
Spremann, 2010; Graham and Leary, 2011; Titman and Wessels, 1988). Both the pecking 
order and signaling theories support a positive relationship between tangibility and 
leverage.  
Farm size: Larger farms are more diversified businesses, which lowers the 
probability of bankruptcy (Flannery and Rangan, 2006; Heshmati, 2001). Size may also 
be an indicator of a farm’s bargaining power (Graham, Leary and Roberts, 2015) and is 
considered to be positively correlated to leverage. This relationship lends support to the 
argument by Frank and Goyal (2009) and Getzmann, Lang and Spremann (2010) that 
larger farms are easily noticeable, in that lenders have more information about them, and 
thus have easier access to loans.  
Growth opportunities: Farms attempt to signal their positive expectations on 
investment through high leverage (Zhao, Barry and Katchova, 2008). Lenders provide 
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loans based on these signals. This would lead to a positive relationship between growth 
opportunity and leverage. The pecking order theory, however, suggests that firms rely on 
retained earnings rather than debt to finance investments (Frank and Goyal, 2007; Graham, 
Leary and Roberts, 2015). This would imply a negative relationship between farm growth 
opportunity and leverage.  
Risk: A higher variability of earnings increases the risk that farms will be unable 
to fulfil their interest and principal payment obligations (Barry, Bierlen and Sotomayor, 
2000; de Mey et al., 2016). This implies the existence of a negative relationship between 
leverage and income variability. The signaling theory based on information asymmetry 
and adverse selection arguments, on the other hand, suggests a positive relationship 
between leverage and risk, i.e. volatility of earnings, stressing that firms with high income 
volatility and operational risk tend to be the ones that apply for loans (Flannery and 
Rangan, 2006; Halling, Yu and Zechner, 2016; Hang et al., 2017). Table 1 summarizes 
the determinants of target capital structure and the expected relationship based on the 
pecking order and signaling theories. 
Table 2.1: Expected relationships between the determinants of target capital 
structure and leverage 
 
Determinant Pecking order theory Signaling theory 
1 
Farm Profit  - + 
2 
Asset Tangibility  + + 
3 
Farm size  + + 
4 
Growth (Investment) Opportunity  - + 
5 
Risk (Earnings Volatility)  - + 
Macroeconomic factors: there is evidence of the impact of farm-specific factors on 
capital-structure decisions. Often ignored and less investigated are the possible 
implications of macroeconomic factors for the target farm’s decision making on capital 
structure (Korajczyk and Levy, 2003). The recent financial crisis of 2008 and the sharp 
economic recession following the crisis have sparked substantial interest in the link 
between macroeconomic conditions and financial structure (Halling, Yu and Zechner, 
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2016). A literature review reveals that inflation, government debt relative to GDP (Debt-
to-GDP) and employment level in the industry have a significant impact on capital 
structure7(Frank and Goyal, 2009). Accordingly, we have included these variables in our 
model. 
2.3.3. Target Capital Structure and Speed of Adjustment 
In a perfect market, the cost of adjustment would be zero, and adjustment to the 
target capital structure would be instantaneous (Faulkender et al., 2012; Flannery and 
Hankins, 2013). The presence of market imperfections, however, such as transaction costs 
and information asymmetry, causes firms to temporarily deviate from their optimal target 
leverage (Hüttel, Mußhoff and Odening, 2010).  
Frank and Goyal (2007) provided the framework of the target adjustment 
hypothesis, where the adjustment speed towards the target capital structure depends on 
two costs: adjustment costs to the target and costs of deviating from the target. When 
adjustment costs are high, the adjustment speed to the target will be slow. Meanwhile, 
when the costs of deviating from the target are high, the adjustment speed will be faster 
(Fischer, Heinkel and Zechner, 1989; Flannery and Rangan, 2006). The incentive to reduce 
leverage is greater than that to increase leverage, implying an asymmetry in target 
adjustment, whereby firms would adjust downward faster than upward (Faulkender et al., 
2012). 
Fama and French (2002) estimated the target leverage adjustment and found that 
firms tend to adjust to their target slowly. On average, firms close about 15% of the gap 
between the actual and target leverage yearly. Conversely, Flannery and Rangan (2006) 
                                                 
7 Note that the policy of the European Commission under the CAP may influence the capital structure of 
farm businesses in Europe. For example, Jongeneel et al. (2010) analyzed the impact of a ‘soft landing’ 
scenario, quota enlargement, free trade agreements and environmental legislation on the overall structural 
change and financial performance of the Dutch Dairy sector. Their simulation results show that milk 
production is expected to increase by 11% after the soft landing and the abolition of the milk quota and that 
integration into the world market may result in an 8% decline in the milk price. 
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reported a much faster speed of adjustment, with an annual reduction of one-third of the 
difference between the actual and target leverage. They argued that the slower rate reported 
by previous studies was mainly attributable to the noise in the strategy to estimate the 
target leverage. Drobetz, Schilling and Schröder (2015) also found a speed of adjustment 
of about 25% per year, supporting the economic relevance of dynamics in the capital 
structure decision. The literature is still inconclusive as to the measurement of annual 
adjustment speed rates (Graham and Leary, 2011). The measures are usually expressed in 
terms of the time needed to return to the target capital structure after a shock. 
2.4. Research Design 
2.4.1. Dynamic Partial Adjustment Model 
Let the leverage8 of farm 𝑖 in period 𝑡, denoted as 𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖𝑡, be a function of 
farm-specific(𝑋𝑖𝑡), macroeconomic (𝑍𝑡), and time-specific determinants represented by 
time dummies (Γt) : 
Leverageit =  𝑓(𝑋𝑖𝑡, 𝑍𝑡, 𝛤𝑡)                                                                                                      [2.1]  
In a frictionless economy, the observed leverage of farm i at time t, 𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖𝑡, 
should be the target leverage, Leverage∗
it
 (𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖𝑡 = 𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒
∗
𝑖𝑡
). However, 
Titman and Wessels (1988) and Fischer, Heinkel and Zechner (1989) show that transaction 
costs are important determinants of a capital structure decision. Even after an active capital 
structure adjustment, the presence of convex or proportional transaction costs makes 
reaching the target leverage impossible or suboptimal (Halling, Yu and Zechner, 2016). 
Adjustment to the target occurs gradually over time, depending on the trade-off between 
                                                 
8 We calculated leverage as total farm debt divided by total assets. We opt to use the ratio variable because 
it makes comparing farm leverage between farm types easier. Also, dividing total farm debt by the total 
assets, allows us to eliminate the differences in farm size. To obtain a more accurate reflection of farm total 
assets, we take the average total asset as a denominator, i.e. the average of the opening total assets at the 
beginning of the accounting period and closing total assets at the end of the accounting period. 
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not operating at target leverage and the costs of adjustment towards the target (Leary and 
Roberts, 2005). This trade-off suggests that farms adjust their current leverage with a 
certain speed of adjustment, λ to attain the desired target leverage, expressed as:  
𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖𝑡−𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖𝑡−1 = λ(𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒
∗
𝑖𝑡
−𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖𝑡−1)                                    [2.2] 
𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖𝑡−1 is a lagged leverage variable, included to construct a dynamic 
specification that allows for the potential effect of the autoregressive (AR) process and 
adjustment costs (Byoun, 2008), λit represents the rate of convergence of 𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖𝑡 to 
𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒∗
𝑖𝑡
 or the magnitude of the adjustments between two subsequent periods. Hence, 
the change in leverage depends on the speed of adjustment and the distance between lagged 
leverage (𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖𝑡−1) and target leverage (𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒
∗
𝑖𝑡
).  
The existence of adjustment costs is represented by the restriction that |λ| <1, 
which is the condition that 𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖𝑡 converges to 𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒
∗
𝑖𝑡
 as 𝑡 → ∞. A |λ| = 1, 
indicates an immediate and full correction of deviations from the target farm leverage in 
one period. The case of λ < 1 implies that the farm does not fully adjust from period 𝑡 − 1 
to 𝑡. If λ > 1, the farm adjusts more than required and is still not at its target leverage level. 
Finally, a λ = 0 shows the absence of adjustment, i.e. the random leverage hypothesis.  
In the absence of adjustment costs, the inferred relationship will suffer from 
specification error if the observed farm leverage is regressed on the determinants of target 
capital structure alone (Heshmati, 2001). In order to avoid a misspecification error, 
equation (2.2) can be rewritten as: 
 𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖𝑡 = (1 − λ)𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖𝑡−1 + λ𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖𝑡
∗ + 𝜀𝑖𝑡                                            [2.3]  
Rewriting equation (2.3) and substituting equation (2.1) results in the following 
relationship for farm leverage at time 𝑡:  
Leverageit = (1 − λ)Leverageit−1 + λ(∑𝛽jXit +
jmn
𝛾𝑚Zit + Δn Γ𝑡) + εit                  [2.4] 
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Farm leverage is modelled as a linear combination of farm-specific, 
macroeconomic, and year-specific factors. Including this relation, multiplying out, 
rearranging, and simplifying equation (2.4), we specify equation (2.5)9, which is the 
integrated dynamic partial adjustment model10 and the basis of our empirical investigation: 
 Leverageit = α + (1 − λ)Leverageit−1 + β1Tangibilityit + β2Sizeit
+ β3Profitabilityit  + β4Growthit + β5Riskit + γ6Debt − to − GDPt
+ γ7Inflationt + γ8Employmentt + Γt + εit                                          [2.5]  
Where, the variables in equation (2.5) were defined in section 2.2, εit is the error 
term, which consists of individual effect (μi) and disturbance (νit), while β γ, Γ, and α are 
parameters to be estimated.  
When estimating equation (2.5) with a short time-series panel, we have a dynamic 
panel bias or “Nickell bias” (Nickell, 1981) where the coefficient of the lagged dependent 
variable is biased towards zero11. In addition, in equation (2.5), we suspect that some of 
                                                 
9 In this paper, we assume the speed of adjustment to be constant over time. To allow the speed of adjustment 
to vary over time, one can specify it as a function of farm characteristics. Doing so, however, has two major 
implications for the dynamics of leverage and statistical inference (Flannery and Rangan, 2006). Firstly, if 
not restricted to a constant speed, the adjustment parameter may be positive in one period (a farm adjusts its 
leverage away from the target), negative in the next (a farm adjusts its leverage towards the target), and zero 
in another (a farm ignores the target).This behavior is inconsistent with the assumptions that farms make 
financing decisions according to the pecking order and signaling theories outlined in the introduction section. 
Secondly, allowing the speed of adjustment to vary over time complicates the statistical inference. The 
parameter is highly sensitive to whether or not the process is stationary, and requires mean reversion tests. 
Since one has to specify the period in which mean reversion is being tested, and the adjustment parameter is 
unique for each farm and time period, in that we only observed it only once in one year for each farm, any 
mean reversion test will have little power. Hence, we assume a constant speed of adjustment.  
10 A similar model is used by Banerjee, Heshmati and Wihlborg (1999) to test the dynamics of capital 
structure in panels of U.K. and US companies. Getzmann, Lang and Spremann (2010) also used the earlier 
version of the model to investigate the determinants of the target capital structure and adjustment speed in 
Asian capital markets. See Chang and Dasgupta (2009) and Iliev and Welch (2010) for a discussion of the 
partial adjustment model. 
11 Nickell (1981) shows that the demeaning process which subtracts the individual’s mean value of 𝑦 and 
each 𝑋 from the respective variable creates a correlation between the regressor and error term. The mean of 
the lagged dependent variable contains observations 0 through (𝑇 − 1) on 𝑦, and the mean error, which is 
being subtracted from each, 𝜀𝑖𝑡 contains contemporaneous values of 𝜀 for 𝑡 = 1… . 𝑇. The resulting 
correlation creates a bias in the estimate of the coefficient of the lagged dependent variable.  
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the explanatory variables are potentially endogenous12. One solution to this problem 
involves taking first differences of the original model. 
Arellano and Bond (1991) proposed a Difference General Methods Moment 
(Difference GMM) in which regression equations are expressed in terms of their first 
difference and endogenous variables are instrumented using lags of their own levels. It 
allows specifying the endogenous variables and involves first differencing that removes 
the time-invariant farm-specific effects. 
This approach has limitations, however, as the lagged levels may be weakly 
correlated with first differences. Notably, this bias is not eliminated by using fixed-effects 
estimators since the regressors and the error term continue to be correlated after such a 
transformation. This is particularly the case when the lagged levels used as instruments 
are highly persistent (Bun and Windmeijer, 2010 and Roodman, 2015). 
To address this limitation, Arellano and Bover (1995) developed an improved 
estimator known as the ‘Level GMM’, in which regressions are expressed in levels and 
endogenous instruments in terms of their lagged differences. Finally, Blundell and Bond 
(1998) combined both approaches to construct a system of equations known as the ‘System 
                                                 
 
12 While this paper deals with the effect of profitability on a farm’s capital structure, a farm’s choice of 
capital structure may, conversely, also affect its profitability. Both directions of causality are thus possible: 
increased leverage can positively or negatively affect farm profitability, but leverage can also be affected by 
profitability. On the one hand, highly leveraged farms may suffer from financial distress, face conflicts of 
interest between the owners and creditors and incur bankruptcy cost, thus decreasing their profitability. On 
the other hand, the impact of profitability on leverage is described by the pecking order and signaling 
theories, each providing a different explanation. The pecking order theory hypothesizes that higher 
profitability results in higher retained earnings and that farms prefer to use these retained earnings to finance 
their investments rather than issue debt. As such, this theory suggests a negative relationship between profit 
and leverage. The signaling theory, however, holds that higher profitability often reduces the bankruptcy 
cost of a farm. In addition, farms that perform well can usually project higher expected returns. Both these 
relationships send a positive signal and lenders are more willing to provide loans to more profitable farms. 
Contrary to the pecking order theory, the signaling theory thus suggests a positive relationship between profit 
and leverage.  
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GMM’. It combines the sets of moments from the difference and level equations into 
instrument-endogenous variables. 
The System GMM is particularly suitable for this study because: (a) it has better 
asymptotic and finite sample properties than the Difference GMM; (b) it uses difference 
equations for instrument endogenous regressors, so that they are also able to handle time-
invariant farm-specific attributes, e.g. heterogeneity and endogeneity; and (c) it is well-
suited to datasets with large numbers of cross-sections, N, and small numbers of available 
periods, T.  
Nevertheless, the System GMM estimator has limitations too. It requires 
orthogonality between the lagged levels of the variables used as instruments and the 
differences of the error terms and, simultaneously, orthogonality between farm-specific 
effects and the lagged difference of the variables used as instruments. Hence, a 
specification test on over-identifying restrictions is required to check the validity of the 
additional instruments (Flannery and Hankins, 2013; Roodman, 2015). 
2.5. Data and Descriptive Statistics 
This paper has benefited from a unique longitudinal data set of Dutch farms that 
have been participating in the Farm Accountancy Data Network (FADN). After the USA, 
the Netherlands is the second largest exporter of agricultural products (Berkhout, 2017). 
The Dutch agriculture sector accounts for 2% of the country’s economy, 20% of the 
country's total export value, and 2.5% of employment. It is further characterized by highly 
educated farmers, large-scale and capital-intensive farming, export orientation, increasing 
input and output-price volatility, and an orientation towards sustainability (Berkhout and 
van Bruchem, 2015; van der Meer, van der Veen and Vrolijk, 2013). 
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The Dutch FADN samples are randomly selected using the disproportional 
stratified random sampling13 technique from the farm census. Economic size and farm type 
are the stratification criteria used to select farms. The data we use in this paper are unique 
in that: (a) they constitute the sole source of farm-level (microeconomic) data across more 
than fifteen years; (b) the samples are representative of 80% of the farms and more than 
90% of production in the Netherlands; and (c) they allow for separate estimation of farm 
types for comparison purposes thanks to the harmonized data-collection procedure14. The 
World Bank provided us with the macroeconomic data on inflation, government debt-to-
GDP ratio and employment in the industry. 
The panel is unbalanced and covers the period from 2001 - 2015. We use the 
following filters for including a farm in the analysis: first, a farm must have a non-zero 
debt, as farm target leverage and adjustment will not occur without liabilities. Second, 
given the problem with calculating the coefficient of variation, farm observations with a 
negative ROA are excluded. Third, given the lag structure of our model, farms need to 
remain in the sample for at least four years. Finally, to address outlier concerns, extreme 
values in the dataset are dealt with by dropping the top and bottom 0.5% observations of 
the variable from the analysis. These criteria reduced the total number of farms included 
in this study to 1,339, i.e. 89 percent of the original number. Table 2.2 presents the 
definitions of the variables used in the empirical analysis and summary statistics of Dutch 
farms.
                                                 
13 Stratified random sampling implies that the whole farm population is divided into groups (strata). 
Subsequently, farms are selected from each of the groups. This ensures the inclusion of farms from all groups 
with different characteristics. Disproportional sampling means that not all farms have the same chance of 
being included in the sample. Farms in relatively homogenous groups have smaller chances as a limited 
number of observations would be sufficient to draw a reliable conclusion. The chance of being included is 
higher for farms in less homogenous groups, which allows for the proper representation of all groups. For 
details of the Dutch FADN sampling procedure, we refer to van der Meer, van der Veen and Vrolijk (2013). 
 
14 The bookkeeping principles and sample selection plans are identical for all farm types in the Netherlands 
and similar to those of other European countries participating in the FADN. 
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Table 2.2: Variables and summary statistics of Dutch farms, 2001-2015 
Variable Explanation Obs. Mean Median SD 
Leverage The total debt to total assets ratio16 15,682 0.363 0.322 0.289 
Dairy Farms  4,101 0.274 0.267 0.163 
Field Crop  2,695 0.253 0.221 0.204 
Horticulture  5,136 0.457 0.413 0.375 
Livestock  3,750 0.414 0.408 0.259 
Asset Tangibility The fixed asset to total assets ratio 15,682 0.709 0.740 0.172 
Farm Size The natural log of total assets 15,682 14.567 14.591 0.847 
Profit (ROA) 
 
Ratio of net farm income17 to total 
assets  
15,682 0.025 0.021 0.091 
Growth Opportunity The total investment to total assets ratio 15,682 0.043 0.017 0.078 
Earnings Volatility The standard deviation of ROA 14,076 0.0423 0.0197 0.0713 
Debt-to-GDP Government debt to GDP percentage 15,682 56.300 55.10 10.294 
Inflation Inflation percentage 15,682 1.884 1.70  0.874 
Employment18 Employment ratio in the industry 15,682 2.490 2.50 0.369 
We note that the average farm leverage ratio for all farms is 36.3% over the 
2001–15 period. The average leverage for dairy, field crop, horticulture, and livestock 
farms is 27.4%, 25.3%, 45.7%, and 41.4% respectively, with horticulture scoring the 
highest. Farms earn a 2.53% profit on average. Figure 2.1 shows the variation in 
leverage over the years across the four farm types19.  
General observation reveals that the average leverage ratio for dairy and 
livestock farms shows a gradual increase over the years. The increased borrowing 
among Dutch dairy farms may be due to the heavy investments required to comply with 
                                                 
16Depreciation and changes in market value have been taken into consideration in calculating the value 
of assets.  
17 We calculate Net Farm Income (NFI) using the FADN principle as Net Farm Income=Operating 
Receipts -Intermediate Costs- Depreciation+ Balance of Subsidies and Tax-Wages-Rent. Note that in the 
profit variable, the interest payment is added back to the NFI calculation to account for differences in 
farm capital structure.  
18 Employment is the ratio of employment in the agricultural sector relative to employment in all other 
industries in the Netherlands for each year. 
19 We followed the Dutch FADN sampling principle to categorize farms into four types. For a detailed 
explanation of farm categorization, we refer to van der Meer, van der Veen and Vrolijk (2013). 
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obligatory manure processing in 2014 and the scale increases prior to the abolition of 
the milk quotas on 1 April, 2015 (Jongeneel et al., 2010). The farm leverage ratio of 
horticulture farms reached its peak in 2011 and 2012, when the cold spring weather 
sparked the need for extra cash to cover the higher energy bills (Berkhout and van 
Bruchem, 2015). 
 
Figure 2.1: Farm leverage by farm type, 2001-2015 
Interestingly, the increasing trend in the leverage ratios of dairy and livestock 
farms supports the notion that neither the changes in farm-specific characteristics nor 
the relationship between these characteristics and leverage alone are able to explain the 
increase. A change in major macroeconomic and financial policies is also relevant in 
explaining the existing capital structure, as well as the observed shifts in leverage ratio 
over the years (Graham, Leary and Roberts, 2015). Figure 2.2 shows the variation in 
profitability over the years across the four farm types. 
Note that horticulture farms exhibited a relatively stable growth in profitability 
compared to other farm types since the year 2011. This is largely attributed to poor 
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production figures in Southern Europe during the summer months after the financial 
crisis (Berkhout and van Bruchem, 2015). The increase in the profit levels of 
horticulture farms asserts the economic significance of the profit variable on leverage 
ratio. The next section presents the empirical results. 
 
Figure 2.2: Farm profitability by farm type, 2001-2015 
2.6. Results 
We start by establishing stylized facts about the determinants of farm target 
leverage. Most importantly, however, we address the question whether or not the 
pecking order and signaling theories of corporate finance can explain the financing 
behavior of farm businesses. In the next step, we analyze the dynamics of farm leverage 
and the speed of adjustment to the target. The last section summarizes the results from 
splitting our sample according to size, growth opportunities, and year.  
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2.6.1. Determinants of Target Capital Structure 
Table 2.3 shows estimates of the System GMM based on the empirical model 
discussed in Section 2.4.1. The Sargan test of over-identifying restrictions suggests that 
the instruments used in the System GMM are valid.  
Table 2.3: Dynamic Panel model estimation result (Dependent Variable: 
Leverageit) 
Variables  Dairy  Field 
Crops 
Horticulture Livestock 
Leverage t-1  0.8688***  0.8262***  0.3597***  0.8862***  
(0.0137) (0.0184) (0.0144) (0.0110)  
Profit  0.2187*** -0.4724*** -1.6320*** -0.8748*** 
 
(0.0655) (0.0626) (0.0625) (0.0469)  
Tangibility  0.09545*** -0.02789 -0.1387** -0.03510  
 
(0.0150) (0.0359) (0.0515) (0.0236)  
Size  0.03426*** -0.01504  0.006263 0.04842*** 
 
(0.0063) (0.0072) (0.0134) (0.0089)  
Growth  0.3825***  0.3470***  0.1911*** 0.3868*** 
 
(0.0153) (0.0178) (0.0357) (0.0208)  
Risk  0.00641 -0.00831** -0.0079*** -0.0426**  
 
(0.0961) (0.0631) (0.0850) (0.0454)  
Debt-to-GDP  0.0001773  0.000030  0.006117***  0.00063**  
 
(0.0001) (0.0002) (0.0005) (0.0002)  
Inflation -0.0083*** -0.0009796  0.003652  0.01960*** 
 
(0.0011) (0.0016) (0.0037) (0.0017)  
Employment  0.01146** -0.001333  0.07799***  0.03152*** 
 
(0.0042) (0.0057) (0.0129) (0.0064)  
-cons  0.4516***  0.2833** -0.1635 -0.7688*** 
 
(0.0900) (0.0980) (0.1997) (0.1323)  
Year Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 Wald χ²(9)=9569.28            P-value = 0.0000 
  Sargan Testχ²(206)=219.3  P-value = 0.2701 
  AR(1) Z=-7.8711                P-value = 0.0000 
  AR(2) Z=-1.5186                P-value = 0.1419 
Notes: Numbers in parentheses are robust standard errors, and *** and ** are significant 
at the 1% and 5% levels respectively. The dummy reference level is the year 2001. 
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The Wald test is significant at the 1% level for all farm types, ensuring the significance 
of the right-hand-side variables. The AR (2) test implies that there is no serial 
correlation. These results indicate that the key identifying assumptions required for the 
System-GMM estimator are satisfied.  
Results in Table 2.3 show a significant and negative relationship between farm 
profit and leverage for all farm types except dairy farms. These results lend support to 
the applicability of the pecking order theory, in that other factors remain constant, the 
high profit earned by farms reduces the need for external funding, and hence more 
profitable farms should be less leveraged over time. Similar results were reported by 
Barry, Bierlen and Sotomayor (2000), Zhao, Katchova and Barry (2004) and Frank and 
Goyal (2003). Nevertheless, the estimates show a positive and significant relationship 
for dairy farms.  
Dutch dairy farms are the most regulated farm type and are subject to frequent 
policy changes, such as obligatory manure processing and the abolition of the milk 
quota system (Boere et al., 2015; Jongeneel et al., 2010; Samson, Gardebroek and 
Jongeneel, 2017). These regulations and policy changes may increase the need for cash, 
either to comply with the regulations or to expand to meet the expected increase in milk 
demand after the abolition of the quota. There is a marked difference in the size of the 
coefficients of profitability, implying different degrees of economic significance of 
profitability on farm leverage. The negative coefficient, in absolute terms, is the largest 
for horticulture farms, followed by livestock farms.  
The estimated relationship between asset tangibility and leverage is significant 
and positive for dairy farms. This is consistent with signaling theory, which holds that 
tangible assets are more valuable to creditors, should farms go into liquidation. The 
result also supports the importance of tangible assets as collateral for debt financing in 
the agriculture business. The structure of the Dutch dairy sector has changed 
significantly in recent years. Compared to the year 2000, the total number of farms had 
decreased by 29% to 16,500 in 2016, while average farm size had increased by 47% to 
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56 ha (CBS, 2017). This structural change, combined with the increase in land value 
over the years, sends a positive signal to lenders. These findings are also consistent with 
the existence of a supply effect, whereby lenders might put more emphasis on asset 
tangibility in loan approval when loan requests are high. Also, larger farms are known 
to be less exposed to bankruptcy risk and hence are likely to receive more loans from 
lenders (Frank and Goyal, 2007). Consistent with this argument, farm leverage is 
positively related to size for horticulture and livestock farms.  
The significant and positive relationship between growth (investment) 
opportunity and leverage for all farm types provides further evidence of the 
applicability of the signaling theory. The theory suggests that farms with more 
investment or growth opportunities borrow more over time. Farms with substantial 
growth rates can afford more financial leverage since they can generate enough 
earnings to offset the additional interest expenses. Similar findings were reported by 
Barry, Bierlen and Sotomayor (2000).  
The estimated relationship between risk (earnings volatility) and leverage is 
significant and negative for all farms but dairy farms. This result provides evidence of 
the applicability of the pecking order theory, which assumes that the probability of 
financial distress increases and a farm’s debt repayment capacity decreases with rising 
earnings volatility, resulting in a negative relationship between leverage and risk. 
Compared to the farm-specific effects, the macroeconomic factors have a less 
economically significant effect on the capital structure decision. The government debt-
to- GDP ratio has a significant and positive effect on leverage for horticulture and 
livestock farms. Mixed results are found regarding the relationship between inflation 
and farm leverage ratio. The positive and significant coefficient estimates for 
horticulture and livestock farms are consistent with the fact that inflation makes the real 
cost of borrowing cheaper, thereby encouraging farms to issue more debt. Lastly, we 
find a significant coefficient showing a positive relationship between employment in 
the industry and farm leverage for dairy, horticulture, and livestock farms. Table 2.4 
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summarizes the results as to which theory better explains the capital structure decision-
making pattern of each of the farm types.  
Table 2.4: Farm capital structure and the pecking order and Signaling theories 
  Determinants20 Dairy Farms  Field Crop Horticulture  Livestock 
1 Farm Profit  + ST) -(PO) -(PO) - (PO) 
2 Asset Tangibility  +(ST and PO)  NS  NS  NS 
3 Farm size  +(PO and ST)  NS  NS +(PO and ST) 
4 Growth Opportunity  +(ST) +(ST) +(ST) +(ST) 
  Risk   NS -(PO) -(PO) -(PO) 
Notes: PO, ST, and NS stand for Pecking Order theory, Signaling theory, and Not Supported, 
respectively 
2.6.2. Adjustment Speed 
The first row of Table 2.3 reports the estimated coefficients of the lagged 
leverage, which are significant and positive at the 1% level for all farm types. The 
results are consistent with the findings reported by Frank and Goyal (2009). The 
coefficients are between zero and one, implying that farm leverage ratio converges to 
the target level over time. This also confirms the presence of dynamics in the farm 
capital structure decision. 
We infer from the estimated lagged leverage coefficient values of 0.8688, 
0.8262, 0.3597, and 0.8862, for dairy, field crop, horticulture, and livestock farms, 
respectively, that farms adjust leverage towards the target. The adjustment speed is 
                                                 
20 Please note that we are not defining the signaling and pecking order theories as the opposite signs for 
each variable in Table 2.4. These theories may, nevertheless, provide alternative explanations for the 
impact of the same variable on farm leverage. When considering farm profitability, for instance, the 
signaling theory holds that farm profit sends a positive signal to lenders to provide more loans. This 
would lead to a positive relationship between profitability and leverage, which is indeed the case for the 
dairy farms in our study (see Table 2.3). The pecking order theory, on the other hand, suggests that higher 
profit is associated with less borrowing because high profits reduce the need for external funding, in that 
farms rely on retained earnings rather than debt to finance investments. This would imply a negative 
relationship between farm profitability and leverage, which is indeed the case for field crop, horticulture, 
and livestock farms. In these cases, the theories offer opposing explanations of the same variable. We 
only seek to examine which theory better captures the existing capital structures of the four farm types 
considered. 
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13.12 % (1 − 𝜆) per year for dairy farms, 17.38% for field crop farms, 64.03% for 
horticulture farms, and 11.38% for livestock farms.  
This speed of adjustment corresponds to a half-life21 of leverage shocks of about 
4.9, 3.6, 0.67, and 5.7 years for dairy, filed crops, horticulture and livestock farms, 
respectively. Compared to findings in other industries, the adjustment speed of Dutch 
farms is slow, with the exception of horticulture farms. Frank and Goyal (2003), for 
instance, report an adjustment speed of around 25% for US publicly - listed companies. 
The slow adjustment to the target leverage is mainly attributed to high 
adjustment costs. Two factors might explain the high adjustment costs of Dutch farm 
businesses. First, it is not easy for farm businesses to gain access to loans. There are 
only a few financial institutions in the Netherlands that specialize in agricultural 
financing (CBS, 2017). Second, compared to corporations, farm businesses are small 
and medium in size. Hence there is an adverse selection issue as a result of information 
asymmetry, which makes adjustments costly. The high adjustment speed of horticulture 
farms could indicate the ease with which horticulture farms have been able to acquire 
financing through debt and lower the adjustment cost.  
All in all, the less significant impact of macroeconomic factors, both in sign and 
magnitude, suggests that farm-specific factors are the core determinants of the target 
capital structure decision. We perform a separate analysis excluding the 
macroeconomic factors to further substantiate our conclusion. The result is reported in 
Table 2.6 of the Appendix section. We found that size has a negative and significant 
relationship with leverage, suggesting that larger farms are able to retain their profit 
rather than rely on external financing. 
                                                 
21 For example, the λ estimate in Table 2.3 for dairy farms is 0.8688, which means that a typical dairy 
farm closes about 13.12% (1-λ) of the gap between its current level of leverage and its target in one year. 
At this rate, it takes approximately 4.9 years for the farm to close half of the gap between the current and 
target leverage.  
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2.7. Farm Size, Growth Opportunity, and Financial Crisis 
We split the sample and re-estimated our model to examine whether our 
findings were robust to differences in size classes, growth opportunities22, and sample 
year. Table 2.5 shows the results.  
Table 2.5: Dynamic panel data estimation results (Dependent Variable: 
Leverageit) 
 Farm Size Growth Opportunity Sample Year 
Variables Large Small High Low 2001-2007 2008-2015 
Leverage t-1  0.1740***  0.9339***  0.7277*** 0.987***  0.8309***  0.4571*** 
 (0.0193) (0.0303) (0.0233) (0.0136) (0.0187) (0.0095) 
Profit -1.1989** -0.8310*** -0.7822*** -1.405*** -0.8614*** -1.4673*** 
 (0.7640) (0.0492) (0.0621) (0.4748) (0.1080) (0.0462) 
Tangibility  0.0809 -0.1487** -0.1905*** -0.5210** -0.0425 -0.0763 
 (0.0583) (0.0253) (0.0259) (0.0323) (0.0303) (0.0249) 
Size --- ---  0.0425*** -0.1397** -0.0575***  0.0476** 
 --- --- (0.0083) (0.0109) (0.0084) (0.0931) 
Growth  0.3022***  0.3506*** --- ---  0.4006***  0.2513** 
 (0.0387) (0.0184) --- --- (0.0192) (0.0188) 
Risk -0.3828*** -0.1954**  0.04692 -0.661*** -0.1061** -0.5694*** 
 (0.01039) (0.04257) (0.0553) (0.0648) (0.0503) (0.0589) 
D-Field -0.2101 -0.0100  0.0501***  0.0598**  0.0133  0.0614*** 
 (0.0561) (0.0189) (0.0157) (0.0220) (0.0171) (0.0161) 
D-Horticulture  0.1625  0.06022**  0.03831**  0.1476**  0.01657  0.2319*** 
(0.0481) (0.01622) (0.01652) (0.0220) (0.0191) (0.0135) 
D-Livestock -0.1765** -0.0603  0.2193 -0.0614**  0.01745  0.1094** 
(0.0704) (0.0136) (0.0145) (0.1583) (0.0137) (0.0130) 
-cons  3.4859  0.1502 -0.4073  2.357***  0.9093***  0.6495*** 
  (0.2987) (0.1344) (0.1246) (0.1591) (0.1274) (0.1339) 
Year Yes Yes Yes Yes NO NO 
Wald (p-value) χ²(9)=1090 0.0000 χ²(9)=3712 0.0000 χ²(9)=448 0.0000 
AR-1 (P-value) Z=-6.1653 0.0000 Z=-4. 1325 0.0000 Z=-2.3491 0.0186 
AR-2 (P-value) Z=-1.5142 0.1230 Z=-1.5582 0.1192 Z=-0.5169 0.6052 
Notes: Numbers in parentheses are robust standard errors, and ***and ** are significant at the 1% 
and 5% levels respectively. The dummy reference levels are dairy farms and the year 2001. 
  
                                                 
22 The top and bottom 25% of farms in terms of total annual output and investment are grouped as large 
and small and high and low growth-opportunity farms, respectively. 
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Although the profitability variable has a similar impact on small and large 
farms, its magnitude is higher for large farms. In addition, the speed of adjustment is 
much higher for large than for small farms, asserting the applicability of the pecking 
order and signaling theories in explaining farm businesses’ capital structure decisions; 
it holds that creditors prefer larger, more visible farms. According to the pecking order 
theory, size provides bargaining power for larger farms, which will reduce the cost of 
adjustment and thus lead to faster adjustment to the target. Frank and Goyal (2003) also 
confirm that the pecking order theory is a better descriptor of the behavior of large firms 
compared to small ones because large firms usually face relatively lower costs of 
adverse selection than smaller firms when considering the possibility of a risky or 
mispriced debt. 
We also split the sample into sub-samples23 based on growth opportunities. The 
results in Table 2.5 show that farms in the lowest and highest growth-opportunity 
brackets are similarly affected by farm-specific factors. Only the leverage ratio of high-
growth farms is significantly and negatively affected by the tangibility of their assets. 
We also find that profitability has a negative impact on target leverage, that size is used 
as a dominant signal to obtain credit, and that farms with higher growth opportunities 
exhibit much higher adjustment speeds. 
Finally, we split the sample into two periods (2001-2007 and 2008-2015), to 
examine the farm capital structure decision pre and post the 2008 financial crisis. The 
analysis shows that the impacts of profit and earnings volatility on leverage are much 
higher and farms adjust to their target capital much quicker in the post-crisis period. In 
addition, the coefficients of the farm type dummies are positive and significant in the 
post-crisis period, suggesting that farm-specific factors played a more prominent role 
                                                 
23 We conduct a T-test to check whether the split sample are significantly different. The results indicate 
that there is a statistically significant difference between the mean leverage for pre-crisis and post-crisis 
periods (t = -10.2205, p = 0.0000) for larger and smaller farms (t = 7.7971, p = 0.0000) and for high and 
low growth-opportunity farms (t = 18.0041, p = 0.0000).  
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in determining the target capital structure in the post-crisis period than in the pre-crisis 
period.  
We also show that the speed of adjustment towards the target leverage was 
significantly lower during the period prior to the financial crisis than after. During the 
period after the crisis, an average farm would close about 54.29% of the gap between 
its target and its actual leverage ratio per year, compared to only around 16.9% in the 
pre-crisis period. We note that the impact of size on leverage is negative and significant 
in pre-crisis periods. This can be attributed to the fact that credit markets do not tighten 
up equally for farms during pre-crisis periods as loans become disproportionately more 
expensive and harder to obtain for smaller farms with little collateral. 
2.8. Conclusions  
In this paper, we aim to examine the applicability of the pecking order and 
signaling theories to farm businesses, the effects of farm-specific and macroeconomic 
factors in determining the capital structure, and the speed of adjustment to the target. 
We applied a partial-adjustment model to a unique panel consisting of 1500 farms 
across fifteen years (2001-2015).  
Results from the System GMM estimation support that the signaling behavior 
in the farm-lender relationship matches the pecking order theory’s explanation of the 
leverage ratios in farm businesses. The most robust findings are the negative association 
between farm leverage and profit and the support provided to the pecking order theory 
by earnings volatility (risk). In addition, consistent with the signaling theory, we find 
that farm leverage is positively related to asset tangibility and growth opportunity, 
something which has often been rejected for publicly listed firms. Decomposing our 
analysis into farm types, we show that dairy farms predominantly follow the signaling 
theory. Horticulture, livestock, and field crop farms, on the other hand, appear to follow 
the pecking order theory more closely when it comes to their financing opportunities. 
All farm types use their growth opportunities to effectively send signals that will 
facilitate their access to credit. As farms do not have much access to external equity, 
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signaling their good prospects through profits and investments plays a major role in the 
borrower-lender relationships. Based on these findings, we were able to provide 
supporting evidence for both the pecking order and signaling theories being good 
predictors of the capital structure of firms in the agricultural sector.   
Farm profitability, asset tangibility, growth opportunity, and size significantly 
determine farm capital structure. Although most of the variables identified in the 
literature affect the leverage of farms, the degree and importance of these factors are 
farm-type specific. Macroeconomic factors also determine a farm’s decision on its 
capital structure, albeit not strongly. The capital structure decision of a farm is thus not 
only the product of its own specific characteristics but partially also of the 
macroeconomic environment in which it operates. 
Further, the empirical results indicate that farms appear to adjust their leverage 
towards the optimal level over time in response to endogenous and exogenous shocks. 
The speed of adjustment to the target capital is slow and varies according to size and 
farm type. It is worth noting that farm leverage is highly persistent, i.e. adjustment 
speed is slow, and that lagged leverage is the best predictor of subsequent leverage 
ratios. The speed of adjustment is relatively faster for horticulture farms and slower for 
livestock farms. This variation is mainly attributed to the difference in adjustment costs. 
The evidence further confirms the existence of dynamics in the farm capital structure 
decision.  
The results shed further light on the dynamic nature of the capital structure of 
farms and the applicability of capital structure theories to farm businesses. The results 
could also help policy makers and lenders develop effective instruments to control and 
influence the financial leverage of farms. For example, the estimate of farm size 
indicates that the speed of adjustment is slow for smaller farms. This suggests that 
lenders use size as a predominant signal of farm creditworthiness. It also suggests that 
policy makers should consider size when designing policy instruments to facilitate 
access to credit.  
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The understanding gained from studying the applicability of the pecking order 
and signaling theories to the farming business benefits both farms and lending 
institutions. Since historical financial performance is used as a valid signal, farms are 
encouraged to keep accurate and detailed financial records. It also enables lenders to 
better understand the dynamics of farm financing decisions and easily identify 
creditworthy farm businesses through the appropriate signals.  
2.8.1. Limitations and Future Research 
This paper has limitations that motivate further research. Despite our use of 
unique and high-quality panel data, it is merely an accounting data set. Future research 
may complement this with behavioral and demographic data on, for example, 
education, farm risk attitude, and risk perception. Another interesting extension would 
be to conduct a farm survey on funding preferences or an experimental procedure as an 
alternative to the econometrics method used in this paper. Future research may also test 
for the applicability of other theories of capital structure to the farming business and 
their impact on farm performance in terms of profitability, survival, and viability.  
Even though we have used the partial adjustment model to account for leverage 
dynamics and adjustment cost, this study is limited in that it explores leverage as the 
only dependent variable. Future research may test some of the richer relationships that 
come with the pecking order and signaling theories, such as the relationship between 
cash flow, debt, and equity. Using cash flow, investment, and short and long-term debt 
as dependent variables might also be an interesting avenue for future research, as is 
refining the relationship between asset tangibility and the pecking order theory. This 
study has only found a weak relationship due to limitations in the information available.  
Finally, a promising direction for future research would be to improve our 
understanding of the variations in farm leverage dynamics across countries and 
economies. This paper documents a number of interesting variations across the four 
farm types. A better understanding of these variations across economies of, for 
example, developed vs developing countries and across countries with different legal, 
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tax, and farm-support systems, such as European countries and the US, could lead to a 
valuable understanding of the dynamics and determinants of leverage in farm 
businesses.   
 
2.9. Appendix 
 
Table 2.6: Dynamic panel regression results (Dependent Variable: Leverageit) 
Variables Dairy Field Crops Horticulture Livestock 
Leverage t-1 0.8541*** 0.8379*** 0.3472*** 0.9112*** 
 (0.020) (0.042) (0.135) (0.067) 
Profit 0.238** -0.501*** -1.972*** -0.827*** 
 (0.119) (0.165) (0.528) (0.1059) 
Tangibility 0.0896*** -0.053 -0.0297 -0.0183 
 (0.016) (0.071) (0.210) (0.0475) 
Size -0.0234** -0.0139 0.0875 0.0338 
 (0.0122) (0.011) (0.0586) (0.0205) 
Growth 0.372*** 0.3551*** 0.0923** 0.404*** 
 (0.042) (0.061) (0.0620) (0.0543) 
Risk 0.0013 -0.08701** -0.0501** -0.00176* 
 (0.0112) (0.0359) (0.0176) (0.0857) 
-cons 0.3188*** 0.2839 -0.8822 -0.4354 
 (0.174) (0.1776) (0.9946) (0.3022) 
Year Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Wald χ²(6)=482.670              P-value=0.990 
  Sargan Test χ²(151)=945.1   P-value=0.990 
AR (1) Z=-7.4523                 P-value=0.000 
AR (2) Z=-1.6229                 P-value=0.1050 
Notes: Numbers in parentheses are robust standard errors, and *** and ** are significant at 
the 1% and 5% levels respectively. The dummy reference level is the year 2001. 
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3. Chapter Three: Farm-Level Risk-Balancing 
Behavior and the Role of Latent Heterogeneity 
3.1. Abstract  
This study provides farm-level empirical support for the risk-balancing 
hypothesis using a longitudinal dataset from a panel of 1500 Dutch farms. The 
adjustment in the level of farm financial risk level (exposure) following a change in 
farm business risk level as a result of exogenous shocks is referred to in the literature 
as risk-balancing. In empirical studies to date, the heterogeneity of risk-balancing farms 
has been neglected. In this paper, we explicitly account for latent heterogeneity using a 
latent mixture regression model. Using the iterative Expectation-Maximization (EM) 
algorithm, the model simultaneously identifies segments based on the influence of the 
selected explanatory variables and estimates the effects of these variables on farm risk-
balancing behavior for each identified segment. We find that profitability, risk, 
leverage, age, size, and diversification play an important role in driving farm risk-
balancing behavior. Interestingly, the heterogeneity at segment level appears to have 
been masked at the aggregate farm-type level, notably the effects of leverage and total 
risk exposure. Assuming homogeneity in farms’ responses and estimating a pooled 
model or a priori classifying farms based on farm type yields a poor fit. The results 
provide new insights in the interdependence of financial and business risks, spark 
discussion about the linearity of farm risk reduction policies and total farm risk, and 
underline the relevance of considering both observed and unobserved factors in 
devising relevant risk-management strategies. 
 
Keywords: Expectation-Maximization (EM) algorithm, farm business, latent heterogeneity, 
mixture regression model, risk-balancing behavior. 
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3.2. Introduction 
Risk management in the agricultural sector is important for improved resource 
allocation, income stabilization, and growth. For public policymakers, an adequate risk-
management strategy is imperative as risk reduction is the predominant rationale for many 
farm-support programs, such as the EU-Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) direct payment 
schemes. Farms have different risk-management strategies at their disposal including but not 
limited to crop and weather insurance, diversification, hedging, saving accounts, and off-farm 
employment (Falco et al., 2014; Organisation for Economic and Development, 2011). 
However, the low uptake of these tools by farmers remains one of the major challenges in 
understanding and designing adequate risk-management tools at farm level (Cordier, 2015; 
Finger and El Benni, 2014). The risk-balancing theory presents a practical but often ignored 
alternative to the existing risk-management strategies. 
The risk-balancing theory suggests that the main motivation to balance farm business 
and financial risks is to maintain an optimal total farm risk. Total farm risk23 is defined as the 
sum (product) of business (or operational) and financial risks. Business risk occurs through 
production, marketing, institutional, personal, and technological changes, and financial risk 
arises through the use of farm debt. While business risk is independent of the level of financial 
risk, the latter, however, is dependent on farm business risk level due to the leverage effect 
such as credit risk, and interest risks (de Mey et al., 2016). An optimal level of total risk can 
be achieved (gained back) by making offsetting adjustments through leverage, investment, and 
production (Gabriel and Baker, 1980) when the level of farm business risk is altered due to 
exogenous shocks. When these shocks induce a decline in business risk, financial risk will also 
decrease. This, in turn, results in a slack in the optimal risk constraint since a decrease in both 
risks will also decrease the total risk. To cope with this slack, farms may opt to adjust their 
                                                 
23 The terms risk and uncertainty can be defined in various ways. One common definition of risk is the variation 
in possible outcomes of an event based on chance. In the literature, we often see a useful distinction between 
uncertainties defined as imperfect knowledge and risk as exposure to uncertain unfavorable economic 
consequences (Hardaker et al., 2015) 
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financing, e.g. by increasing leverage, investment policies, e.g. by investing in risky projects, 
or production, e.g. by engaging in riskier farming activities. Alternatively, farms may opt to 
decrease the leverage level and engage in less risky production when shocks24 increase business 
risk.  
The concept of the risk-balancing hypothesis is well established in agricultural finance 
and economics literature. Its insightfulness has inspired many extensions since its introduction 
by Gabriel and Baker in 1980. Using the risk-balancing framework, Collins (1985), 
Featherstone et al. (1988), Escalante and Barry (2003), and, more recently, Uzea et al. (2014), 
de Mey et al. (2014); (de Mey et al., 2016) and Bampasidou, Mishra and Moss (2017) provide 
evidence of farm risk-balancing. Very few studies, nevertheless, examine the determinants of 
risk-balancing behavior. This is partly explained by the lack of comprehensive farm-level 
longitudinal accounting data to assert the risk-balancing behavior of farms in the long-term.  
Most importantly, however, the heterogeneity of risk balancers is unaccounted for in 
the risk-balancing literature. To the best of our knowledge, no previous study to date explicitly 
accounts for the heterogeneity of risk-balancing farms. Two reasons may explain why (Saint‐
Cyr and Piet, 2017): First, most previous studies focus on specific farm types (e.g., dairy, cash 
grains or livestock farms), size, age or region, rather than explicitly addressing farm type as a 
mere unit of interest. Analyzing farms by categorizing using observable characteristics 
suggests an implicit assumption that the same decision-making process applies to those farms 
that share the same observable characteristics. This has led to the assumption that farms within 
these groups are homogenous. Farm heterogeneity may, however, originate from several 
sources within these homogenous farm types, such as: (a) different farming motivations, (b) 
different external production conditions, (c) the ability to balance risk may also depend on 
other factors such as managerial capacity, risk perception, and risk tolerance (Trujillo-Barrera, 
Pennings and Hofenk, 2016). Second, previous studies often used fixed-effects models to 
                                                 
24 The level of farm financial risk can also be affected by a shock. For instance, the increased risk associated with 
borrowing due to interest rate shocks is offset by reducing the risk of output price variability by engaging in less 
risky production or through diversification.  
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control for any time-invariant unobserved heterogeneity. Explicitly modeling this 
heterogeneity, however, yields a better understanding of the determinants of risk-balancing 
behavior as not all sources of farm heterogeneity are observable, nor linkable to farm 
characteristics. Cases in point would be a farmer’s attitudes, perceptions, preferences, and 
abilities. 
Thus, the main objective of this paper is to investigate the presence and determinants 
farm risk-balancing behavior while accounting for unobserved. We explicitly model the effects 
of unobserved heterogeneity using a latent mixture regression model, which classifies farms 
into segments, in which the farms’ risk-balancing response to the selected explanatory 
variables is identical within each segment but different across segments. Hence, we offer a 
better understanding of the financial structure and characteristics of farms and their relationship 
with risk-balancing. In addition, we offer a new analysis of risk-balancing behavior using 
micro-level data. Finally, we take into account four farm types: dairy, livestock, field crop, and 
horticulture farms. This allows us to analyze a larger segment of the farm sector and gain a 
better understanding of the interdependence of financial and business risks and the implications 
for farms and public policymakers.  
This chapter is structured as follows: Section 2 provides a review of the risk-balancing 
literature, followed in section 3 by our theoretical framework. Section 4 offers a description of 
the empirical model and the data used to examine farm risk-balancing behavior. Section 5 
features a discussion of the results of the empirical analyses. The chapter concludes with a 
discussion of key findings, limitations, and suggestions for further research. 
3.3. Related Literature 
In this section, we provide a brief background of business and financial risks in 
agriculture, an overview of related studies in the risk-balancing literature, and the theoretical 
foundations of the heterogeneity of risk balancers.  
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3.3.1. Business and Financial Risks in Agriculture 
Agriculture is inherently a risky business. While risks such as bad weather are unique 
to agriculture, other types of risks will also create a financial burden on farmers. The sources 
of total risk in agriculture can be classified in several ways, most commonly by considering 
the business and financial risks (e.g.,Escalante and Barry, 2003; Gabriel and Baker, 1980; 
Langemeier, 2016).  
Business risk can be defined as the inherent variability in the operating performance of 
a farm, independent of the way it chooses to finance its operations (Escalante and Barry, 2003). 
The most common farm business risks are production (yield), price, institutional, 
technological, and personal risks.  
Uncontrollable factors often related to weather such as heavy (lack off) rainfall, insect 
infections, and diseases result in farm yield (production) risks (Hardaker et al., 2015). Changes 
in the output and input prices of agricultural products are associated with price risks (Harwood 
et al., 1999). Changes in government policies and regulation related to agriculture (e.g., the 
abolition of milk quota in 2015 in Europe) are categorized under institutional risks (Barry et 
al., 2012).  
Technology risk also plays a key role in production risk in farming when certain 
practices risk becoming obsolete, for example, the use of machinery for which spare parts are 
no longer available (Harwood et al., 1999). Death, divorce, injury, or poor health of the farm 
owner (operator) are some of the personal risks.  
Financial risk is caused by uncertainties related to inters rates, changes in the cash flow 
from farm operations, which could be used to repay farm loan, and changes in the market value 
of farm assets used as loan collaterals (Langemeier, 2016). The use of borrowed funds means 
that a portion of the returns from the business must be reserved for making debt and interest 
payments (Harwood et al., 1999). Since the sources of business and financial risks are multiple, 
a comprehensive strategy that integrates production and finance would reduce total farm risk 
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exposure than a separate response. The risk-balancing theory presents an interesting alternative 
to the already existing risk-management strategies.  
3.3.2. Risk-balancing  
The strategic adjustment (trade-off) between business and financial risks is introduced 
to the literature as the risk-balancing theory by Gabriel and Baker (1980). According to the 
theory, total risk is the sum or product of business and financial risks, and when exogenous 
shocks increase farm business risks and shift the optimal (acceptable) risk level, a farm will 
opt to reduce their level of debt and refrain from incurring additional financial obligations. 
Conversely, when exogenous shocks (e.g., export stimulating policies) decrease the level of 
business risk, a farm may opt to increase their borrowing (increase their financial obligations, 
hence financial risk), and thus total risk remain optimal (e.g., Collins, 1985; Featherstone et 
al., 1988).  
Gabriel and Baker (1980) make two explicit assumptions about farm behavior: (1) 
farmers are risk-averse, and (2) profit maximization and survival are the main goals of farmers. 
Risk aversion25is an important element in understanding a farm’s risk-balancing behavior as 
risk management has always been the major rationale behind decision making at farm level 
and policy making in general (Pennings and Smidts, 2000). Changes in farming technologies, 
marketing systems, and environmental policies, for instance, will affect the decision making of 
farms under risk, such as choosing the optimal level of capital structure (leverage ratio), and 
asset allocations to investment farming and non-farming activities (de Mey et al., 2016; Skevas, 
Wu and Guan, 2018). 
Including risk aversion in the risk-balancing analysis is not easy due to measurement 
challenges (Thomas, 2016). Gabriel and Baker (1980) assumed that the ultimate goals of 
farmers are profit maximization and firm survival and that they will try to maximize net returns 
                                                 
25 Risk aversion is commonly defined in the literature as the risk attitude (perception and preference) and the 
fundamental descriptor of the feeling guiding the person taking a decision between two alternatives when the 
outcome of one or both is uncertain (Thomas, 2016). 
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without exceeding a risk constraint. While they recognized that farmers may respond to shocks 
out of risk aversion, they did not explicitly include risk aversion in their model. 
The role of risk aversion was further explored by Escalante and Barry (2003), who 
included the risk aversion parameter as a positive determinant, i.e. assumed that the debt-to-
assets ratio would increase as risk aversion increased. Building on Collin’s (1985) expected 
utility mean-variance (EUMV) approach, Turvey and Kong (2009) modeled profitability as a 
function of expected returns on assets, financial leverage, and the cost of leverage. In addition, 
they solved the optimum debt level for a level of risk aversion and hypothesized that more risk-
averse individuals would incur less debt than their less risk-averse counterparts. Using micro-
level data from US Kansas farms, Jensen and Langemeier (1996) found that farm leverage is 
associated with risk aversion, alongside farm growth rate, tax and profit, and business risk. 
Findings by Escalante and Rejesus (2008) suggest that farms only exhibit risk-balancing 
behavior when decreasing absolute risk aversion and in constant relative risk aversion models. 
Escalante and Barry (2001) also found that the importance of risk-balancing is low when 
farmers can use diversified risk-management strategies. 
Many studies in the risk-balancing literature revolve around leverage adjustments made 
by farms following the changes in the level of business risk. Robison and Barry (1987) 
underlined the importance of adjustments to leverage and financial risk when considering risk-
management strategies. Applying the expected utility model of optimal hedging, Turkey and 
Baker (1989) provide empirical evidence of risk-balancing behavior in that hedging is used as 
a risk management instrument to lower business risk whenever financial risk increases due to 
a higher leverage ratio. Featherstone et al. (1990) captured the sequential and stochastic nature 
of capital structure decisions of farms in response to the expected net farm income. Similarly, 
Moss, Shonkwiler and Ford (1990) used an autoregressive conditional heteroskedastic model 
and showed that aggregate debt is very elastic( greater than one) with respect to farm earnings 
(expected farm income).  
In line with the leverage adjustment studies, Ramirez, Moss and Boggess (1997) 
reformulated Collins (1985) risk-balancing hypothesis showing that the ratio of debt to asset is 
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elastic for business risk measured as the volatility of expected return on farm asset. Langemeier 
(2016) showed that farms opt to adjust their exposure to business risk through, for instance, 
diversification or purchasing crop insurance when financial risk exposure becomes higher 
following an increase in interest rates on farm loans. Recently, using US data, Bampasidou, 
Mishra and Moss (2017) modelled farm capital structure choices and showed that earnings 
volatility is negatively related to the total amount of farm debt. 
An interesting phenomenon in the risk-balancing literature is the concept called ‘the 
risk-balancing paradox’, where farm policies designed in order to reduce/buffer the level of 
business risk exposure might actually expose farms even to a higher total risk through risk-
balancing. Collins (1985) provided the first evidence in this regard on how policies that aim to 
increase farm income might induce greater risk-taking behavior. Similarly, Featherstone et al. 
(1988) showed that farms can go bankrupt by increasing leverage due to income augmentation 
policies. Ahrendsen, Collender and Dixon (1994) found that policies intended to decrease farm 
business risk or increase farm profit induce farms to increase financial risk through the 
acquisition of more debt. They underlined, however, that the adjustment process is slow and 
time-consuming. Ifft, Kuethe and Morehart (2013) also found evidence supporting the paradox 
of risk-balancing in which farm financing decisions (debt use), participation in Federal Crop 
Insurance (FCI) and financial risk are interrelated. They argued that for farms that have been 
operating at the optimal total risk level, a more financial risk (a higher level of leverage) 
becomes acceptable when business risk decreases. However, Cheng and Gloy (2008) provide 
evidence that contradicts the phenomena of the paradox of risk-balancing. Their analysis of 
risk adjustment by farms shows that policies aiming at reducing farm risks provide discipline 
in debt use to reduce the volatility of farm income while also increasing the expected income 
from farm activities.  
Only a small number of studies have examined the determinants of risk-balancing 
behavior. Escalante and Barry (2003) used correlation relationship and regression analysis on 
US grain farms and found that crop insurance, diversification, and farmland tenure positions 
significantly affect farm risk-balancing behavior. Turvey and Kong (2009) examined small 
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farm household risks in China, finding evidence of risk-balancing. Farm profit, risk, risk 
aversion, age, and sources of funding were identified as determinants. Using a panel of 
Canadian farmers, Uzea et al. (2014) found that the likelihood of risk-balancing by farms 
reduces with the amount received in support payments. Size, operation efficiency, and interest 
expenses were identified as significant determinants of risk-balancing behavior. In addition, 
Ifft, Kuethe and Morehart (2015) found that both short-term and long-term farm debts are 
positively associated with participation in crop insurance programs.   
The first empirical evidence of the risk-balancing behavior of European (EU-15) 
farmers were provided by de Mey et al. (2014) by investigating the adjustment in financial risk 
levels by farms in response to changes in the business risk as a result of exogenous shocks. A 
little more than half of the farms investigated are found to be risk balancers in weak form, i.e., 
while farm balance their risk, there is a form of variation in the total risk constraints contrary 
to the strong form of risk-balancing where total risk is assumed to be constant all the time. 
Recently, de Mey et al. (2016) extended the risk-balancing hypothesis from farm level 
to household level and provide empirical evidence for household risk-balancing behavior by 
estimating fixed-effects Seemingly Unrelated Regression (SUR) using the Swiss FADN data. 
They found that in addition to strategic on farm adjustments, farms at the household level also 
make off-farm adjustments (e.g., adjusting the level of off-farm income and consumption) in 
response to the change in farm business risk. 
Based on the aforementioned literature review and the original risk-balancing 
hypothesis, we include structural and financial characteristics of farms (e.g., age, size, total 
debt, total level of risk exposure, profitability, diversification. investment and participation in 
government support programs) in our analysis to explore their linkage with the risk-balancing 
behavior of farms.  
3.3.3. Heterogeneity of Risk Balancers 
The assumption of homogeneity among decision-makers has often been rejected in the 
analysis of behavior (Pennings and Garcia, 2004). While characterizing all observations by a 
  
65 
single model is convenient, it may mask critical relationships. In studying farmers’ hedging 
behavior, Pennings and Garcia (2010) showed that unobserved (latent) heterogeneity masks 
important drivers of hedging. Factors that play an important role in risk-balancing behavior for 
some farmers may be unimportant for others. Also note that the role of risk attitudes and risk 
perceptions may vary widely among farmers (Pennings and Garcia, 2001). While economic 
theory suggests that risk attitude and risk perception are important concepts in understanding 
risk-balancing behavior (Turvey and Kong, 2009), it is not easy, nevertheless, to include risk 
preference in the risk-balancing analysis, mostly due to challenges in measuring its variability 
and lack of data.  
To account for the heterogeneity among risk balancers, previous studies have used 
observable variables like size, location or farm type to segment the total population (de Mey et 
al., 2014; de Mey et al., 2016; Escalante and Barry, 2003; Escalante and Rejesus, 2008; Uzea 
et al., 2014). This approach implicitly assumes that farms of the same type will respond 
similarly to changes in the determinants of risk-balancing behavior. A potential problem is that 
the assumptions of homogeneity among decision makers and the characterization of all 
observations by a single model tend to mask critical relationships. This may be misleading if 
the sample contains latent segments, a situation particularly relevant to the farming sector, 
where many of the relevant observations concern farmers’ highly personal motivations, risk 
attitudes, and perceptions. In this sector, a priori classification may fail to capture the wide 
heterogeneity in farm management activities. Further, standard regression neglects the integer 
properties of the dependent variable, in that it does not allow for creating segments in the 
population (Morduch and Stern, 1997). Addressing these limitations requires disaggregation 
of the entire sample into segments.  
Following De Soete and DeSarbo (1991); Pennings and Garcia, (2010), and Wedel and 
Kamakura (2012), we advocate the use of a latent-class logit mixture model to explicitly 
account for latent heterogeneity. In this model, farms are simultaneously classified into 
multiple segments based on the relationship between the determinants of risk-balancing 
behavior and the actual risk-balancing, and finally, the model estimates the influence of the 
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determinants of risk-balancing for each segment identified. The classification of the farm is 
based on whether farms respond to the determinants of risk-balancing in similar ways. For 
farms within a segment, the influence of these determinants on risk-balancing behavior is the 
same, and the actual probability/likelihood of risk-balancing by the farm is dependent on the 
level of the determinants. Ceteris paribus, farms with a similar relationship between their 
profitability ratio and risk-balancing are classified together, for example, regardless of their 
size, region or farming systems. In a predictive sense, the exact effect of the farm’s profitability 
ratio on the likelihood of risk-balancing will then be determined by the profitability of the farm.  
The procedure emphasizes the role of theory in the empirical analysis, as the 
determinants of risk-balancing behavior are used both to explain the risk-balancing behavior 
and to discriminate among groups of farms. This is a fundamentally different approach from 
previous studies dealing with heterogeneity, where the segments were determined a priori, 
based on a single observable variable such as size, region or farming types. Note that, from a 
conceptual perspective, the procedure permits the determinants of risk-balancing to have a 
different influence on the actual likelihood of risk-balancing behavior in each identified 
segment.  
3.4. Theoretical Framework 
Two approaches are commonly used to derive the risk-balancing hypothesis: the 
expected utility mean-variance approach and the equilibrium analysis approach. The former 
approach derives the risk-balancing hypothesis from an expected utility mean-variance 
framework and accounts for the effects of the risk magnitude and the risk attitude behavior of 
decision makes on farm total leverage decisions. The latter approach examines how an optimal 
asset and liability organization of farms is restored to equilibrium through risk-balancing after 
the imbalance in the optimal level as a result of exogenous shocks. The additive approach of 
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Gabriel and Baker (1980) and the multiplicative approach26of Barry and Robinsons (1987) fall 
into this category.  
We adopt the additive equilibrium approach of Gabriel and Baker (1980), a proven 
parsimonious model that can help explain risk-balancing behavior. In addition, we have an 
accounting data that fits this modelling framework well. The approach utilizes income and cash 
flow statements in developing a conceptual framework to integrate business risk (BR) and 
financial risk (FR) as: 
TR = BR + FR                                                                                                                                     [3.1] 
Total Risk (TR) is given by (Gabriel and Baker, 1980): 
TR =
σ2
μ̅x − I
                                                                                                                                          [3.2] 
The standard deviation of net farm income is used to measure farm business risk as:  
BR =
σ1
μ̅x
                                                                                                                                                [3.3] 
Where, σ1 and σ2 are, respectively, the standard deviations of net farm income with and 
without debt financing (Escalante and Barry, 2003), μ̅x is the expected net farm income, and I 
is the interest payments. 
Hence, FR can be derived by subtracting equation (3.3) from equation (3.2) 
FR =
σ2
μ̅x − I
−
σ1
μ̅x
                                                                                                                                [3.4] 
Baker and Gabriel further simplify equation (3.4) by assuming that leverage has no scale effect 
(σ1 = σ2). Hence, rewriting equation (3.4) results in: 
                                                 
26 The multiplicative approach by Robison and Barry (1987) uses concepts from the portfolio theory and proposes 
an integrated conceptual framework for the optimal organization of the farm assets and liabilities of risk-averse 
decision makers. The basic concept of the model is that total farm risk (TR) equals the product of farm business 
risk (BR) and financial risk (FR). 
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FR =
σ1
μ̅x
∗
I
μ̅x − I
                                                                                                                                 [3.5] 
From equation (3.5), we can see that BR is one of the determinants of FR. Thus, total risk is 
determined as: 
TR =
σ1
μ̅x
+
σ1I
μ̅x(μ̅x − I)
                                                                                                                       [3.6] 
de Mey et al. (2014) best explained the risk-balancing effect by expressing total risk 
using the additive relationship between business and financial risks, and by setting the target 
total risk level with which a farmer can cope (introduce a risk constraint in the framework). 
The introduced risk constraint depends on farm and farmer characteristics at micro level, and 
policy and other general economic shocks at the macro level. With the preceding argument, the 
total risk (TR) constraint can be written as:  
Φ ≤ TR = BR + FR =
σ1
μ̅x
+
σ1I
μ̅x(μ̅x − I)
≤ β                                                                                [3.7] 
In equation 3.7, a maximum total risk exposure level a given farmer can cope up with 
is given by β, whereas, the lower bound to total risk constraint is captured by Φ. If a farm price 
stabilizing or export inducing policy, for instance, reduces the level of business risk, from 
equation 3.7, we can infer that the level of financial risk will also decrease. This, in turn, creates 
a slack in the total risk constraint given by β. In order to restore the relationship to the optimal 
level i.e., TR = β, farms could opt to increase their exposure to financial risk by taking more 
debt (de Mey et al., 2014). Alternatively, when exogenous shocks increase the farm business 
risk level and results in a situation where a farmer is not in a position to cope up with, i.e.,TR >
β, a farmer will adjust its level of financial risk exposure by refinancing the already taken loans 
or engage in a less risk production activities so that the total risk exposure level remains at the 
optimum level.  
The risk-balancing effect described in the previous paragraph is based on the 
assumption that the total risk remains constant (optimal) while business and financial risks 
moves in an opposite direction. If this assumption holds, the risk-balancing behavior is said to 
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be of a strong form (de Mey et al., 2014). In practice, however, this assumption is strong and 
difficult to hold because; (a) according to Robison and Barry (1987), the level of risk aversion 
varies amongst farms , hence, results in a different level of farm risk-absorbing capacity, (b) 
according to Ahrendsen, Collender and Dixon (1994), it might take more than a year in order 
to observe the risk-balancing effect on the total risk constraint. Consequently, this paper 
considers the weak form of risk-balancing where a change in the total risk constraint can be 
observed. 
Further, the risk-balancing hypothesis assumes an inverse relationship between a lagged 
business risk and the current level of financial risk. This relationship constitutes the basis of 
our empirical model. The following paragraphs explain the two rationales behind this 
hypothesis.   
First, if an exogenous shock induced a decline in business risk, financial risk would 
also be lower. This results in a slack in the total risk constraint. To take advantage of this slack 
and retain the optimal risk level, a farmer engages in more borrowing, hence, increases the 
levels of financial risk.  Going back the original risk-balancing framework by Gabriel and 
Baker (1980), we can infer that the standard deviation of the expected farm income (
σ1
μ̅x
) is used 
to measure the level of business risk whereas the balancing component of equation 3.7, (
I
(μ̅x−I)
) 
is used to capture the level of farm financial risk. With this relationship in mind, we can 
introduce time periods in our analysis by stating that past volatility levels are used as a proxy 
for expected business risk E(BRt) = BRt-1, which in turn leads to the argument that FRt could 
be a function of BRt-1. Thus, considering that the business risk condition of the previous year 
influences the current year financial structured decision-making, farm risk-balancing behavior 
is measured by pairing the current financial risk level with a lagged business risk level.  
Second, capital structure is one of the critical decisions a farmer will make taking the 
expected level of farm return and the risk associated with this return into account (Cheng and 
Gloy, 2008). By increasing their leverage, farm will be able to increase the available investment 
capital for farming operations such as farm expansion.  In addition, if the increase in leverage 
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is complemented by a lower cost of debt, it will generate a higher return on equity. These 
benefits, however, will not come without expenses for highly levered farms must properly 
manage their cash flows (uncertainty and volatility) in order to meet their financial obligations. 
The uncertainty and variability of future income from farm business, thus, are one of the 
determining factors in the farm leverage ratio. Therefore, farm decisions on financial leverage 
must first consider business risks.  
Based on these two arguments, we assume that the financial risk decision in the current 
period reflects the previous period’s level of business risk. Also note that this inverse 
hypothesis is not a mere theoretical prediction but has been empirically tested in other studies 
as well, including, for example, Langemeier, (2016), de Mey et al. (2014), Uzea et al. (2014) 
and Escalante and Barry (2003). 
3.5. Methodology 
3.5.1. Data and Descriptive Statistics 
The empirical analysis uses an unbalanced rotating panel from the Wageningen 
Economic Research-WUR database. The Wageningen Economic Research-WUR) is 
responsible for the Dutch Farm Accountancy Data Network (FADN)27, with data available 
from 2001 to 2015.  
The Dutch FADN sample is randomly selected using disproportional stratified 
sampling28from the farm census. Economic size and farm type are the stratification criteria. 
The dataset used in this chapter is high quality in that (a) the samples are representative of 80% 
of the farms and more than 90% of production in the Netherlands, and (b) it allows for separate 
                                                 
27 FADN is an annual survey at European Union level, carried out in each member state. 
(http://ec.europa.eu/agriculture/rica/). Also, we refer the readers to Berkhout and van Bruchem (2015) for a 
detailed description of the Dutch agriculture sector. 
28 We refer to Meer, Veen and Vrolijk (2013) for details on the Dutch FADN sampling procedure. 
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estimation of farm types for comparison purposes due to the harmonized29 data-collection 
procedure, i.e. the bookkeeping principles are identical for all farm types.  
We have applied the following inclusion criteria for farms: firstly, continuous whole-
farm data had to be available from 2001-201530. Secondly, a farm had to have debt, as there 
can be no farm risk-balancing without debt. Thirdly, farm observations with negative net farm 
income and return on assets were excluded, given our calculation of the coefficient of variation. 
Fourthly, farms needed to remain in the sample for at least four years since our model has a lag 
structure and business risk is calculated based on a three-year rolling window. Finally, to 
address outlier concerns, extreme values in the dataset were handled by dropping the top and 
bottom 0.5% observations of the variable from the analysis. These criteria reduced the total 
number of farms included in this study to 1,339 (89 percent of the original farms) and reduced 
the number of observations from 15,982 to 9,040. Table 3.1 shows the summary statistics and 
variable definitions for the sample farms. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
29 The bookkeeping principles and sample selection plans are identical for all farm types in the Netherlands and 
similar to those of other European countries participating in the FADN. 
30 A farm will be dropped from the analysis if more than half of the variables in each year show missing values. 
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Table 3.1: Variables and summary statistics 
Variable Definition Unit Obs. Mean SD 
Financial Risk The Ratio of Interest Paid on Net Farm 
Income(NFI) After Interest has been 
Paid 
Ratio 9,040 0.830 1.863 
Dairy Farms 
  
2,654 1.085 2.104 
Field Crops 
  
1,798 0.708 1.657 
Horticulture 
  
2,888 0.618 1.629 
Livestock 
  
1,700 1.700 0.921 
Business Risk Coefficient of Variation of NFI, 
Calculated over a Three-Year Window. 
CV 7,717 0.330 0.271 
Dairy Farms 
  
2,329 0.252 0.218 
Field Crops 
  
1,567 0.361 0.274 
Horticulture 
  
2,408 0.369 0.287 
Livestock 
  
1,413 0.361 0.290 
Total Risk Financial Risk +Business Risk 
 
7,717 1.128 1.128 
Cost of Debt The Ratio of Interest Paid Over Total 
Outstanding Debt 
% 9,040 4.261 364.61 
Leverage Total Debt/Total Asset Ratio 9,040 0.276 0.219 
Farm Area Total Agricultural Area Utilised Hectares 9,040 44.527 61.376 
Farm Size Ln of Total Farm Output Euro 9,040 14.568 0.833 
Profit (ROA) Net Farm Income/Average Total Asset Ratio 9,040 0.0517 0.0454 
Investment31  Total Net Farm Investment  Euro 9,040 148,962 38,627 
Direct Payment 
 
Share of Direct Payment Received in 
Total Gross Revenue 
Euro 9,040 0.0297 0.050 
Diversification32 Share of Other Farm Output in Total  
Farm Output 
Ratio 9,040 0.163 0.201 
Age Age of Farm Operator Years 9,040 51.15 10.096 
The average farm’s financial risk was 83% over the 2001–15 periods, implying that 
farm indebtedness is at a high level and that more than a substantial part of net farm income is 
being used to pay-off these debts. The statistics also show variation by farm type. Figure 1 
                                                 
31 According to the FADN guidelines, a farm investment is an investment in fixed assets, which includes costs of 
current upkeep of equipment (and purchase of minor equipment), car expenses, current upkeep of buildings and 
land improvements, insurance of buildings, major repairs, new plantations of permanent crops. Net investment is 
calculated as gross investment on fixed assets minus depreciation.  
32 We measure farm diversification as the ratio of income (revenue) from other farm outputs to income from the 
specialized farming activity. For instance, a typical dairy farm average diversification score is 0.75, meaning that 
this farm earns 75% of its net farm income from other farming activities such as sheep, goat or other grazing 
livestock and earns only 25% of its income from dairy production. A higher ratio thus represents a more diversified 
farm. 
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shows the variation in farm financial and business risk across the four farm types and over the 
years.  
 
Figure 3.1: Financial and business risks by farm type, 2003-2015 
Field-crop and livestock farms exhibit above-average levels of business risk33, which 
can be explained by their increased exposure to production risk due to weather impacts and 
price volatility in their input and output markets. Interestingly, dairy farms carry below-average 
business risk, which is attributed to the stable milk price in the Netherlands compared to that 
of field crops during our sample period (2001-2015) (Rizov, Pokrivcak and Ciaian, 2013). The 
next section presents the empirical results. 
                                                 
33 To get a clear picture of the variation in business risk over the years, we plot a new figure using downside 
deviation as a measure of business risk. We have observed similar patterns and for reference, the figure is 
presented in the appendix section. 
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3.6. Empirical Model 
3.6.1. Farm-level Risk-balancing Behavior 
In order to examine whether farms exhibit risk-balancing behavior, we use a fixed-
effects panel-regression model34, where we regressed the financial risk on one-year lagged 
business risk and selected farm characteristics. We have used the literature review and the 
theoretical framework in the previous section to guide the regression and selection of the right-
hand side variables.  
The ratio of interest paid to net farm income after interest is paid (I/(NFI-I)) is used to 
measure farm financial risk. To measure farm business risk, we use the coefficient of variations 
of net farm income based on observations from the immediately preceding three years. 
Equation (3.6) in the theoretical framework section suggests that farm profitability and the cost 
of debt further motivates risk adjustment by farmers. We expect the cost of debt from the 
previous year, which is measured as the interest paid on the farm’s total outstanding debt ((I/Dt-
1), to have a positive effect because a high cost of capital will lead to a higher level of financial 
risk (de Mey et al., 2014), ceteris paribus. Farm profitability, measured as the ratio of net farm 
income to total assets, is hypothesized to have a negative effect on farm financial risk as it 
helps cover the interest expenses while at the same time enabling farms to increase their debt 
coverage level ( Escalante and Barry, 2003).  
We included farm size and operator age as farm-structural factors to explore their 
linkage with farms’ financial risk. Farm size measured in terms of farm total output is expected 
to be positively related to farm financial risk as large farms tend to incur more debt in order to 
sustain the benefits of economies of scale and production efficiencies (Escalante and Barry, 
2003; Purdy, Langemeier and Featherstone, 1997). Farm operator age, used as a proxy for 
measuring management expertise, is hypothesized to have a negative relationship with 
                                                 
34 In conformity with previous studies (de Mey et al., 2014; Escalante and Barry, 2003), we have performed a 
correlation relationship analysis. The results have been included in the Appendix section. 
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financial risk. Older and more experienced farmers tend to decrease their financial risk. This 
behavior may be attributed to the increase in risk-averse behavior with age, greater adaptability 
in devising alternative risk-management strategies (Escalante and Barry, 2003), and the life-
cycle hypothesis, which holds that as farmers get older, they tend to pay off their debt 
obligations (de Mey et al., 2014). 
Farm type dummies are included in the regression model to examine the impact of 
alternative farming systems on financial risk. A time dummy is also included to capture 
business-cycle impacts, such as inflation, interest rate, unemployment, and GDP growth, on 
farm financial risk. A logarithmic form of the explanatory variables was used in the regression 
to normalize the data35. Our estimated model can be specified as: 
ln(I/(NFI − I)𝑖,𝑡=𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽1ln(𝐵𝑅)𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽2ln(𝐼/𝐷)𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽3ln(𝑅𝑂𝐴)𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽4ln (𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒)𝑖,𝑡−1
+ Δ𝑖,𝑡  + Γ𝑡 + ε𝑖,𝑡                                                                                                      [3.8] 
Where 𝑖 and t are indexing farm and year, Δ𝑖𝑡 and Γ𝑡 are the farm type and year 
dummies, respectively, ε𝑖,𝑡 is the error term, α, β, Δ, and Γ are parameters to be estimated. 
3.6.2. Drivers of Farm Risk-balancing Behavior 
Structural and financial characteristics of farms were included in the analyses to explore 
their possible links with risk-balancing. The characteristics are selected based on the literature 
and the theoretical framework discussed in section two. These factors include farm 
profitability, size, total risk, leverage, cost of debt, government-support programs, i.e. 
subsidies, age, investment, and alternative risk-management strategies (diversification). To 
identify the drivers of farm risk-balancing behavior, we estimate a the logit panel model as: 
Pr(Yit = 1|Xit) = 𝑔(βXit)                                                                                                                 [3.9]  
                                                 
35 While cleaning the data, we perform a skewedness /kurtosis test for normality, which shows that some of the 
variables, e.g., cost of debt, are not normally distributed. In addition, a log transformation is performed to increase 
the interpretability of the coefficients. 
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With  
Yit = βXit + Δ𝑖𝑡+Γ𝑡 + 𝑒it                                                                                                                [3.10] 
Where 
 Yit=Farm risk-balancing behavior, which only takes the value of 1 when financial risk 
(FR) moves in the opposite direction of a one-year lagged business risk (BR), and 0 
otherwise. 
 Xit= Vectors of right-hand-side variables, such as farm profitability, size, total risk, 
leverage, cost of debt, subsidies, age, investment, and diversification.  
 g(. ) = Logistic cumulative distributions function for the logit model. 
3.6.3. Farm Risk-balancing Behavior and Latent Heterogeneity 
The assumption of homogeneity among decision makers and the characterization of all 
observations by a single model tend to mask critical relationships and may be misleading if the 
sample consists of a number of unknown segments. Addressing this limitation requires 
disaggregation of the entire sample into segments. Following De Soete and DeSarbo (1991) 
and Wedel and Kamakura (2012), we advocate the use of a latent-class logit mixture model.  
The rationale behind this model36 is as follows: The sample contains a finite and fixed 
number of homogeneous segments. Farms belong to these segments with some probabilities, 
which are assumed a priori and are invariant across farms. Conditional upon membership of a 
segment, the probability of a farm’s choice decision is given by a choice model (logit model). 
The intercepts and sensitivities to explanatory variables in the choice model are allowed to vary 
across segments. Then, by maximizing the unconditional likelihood of the entire farm sample, 
we can obtain the estimates of membership and the associated coefficients for the independent 
variables simultaneously. Finally, each farm can be assigned to a segment through the updated 
posterior probability.  
                                                 
36 For a detailed review of latent-class models, see Wedel and Kamakura (2012), Hagenaars and McCutcheon 
(2002), Kamakura and Russell (1989), and Rabe-Hesketh and Skrondal (2004). 
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The measures of farm risk-balancing behavior are indexed by 𝑡 = 1… . , 𝑇 for 𝑖 =
1… . , 𝑁 farms. Let 𝑦𝑖𝑡 denote the risk-balancing behavior of farm 𝑖 in year 𝑡. If farm 𝑖 prefers 
to balance its risk in year 𝑡, then 𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 1; otherwise 𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 0. We also assume that farms come 
from a population that consists of a mixture of unobserved (latent) segments 𝑆, and each farm 
𝑖 in year 𝑡 belongs to one, and only one, segment 𝑠 which is not known in advance. While 
farms within each segment are assumed to be homogeneous with respect to their sensitivities 
to the explanatory variables, these sensitivities can vary across segments. The relative size 
(proportion) of segments 𝜋𝑆 is restricted to: 
0 <  𝜋𝑆 < 1,∑𝜋𝑆 = 1    
𝑆
𝑠=1
                                                                                                              [3.11] 
Let 𝐗𝒊𝒕 = (1, Xit
(1), … . . , Xit
(k)) denote a row vector of 𝑘 predictor variables that could 
help explain farm risk-balancing behavior. Since 𝑦𝑖𝑡 is binary, then, conditional on farm 𝑖 in 
year 𝑡 belonging to segment 𝑠, the probability that farm 𝑖 balances its risk in year 𝑡 can be 
represented as follows in a logit regression model: 
𝑃(𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 1|𝑠) =
exp(𝛃𝑠𝐗𝑖𝑡
′ )
1 + exp(𝛃𝑠𝐗𝑖𝑡
′ )
 ,                                                                                                [3.12] 
where 𝛃𝑠 = (𝛽𝑠
(0), 𝛽𝑠
(1), ……… , 𝛽𝑠
(𝑘)) is the coefficient vector associated with the 
vector of the predictor variables 𝐗𝒊𝒕. 
 We model the probability that farm 𝑖 in year 𝑡 belongs to segment 𝑠 in year 𝑡, P𝑖𝑡𝑠, 
depending on a vector of farm-specific variables 𝐙𝑖𝑡 = (1, 𝑍𝑖𝑡
(1), 1, 𝑍𝑖𝑡
(2), ……… , 𝑍𝑖𝑡
(𝑚)). 
Assuming the values of segment membership follow a multinomial distribution, the probability 
P𝑖𝑡𝑠 can be written as:  
P𝑖𝑡𝑠 =
exp(𝜼𝑠𝐙𝑖𝑡
′ )
∑ exp(𝜼𝑠𝐙𝑖𝑡
′ )𝑆𝑠 )
 ,                                                                                                                   [3.13] 
where 𝜼𝑠 = (𝜂𝑠
(0), 𝜂𝑠
(1), ……… , 𝜂𝑠
(𝑚)) is the vector of segment-specific parameters to be 
estimated, capturing the difference between the effect that the farm-specific variable has on the 
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probability of membership of segment 𝑠 and its effect on the probability of belonging to 
segment 𝑆. 
Given Equations (3.12) and (3.13), the unconditional probability that a randomly selected farm 
𝑖 balances its risk in year 𝑡 is expressed by: 
𝑃(𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 1) = ∑𝑃𝑖𝑠𝑡.
𝑆
𝑠
𝑃(𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 1|𝑠)                                                                                             [3.14] 
For each farm, 𝑖 in year 𝑡, i.e. the likelihood function conditional on farm i′𝑠 membership, can 
be formulated as: 
𝐿𝑖𝑡|𝑠 = ∏ ∏𝑃(𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 1|𝑠)
𝑦𝑖𝑡(1 − 𝑃(𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 1|𝑠))
𝑦𝑖𝑡 .
𝑇
𝑡=1
                                                         [3.15]
𝑁
   𝑖=1
 
Hence, the unconditional likelihood for each farm 𝑖 is: 
𝐿𝑖𝑡 = ∑𝑃𝑖𝑠𝑡.
𝑆
𝑠=1
𝐿𝑖𝑡|𝑠,                                                                                                                           [3.16] 
The complete likelihood over the entire sample of farms is: 
𝐿𝑖𝑡|𝑠 = ∏∑𝑃𝑖𝑠𝑡 ∏𝑃(𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 1|𝑠)
𝑦𝑖𝑡(1 − 𝑃(𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 1|𝑠))
𝑦𝑖𝑡
𝑇
𝑡=1
𝑆
𝑠=1
𝑁
𝑖=1
                                             [3.17] 
The log-likelihood is:  
ln 𝐿 = ∑ln [∑𝑃𝑖𝑠
𝑆
𝑠=1
∏𝑃(𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 1|𝑠)
𝑦𝑖𝑡(1 − 𝑃(𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 1|𝑠))
𝑦𝑖𝑡
𝑇
𝑡=1
]
𝑁
𝑖=1
                                        [3.18] 
By maximizing the log-likelihood function (3.18), the unknown parameters of the 
problem 𝛃𝑠 = (𝛽𝑠
(0), 𝛽𝑠
(1), ……… , 𝛽𝑠
(𝑘)) 𝜼𝑠 = (𝜂𝑠
(0), 𝜂𝑠
(1), ……… , 𝜂𝑠
(𝑚)) can be estimated with 
the iterative Expectation-Maximization (EM) algorithm37.  
                                                 
37 Wedel and Kamakura (2012), Rabe-Hesketh and Skrondal (2004), and Vermunt, Tran and Magidson (2008). 
provide detailed descriptions of the EM algorithm.  
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The EM algorithm implies iterative alternation between an expectation step (E-step) 
and a maximization step (M-step). It is based on the idea that the likelihood function contains 
missing observations, i.e., the 0/1 memberships of subjects in the s segments. The expectation 
of the likelihood can be formulated using a multinomial distribution for segment membership. 
This involves calculating the posterior membership probabilities and the current parameter 
estimates of independent variables and substituting them into the likelihood function.  
In the E-step, the log-likelihood is replaced by its expectation, which is calculated based 
on provisional estimates of the set of parameters that identify the segment to which the farm 
belongs. In the M-step, the expectation of ln 𝐿 is maximized with respect to the set of 
parameters to obtain new provisional estimates (Pennings and Garcia, 2010). This iteration of 
the E and M steps continues alternately until convergence is reached.  
Once the estimates are obtained from the observed data, the a posteriori probability, 
𝜆𝑖𝑡|𝑠 that a farm 𝑖 belongs to latent class 𝑠 in year 𝑡 can be calculated for each observation 
vector y𝑖𝑡, including an estimate of the vector of the parameters by means of Bayes’ theorem: 
𝜆𝑖𝑡|𝑠 =
𝜋𝑠 ∏ 𝑓(𝑦𝑖𝑡|𝑥𝑖𝑡 , 𝛽𝑠)
𝑇
𝑡=1
∑ 𝜋𝑠 ∏ 𝑓(𝑦𝑖𝑡|𝑥𝑖𝑡 , 𝛽𝑠)
𝑇
𝑡=1
𝑆
𝑠=1
                                                                                               [3.19] 
A farm can then be assigned to the segment to which it most likely belongs on the basis 
of these posteriori probabilities. Once the posteriori probabilities are calculated, a follow-up 
question is how many classes are required to adequately represent the data, as one cannot know 
this in advance. The common approach is to test a likelihood ratio statistic on whether a solution 
with 𝑆 + 1 segments gives a significantly better fit than a solution with 𝑠 segments, expressed 
as: 
𝑈 = −2 log [
𝐿(𝑆)
𝐿(𝑆+1)
]                                                                                                                      [3.20]  
where 𝐿(𝑆) denotes the maximum obtained for equation (3.18) with 𝑠 segments. The likelihood 
ratio in latent class logit models is not asymptotically distributed, however, and its distribution 
depends on the total number of subjects (De Soete and DeSarbo, 1991). As an alternative, 
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several measures have been proposed (McLachlan and Peel, 2004) including the AIC (Akaike 
Information Criterion) and BIC (Bayesian Information Criterion). These criteria are defined 
as: 
𝐴𝐼𝐶 = −2ln𝐿 + 2(𝐿. S + S − 1).                                                                                                 [3. 21] 
𝐵𝐼𝐶 = −2ln𝐿 + (𝐿. S + S − 1) ln(𝑛).                                                                                        [3. 22] 
The number of segments that best represents the data is reached when either the AIC or 
BIC hits a minimum. In addition, an entropy statistic 𝐸𝑠, can be calculated for any segment to 
ensure that for each segment, the posterior probabilities are separated sufficiently, which 
determines segment membership: 
𝐸𝑠 = 1 + ∑∑𝜆𝑖𝑠. ln(𝜆𝑖𝑠)
𝑆
𝑠=1
𝑁
𝑖=1
𝑁 ln⁄ (S)                                                                                        [3. 23] 
The entropy statistic in equation (3.23) is a relative measure, bounded between 0 and 1. 
𝐸𝑠 values close to 1 indicate that the posterior probabilities of farms belonging to a specific 
segment are close to either 0 or 1, i.e. the segments are well defined (Pennings and Garcia, 
2010). The 𝐸𝑠 value is trivially 1 if only one segment is used.  
3.7. Results 
3.7.1. Farm-level Risk-balancing Behavior 
Further evidence of farm level risk-balancing behavior is presented using the log-linear 
fixed-effects panel-regression model. Table 3.2 shows the parameter estimates from equation 
(3.8). In general, all factors, except the cost of debt and a few farm type and year dummies, 
have a significant association with farm financial risk. 
After controlling for other financial risk determinants and fixed effects, the coefficient 
estimate of our variable of interest, lagged business risk (BRt-1)
38 is negative and significant at 
                                                 
38
 In the empirical analysis section, we assume that business risk is exogenous. Thus, business risk is defined as 
the risk inherent in running a farm, independent of the way it is financed. Nevertheless, we recognize that 
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the 5% level. The coefficient estimates in Table 3.2 suggests that a one percent increase over 
last year’s business risk is followed by a 0.0276 percent reduction in farm financial risk, 
suggesting that, consistent with the risk-balancing hypothesis, Dutch farms make strategic 
financial risk adjustment depending on the level of business risk in the previous year.  
This result is consistent with the findings of de Mey et al. (2014) and Escalante and 
Barry (2003). In addition, the low standard error (0.0150) suggests that farmers have a very 
slim chance of achieving a positive coefficient. Since a one percent increase in business risk is 
followed by a less-than1% decrease in farm financial risk, we reject the strong form of risk-
balancing. The weak form of risk-balancing can be attributed to the fact that it might require 
more than just three years to make and see the impact of strategic leverage adjustments 
(Ahrendsen, Collender and Dixon, 1994; de Mey et al., 2014).  
In line with our expectation, the estimated relationship between lagged profitability and 
financial risk is significant and negative at the 1% level. All things remaining the same, higher 
farm profitability results in lower farm financial risk. The signs of the significant coefficient 
estimates for farm size and age are positive and negative, respectively, coinciding with our 
expectation.  
 
 
 
                                                 
endogeneity is a potential problem in the model that we specified in equation (3.8). In principle, and much like 
the bulk of the literature, we assume that our main independent variable of interest, lagged business risk is 
exogenous to current financial risk. Our estimates are biased, however, if this variable is not exogenous due to 
reverse causality, i.e. feedback effects, or due to the omission of variables that are correlated with it and the 
dependent variable. Aaccordingly, we run a Durbin-Wu-Hausman test (Cong, 1999). We find that the second and 
third lag values of the business risk variables are valid instruments (the first stage regression’s R2 is high at 0.4055 
and the F test of joint significance result a p Value of 0.000). In the second stage instruments variable regression, 
a Hausman test for endogeneity results a p-value of 0.623 suggesting that we fail to reject the null hypothesis that 
the lagged business risk (BRt-1) is exogenous. In other words, there is evidence that the lagged business risk 
variable is exogenous. 
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Table 3.2: Fixed-effects panel-regression results over the period 2001-2015 
Variable  Coefficient SE 
Ln BRt-1  -0.0276** (0.0150) 
Ln I/Dt-1   0.0165 (0.0269) 
Ln ROAt-1  -0.1140*** (0.0321) 
Ln Size   0.2494*** (0.0317) 
Age  -0.0376*** (0.0027) 
 Farm Type Dummies  
Field Crops  -0.6364*** (0.1202) 
Horticulture  -0.3362*** (0.1280) 
Livestock  -0.0557 (0.1254) 
Year Dummies    
2005  -0.1390** (0.0792) 
2006  -0.0635 (0.0749) 
2007  -0.0581 (0.0748) 
2008   0.2766*** (0.0774) 
2009   0.3948*** (0.0841) 
2010  -0.1675** (0.0816) 
2011   0.1349** (0.0773) 
2012  -0.0105 (0.0778) 
2013  -0.0675 (0.0765) 
2014   0.0580 (0.0770) 
2015  -0.4485*** (0.0781) 
Constant  -0.4485** (0.2454) 
R2 Within  0.0639  
F    15.95***  
Observation   9,040 
Notes: SE provides the robust standard errors, ***, **, * are significant at the 1%, 5%, and 10% 
levels, respectively, and the dummy reference levels are dairy farms and the year 2004, 
respectively. 
 
A joint Wald test of the farm type and year dummies shows overall significant effects 
at the 1% level. Field crops have slightly higher levels of financial risk, followed by 
horticulture. The overall coefficients for farm-type estimates are higher than those for year 
dummies, implying a more pronounced farm-sectoral difference in financial risk. Interestingly, 
the magnitude of the year dummies coefficient estimates exhibits an increasing trend in 
financial risk, especially after 2009, further suggesting the far-reaching impact of the financial 
crisis.  
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3.7.2. Drivers of Farm-level Risk-balancing Behavior 
Table 3.3 shows the estimation results of logit estimates of drivers of farm risk-
balancing behavior. We fail to reject the null hypothesis of the Hausman test that the preferred 
model is a random-effect model, as opposed to a fixed-effects model. In practice, failure to 
reject the null hypothesis means that a) the random and fixed-effects estimates are similar and 
there is no systematic difference between the fixed and random-effects coefficients or (b) the 
sampling variation in fixed effects is extremely large and the data contains insufficient 
information to obtain precise estimates (Uzea et al., 2014; Wooldridge, 2015). Hence, both the 
random and fixed effects were estimated. Since the fixed-effects estimator heavily relies on the 
farm-internal variation of the dependent variable, farms that consistently balanced or refrained 
from balancing for the entire observation period were dropped from the estimation. As a result, 
we lost 752 farms (1,281 observations) while estimating the fixed-effects model.  
Results show that farm profitability and participation in government support programs, 
i.e. subsidy schemes, decrease the probability of farm risk-balancing behavior. This lower 
dependence on government support programs to stabilize income and manage risk is consistent 
with Escalante and Barry (2003) and may form an interesting policy implication in light of the 
current debate on the relevance of farm-supporting policy schemes.  In addition, contrary to 
the findings of de Mey et al. (2016), larger farms tend to be significantly less likely to balance 
their risk. Farm investment, on the other hand, increases the likelihood of farm risk-balancing 
behavior.  
A Wald test of year dummies shows overall significant effects at the 1% level but does 
not confirm the statistical significance of the farm type dummies. Interestingly, the magnitudes 
of the year dummies estimates suggest an increasing trend of farm risk-balancing behavior over 
the years, particularly in the aftermath of the 2008 financial crisis. 
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Table 3.3: Logit estimates of drivers of farm risk-balancing behavior 
 
Notes: SE provides the robust standard errors, ***, **, * are significant at the 1%, 5%, and 
10% levels, respectively, and the dummy reference levels are dairy farms and the year 2004, 
respectively. 
 
To increase our understanding and facilitate the interpretation of the coefficients, we 
estimated the marginal effects of the random-effects logit model, the results of which are 
included in Table 3.4. The marginal effect is the effect of a one-unit change in the predictor 
variable on the probability P(Y = 1|X = x) with all other variables remaining constant and can 
be expressed as: 
𝜕𝑃(𝑦𝑖𝑡=1|𝑥𝑖𝑡)
𝜕𝑥𝑖𝑡
=
𝜕𝐸(𝑦𝑖𝑡|𝑥𝑖𝑡)
𝜕𝑥𝑖𝑡
= 𝜑(𝑥𝑖𝑡
′ 𝛽)𝛽                                                                                           [3.24]  
  Random Effects Fixed Effects 
Variable Estimates SE Estimates SE 
Age  0.003 (0.004)  0.005 (0.007) 
Size -0.122** (0.057) -0.032 (0.265) 
Leverage  0.113 (0.199)  1.441*** (0.554) 
Total Risk  0.001 (0.019) -0.003 (0.027) 
Cost of Debt  0.028 (0.053)  0.011 (0.032) 
ROA -2.936** (1.472) -7.641*** (2.827) 
Investment  0.024** (0.009)  0.020** (0.012) 
Subsidy -1.472** (0.859) -1.892 (1.204) 
Diversification  0.115 (0.224)  0.820 (0.723) 
Farm Dummies     
Field Crops  0.024 (0.124) 1.125 (0.749) 
Horticulture -0.102 (0.126) 1.060 (0.854) 
Livestock -0.088 (0.132) 0.360 (0.475) 
Year Dummies     
2005 0.538** (0.301) 1.177 (0.804) 
2006 0.456 (0.295) 1.072 (0.832) 
2007 0.778*** (0.294) 1.414** (0.834) 
2008 0.714*** (0.294) 1.442** (0.835) 
2009 1.001*** (0.302) 1.705** (0.840) 
2010 0.734*** (0.290) 1.451** (0.837) 
2011 0.940** (0.291) 1.574** (0.837) 
2012 0.973*** (0.289) 1.644** (0.838) 
2013 0.886*** (0.287) 1.623** (0.837) 
2014 0.801*** (0.285) 1.465** (0.838) 
2015 0.916*** (0.281) 1.632** (0.837) 
Constant 1.135 (0.899) -- --  
R2 Pseudo  0.025   0.007  
Log-Likelihood -3085  -1405  
𝜒2  38.70**   50.92***  
Obs.  9040   7759  
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Table 3.4: Marginal effects of the random effects logit model 
Variable Coefficients SE 
Age  0.0007 (0.0008) 
Size -0.0263** (0.0124) 
Leverage  0.0243 (0.0430) 
Total Risk  0.0002 (0.0041) 
Cost of Debt  0.0060 (0.0114) 
ROA -0.6336** (0.2842) 
Investment  0.0051** (0.0020) 
Subsidy -0.3176** (0.1852) 
Diversification  0.0247 (0.0484) 
Farm Dummies   
Field Crops  0.0051 (0.0268) 
Horticulture -0.0221 (0.0273) 
Livestock -0.0191 (0.0286) 
Year Dummies   
2005 0.1161** (0.0650) 
2006 0.0984 (0.0636) 
2007 0.1679*** (0.0634) 
2008 0.1541** (0.0633) 
2009 0.2171*** (0.0650) 
2010 0.1584*** (0.0625) 
2011 02029** (0.0628) 
2012 0.2101*** (0.0629) 
2013 0.1913*** (0.0619) 
2014 0.1728*** (0.0615) 
2015 0.1977*** (0.0606) 
Obs. 9040  
Notes: SE provides the robust standard errors, ***, **, * are significant at the 1%, 5%, and 10% 
levels, respectively, and the dummy reference levels are dairy farms and the year 2004, 
respectively. 
The results indicate that, on average, a one-unit change in farm size, profit and subsidy 
rates results in a 2.63, 63.4, and 31.8 percentage points lower likelihood of making strategic 
risk adjustments, respectively, with all else held at means.  
Due to the nonlinear nature of the logit model, the marginal effect of the predictor 
variables depends on the location of the covariates. Hence, visualizing the relationship across 
the range of covariate values enhances the analysis (Trujillo-Barrera, Pennings and Hofenk, 
2016). Figure 3.2 depicts the average marginal effects of total risk, subsidy, leverage, size, 
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profit, and age on the probability of risk-balancing, leaving all other predicting variable values 
as observed. Each figure includes the 95% confidence intervals (CIs) as shaded areas. 
 
Figure 3.2: Average marginal effects of total risk, subsidy, leverage, size, profit, and age 
on the probability of risk-balancing 
The probability of farms balancing their risk increases steeply as subsidy rates or 
government support decrease. The likelihood of farms’ exhibiting risk-balancing behavior rises 
as farms age and their leverage ratio increase. In line with our coefficient estimates in Table 
3.3, the probability of farm risk-balancing decreases as farms become more profitable and 
larger in size. 
Note that farms from different regions or with different production systems may face 
dissimilar economic and policy constraints that might lead to different choices in risk-balancing 
behavior. Similarly, farm managers may have different motivations, risk attitudes and 
perceptions (Pennings and Garcia, 2010). We may expect this heterogeneity to affect farm risk-
balancing behavior. A Wald test did not confirm the statistical significance of farm type 
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dummies, however (see Tables 3.3 and 3.4), suggesting that the effects of selected farm 
characteristics on farm risk-balancing behavior cannot a priori be assumed to be equal for all 
farm types. Hence, using the latent mixture logit model outlined in section 3.2.3, we examined 
whether all farms can be treated in a similar way or whether there are segments of farms that 
exhibit dissimilar risk-balancing behavior. Table 3.5 lists the AIC, BIC, and Es statistics from 
our mixture regression analysis that correspond to the log-likelihood.  
 
Table 3.5: Fit statistics of the mixture models for segments S=1 to 6 
Segments S Log Likelihood AIC BIC 𝐸𝑠 
1 -3165 6354 6431 1.000 
2 -3096 6242 6403 0.251 
3 -3063 6103 6447 0.410 
4 -3065 6206 6451 0.372 
5 -3027 6183 6594 0.310 
6 -3018 6190 6686 0.314 
 
Based on the minimum AIC statistic (6103) and maximum entropy value 39(0.410), we 
selected s=3 as the appropriate number of segments. This solution has a log likelihood of -
3063. Table 6 presents the estimated coefficient for the three-segment solution. The results 
document the presence of multiple farm segments with different relationships between farm 
characteristics and the likelihood of a risk-balancing behavior.  
Segment 1 (s=1) is the smallest segment, which constitutes 13.3% of the sample and 
contains 42% of the dairy farms, 14% of the field-crop farms, 31% of the horticulture farms, 
and 13% of the livestock farms. Note that, while constituting 42% of segment 1, dairy farms 
are also an important part of the other segments. In this segment farm profitability, total risk 
exposure, leverage, and diversification show a significant association with farm risk-balancing. 
These terms can be clearly interpreted. The probability of farms balancing their risk is higher 
in this segment, which is exposed to a higher total risk, and these farms would probably use 
                                                 
39 The moderate value of our entropy statistic can be attributed to the fact that we have used panel data and allowed 
farms to switch segments, which might affect the stability of class membership. 
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leverage as an instrument. These findings confirm the previous findings of de Mey et al. (2014). 
This segment also includes the highest percentage of risk balancers compared to the other two 
segments.  
 
Table 3.6: Finite mixture-panel logit regression results for the three-segment solution in 
which farm risk-balancing behavior is the dependent variable 
Variables s=1 s=2 s=3 
ROA  2.916** -10.552***  12.206** 
Total Risk  30.604***  0.156* -0.197* 
Investment  9.869  0.015  0.006 
Leverage  0.169*  1.147*** -2.161** 
Size -4.244 -1.332**  1.270* 
Age -0.644  0.031*** -0.049*** 
Subsidy  1.778 -1.837  3.579 
Cost of Debt  0.072  0.013  0.016 
Diversification -3.801* -0.089  1.615** 
Constant  2.916 -1.800**  3.726*** 
Percentage of farm types    
Dairy Farms 157 (42%) 865 (30%) 481 (37%) 
Field Crops 53 (14%) 660 (23%) 258 (20%) 
Horticulture 119 (31%) 850 (29%) 366 (28%) 
Livestock 48 (13%) 542 (18%) 188 (15%) 
Segment Size, 𝜋𝑠  0.133 %  0.637 %  0.286 % 
Note: ***, **, * are significant at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
Segment 2 (s=2) is the largest segment, containing 63.7% of the entire sample. It is 
composed of 30% dairy farms, 23% field-crop farms, 29% horticulture farms, and 18% 
livestock farms. Similar to segment 1, farm profitability, total risk and leverage show a 
significant effect on farm risk-balancing behavior. Similar to segment 3, farm size and age also 
have a significant effect on farm risk-balancing behavior.  
The risk-balancing behavior of farms in segment 3 (s=3) is driven by farm profitability, 
total risk, leverage, farm size, age, and diversification. This segment represents 28.6% of the 
entire sample and consists of 37% dairy farms, 20% field-crop farms, 28% horticulture farms, 
and 15% livestock farms.  
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Note further that farm leverage, profitability, and total risk are significantly associated 
with risk-balancing behavior in all three identified segments, with different size effects. The 
importance of the risk variable and leverage is consistent with the risk-balancing hypothesis 
that farms will use leverage to balance their risk when exogenous shocks alter their total risk 
level. 
Interestingly, we find that the three segments are not homogeneous with respect to the 
type of farm (dairy, field-crop, horticulture, and livestock). In addition, contrary to our findings 
in Table 3.6, variables such as leverage, size, age, and diversification were not significantly 
related to farm risk-balancing behavior during the traditional logit analysis in section 3.2. The 
results in Table 3.6 thus substantiate the importance of applying the mixture model. Using the 
latter, heterogeneity emerges from the impacts of the determinants of farm risk-balancing 
behavior (as measured in the estimated coefficients for each segment), rather than from a single 
observation variable, such as farm type. Table 3.7 provides further descriptive statistics for 
each identified segment. 
If we were to ignore this latent heterogeneity and instead adhere to our approach of 
farm classification based on farm type as outlined in section 3.2, we would explicitly restrict 
the relationship between the explanatory variables and risk-balancing behavior to being 
identical for all dairy, field crops, horticulture, and livestock farms, but different across these 
farm types.  
The results in Tables 3.6 and 3.7 provide interesting economic interpretations. Segment 
1 is characterized by the highest percentage (80%) of farms that balance their risk, and their 
risk-balancing decisions depend mostly upon their total risk exposure, leverage, diversification, 
and profitability. Interestingly, compared to the other segments, segment 1 is dominated by 
farms with the smallest non-farm incomes, direct payments, land size, and, most importantly, 
risk-bearing capacity. These characteristics contribute to the fact that farms in this segment 
depend heavily on risk-balancing as a risk-management instrument. In this context, 
diversification is an alternative, not a complementary strategy in the overall risk-management 
approach. 
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Table 3.7: Descriptive statistics for identified segments 
 s=1 s=2 s=3 
Segment Size (obs.) 377(13.3%) 2,917(63.7%) 1,293(28.6%) 
Percentage Risk Balancers 303(80%) 1,427(49%) 699(54%) 
Average Net Farm Income 144,933 152,558 122,418 
Total Asset 3,154,874 3,417,973 3,087,186 
Non-Farm Income 7766 10,237 9244 
Total Farm output 768,216 745,083 597,222 
Investment 154,401 170,733 146,415 
Subsidy-direct payment 16,328 16,444 17,381 
Average land size 38.767 48.33 54.596 
Average Risk bearing capacity40 0.170 0.455 0.427 
Segment 2 contains the largest proportion of the sample’s farm population (63.7%), 
with a relatively low proportion of risk-balancing farms (49%). In contrast to the other 
segments, this segment is dominated by larger farms in terms of total assets, with the highest 
profitability, non-farm incomes, investments, and risk-bearing capacity. These attributes 
account for the strong risk resilience of the farms in this segment, which leads to lower risk-
balancing and a preference for alternative risk-management strategies.  
Segment 3 is dominated by farms with the largest utilized land area, but with the 
smallest non-farm income and total assets. Relative to farms in the other segments, these farms 
receive the highest subsidies in the form of direct payments from the government. It is also 
interesting to note that farms in this segment use diversification as a complementary, rather 
than a substitute strategy for balancing risk. Proportionally, dairy and horticultural farms take 
the lion share in all three segments. To further investigate what sets these three segments apart, 
                                                 
40 Following Mishra, Wilson and Williams (2009), we use liquidity as a proxy for farm risk-bearing capacity and 
measure it as the ratio of current liability to current asset. It reflects the utilization of current assets to efficiently 
meet short-term and long-term financial obligations without disrupting normal operations. Maintaining optimal 
liquidity is important for farms that do not have continuous sales throughout the year. 
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i.e. why farms respond differently across segments, we used age, business and financial risk, 
and leverage as profiling variables. Table 3.8 presents the results.  
Table 3.8: Profile of the three segments using farm age, business risk, financial risk, and 
leverage 
 s=1 s=2 s=3 
 Mean  SD Mean  SD Mean  SD 
Age 53 10.130 52 9.890 52 10.140 
Business Risk 0.346 0.303 0.335 0.270 0.310 0.250 
Financial Risk 0.458 1.023 0.721 1.731 0.932 2.242 
Leverage 0.270 0.234 0.254 0.223 0.244 0.206 
SD is the standard deviation. 
Interestingly, segment 1(s=1) is dominated by farms with the highest business risk and 
leverage ratios and the lowest financial risk. Note that the majority of farms (80%) in this 
segment balance their risk, and the descriptive statistics in Table 3.7 further suggests that these 
farms use leverage to respond to increased business risk due to major shocks in the sector. In 
contrast, segment 3 (s=3) is characterized by relatively young farms with the highest financial 
risk and the lowest business risk and leverage ratios. Recall that the percentage of risk balancers 
in segment 1 > segment 3 > segment 2, and age is significant in defining segment 2 and 3, 
though not segment 1. 
3.8. Robustness Checks  
One of the challenges in agricultural economics and finance literature is the lack of a 
commonly accepted measure of farm risks (Hardaker et al., 2015; Thomas, 2016). To obtain a 
complete picture of farm risk exposure and further examine the measurement invariance 
robustness of our results, four separate analyses are done using (a) standard deviation as a 
measure of business risk, (b) downside deviation as a measure of business risk, (c) solvency 
ratio41as a measure of business risk, and (d) the standard deviation of net farm income without 
debt financing as a measure of total risk. The results presented in Tables 3.9 through 3.12 of 
                                                 
41 It is measured as the ratio of total debt to equity (total debt/equity). 
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the Appendix show that a change in risk measure does not significantly alter our main 
conclusions about the existence and the drivers of risk-balancing behavior among Dutch farms.  
In addition, estimating the panel fixed-effects regression model is econometrically 
challenging. We suspect that some of the explanatory variables in equation (3.8) are potentially 
endogenous. Hence, estimating the parameters with the standard OLS estimator may lead to 
inconsistency and bias (Greene, 2003).  An instrumental variable approach is a common 
practice to account for endogeneity. In most socio-economic research, it is very difficult to 
obtain (external) instruments that are valid from a theoretical and an empirical point of view. 
We use System-GMM estimation as an ‘internal’ instrument approach42. We ran the analysis 
using the –xtdpdsys- command on STATA, and the results are included in Table 3.10 of the 
Appendix. The specification tests, i.e. the Sargan test of over-identifying restrictions and no 
second-order autocorrelation, indicate that the key identifying assumptions required for the 
System-GMM estimator are satisfied.  
Finally, dropping an observation just because it is an outlier is not always an optimal 
solution. Hence, we ran all the additional analyses in the robustness section without trimming 
the data and found that including the outlier does not change the results but only affects the 
assumptions of the distribution.  
3.9. Conclusions 
The paper provides a farm-level empirical support for the risk-balancing hypothesis 
based on longitudinal data from a panel of 1500 Dutch farms over a period of fifteen years 
between 2001 and 2015. We have found that more than half of the farms exhibited risk-
balancing behavior over this period, implying that farms make strategic adjustments by taking 
more (less) debt in response to a decrease (increase) in business risks. Results from the linear 
fixed-effects model show evidence of farm risk-balancing behavior: a negative relationship 
between lagged farm business risk levels and the current financial risk, with its extent differing 
                                                 
42 A detailed discussion of the System-GMM estimator is included in the Appendix of this chapter. 
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across farm types. The logit panel regression results show that the likelihood of risk-balancing 
by farms decreases with size, profit, and share of government subsidy payments. Conversely, 
it increases with investment and leverage.  
Because we expect our sample to contain latent segments, we have applied a latent 
mixture regression model. The model, estimated with the iterative EM algorithm, 
simultaneously identifies segments based on the influence of the selected explanatory variables 
and estimates the effects of these variables on farm risk-balancing behavior for each identified 
segment. Our analysis shows that farm profitability, leverage, age, size, and diversification 
play an important role in driving the probability of farm risk-balancing behavior. The 
importance of the risk variable and leverage is consistent with the risk-balancing hypothesis 
that farms will use leverage to adjust to the optimal total risk level when exogenous shocks 
alter their total risk level. 
In addition, the analysis shows the presence of multiple segments that can be interpreted 
by the risk-balancing hypothesis. Farm profitability, total risk, leverage, age, size, and 
diversification are the factors related to farm risk-balancing behavior. Interestingly, we find 
that these factors are not equally important across the farm sector. Assuming homogeneity in 
farms’ responses and estimating a pooled model or a priori classifying farms based on farm 
type would, therefore, yield a poor fit and would lead to the conclusion that only size, profit, 
subsidy, and investment were determinants of the likelihood of farm risk-balancing. The 
existing heterogeneity at segment level appears to have been masked at aggregate farm-type 
level. These masking effects are prominent for the factors that are part of the risk-balancing 
hypothesis, such as farm leverage and total risk exposure. The advantage of the segmentation 
method becomes apparent from the different farm types present in each segment: each of the 
identified three segments contains dairy, field-crop, horticulture, and livestock farms in varying 
proportions.  
Our work has implications for farms, financial institutions, and policymakers. The 
importance of leverage and farm profitability in farm risk-balancing behavior has at least two 
important implications. First, farms rely heavily on the availability of and access to loans. 
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Given the fact that farm businesses have minimal access to equity markets or none at all, 
policies aimed at helping farms manage their risk should make access to credit facilities a 
priority. Furthermore, the heterogeneity of farm risk balancers suggests that financial 
institutions can use these characteristics for risk profiling and loan evaluation in each segment. 
Second, farm profitability and risk-balancing are strongly related, suggesting that farms use 
their retained earnings as a buffer when exogenous shocks disturb the optimal total risk level. 
As a result, the effects of farm-support programs, such as subsidies and direct payments aiming 
at stabilizing profit, cannot be easily identified. Our work should thus spark discussion about 
the linearity of the relationship between risk-management policy instruments and total farm 
risk. Furthermore, with the identification of farm segments and the provision of information 
for profiling within each segment, public policymakers will be able to target these segments 
more effectively and design risk-management strategies that best suit each segment. In general, 
our results suggest that more attention should be paid to both observed and unobserved factors 
in designing and implementing individual risk-management instruments and in assessing their 
impact on the farm sector. 
This paper has limitations that motivate further research. Despite our use of high-quality 
panel data, this is merely an accounting data set. Future research may complement this study 
with behavioral and demographic data on, for example, education, farm risk aversion, risk 
attitude, and risk perception. It is also interesting to examine alternative measurements of farm 
risk-balancing behavior. Another interesting extension would be to conduct a farm survey on 
risk preferences or an experimental procedure as an alternative to the econometrics method 
used in this paper. Future research may also test the synergistic relationship of risk-balancing 
with other alternative risk-management strategies and its impact on farm performance in terms 
of profitability, risk resilience43, and viability44.   
                                                 
43 Risk resilience is commonly defined as the capacity to prepare for, cope with, and adapt to a shock as a result 
of farm business and financial risks while maintaining the basic farming operations(Gitz and Meybeck, 2012; 
Hardaker et al., 2015).  
44 Here, the term farm viability is used to conceptualize the ability/capability of a farm to generate revenue (farm 
income) from its basic farming activities, which is then used to cover all the fixed and variable costs of the farm 
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Policy-wise, in this chapter, we argue that risk management should be still a public 
policy and should recognize both the observed and unobserved heterogeneity among farms. 
Nevertheless, it would be also interesting to see whether risk management in agriculture in 
Europe could be strictly a public policy matter or left to the discretion of individual farmers 
with minimal support from the government.  A final promising direction for future research 
would be to improve our understanding of the variations in farm risk-balancing behavior across 
countries and economies, including, for example, the economies of developed vs developing 
countries and across countries with different risk-management and farm-support systems, such 
as European countries and the US. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
business, and provide means of livelihood (making a living out of it). O'Donoghue et al. (2016: p. 164) provide a 
comprehensive list of definitions of farm viability from different theoretical perspectives. 
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3.10. Appendix 
A1. Correlation Relationship Analysis 
The correlation coefficients are estimated over pairings between one-year lagged 
business risk (BR) and the current period’s financial risk (FR). Since the risk-balancing theory 
hypothesizes an inverse relationship between one-year lagged business risk and current 
financial risk, a negative and significant correlation coefficient would constitute simple 
descriptive evidence of farm risk-balancing behavior.  
Table 3.9: Proportion of risk balancers 
 
 
We can infer from Table 3.9 that the overall correlation coefficient between financial 
risk and one-year lagged business risk is -0.0432. de Mey et al. (2014) also document a slightly 
lower negative coefficient. Table A-1 further shows that more than half of the observations 
(53.03%) exhibit risk-balancing behavior. Comparing across farm types, dairy farms and field-
crop farms have a slightly higher proportion of risk balancers. The difference between the 
                                                 
45A farm observation is classified as risk balancer when the three-year correlation coefficient between financial 
risk and one-year lagged business risk is negative.  
Year 
Risk45 
Balancers 
Proportion 
(%) 
Average Coefficients 
Risk Balancers  
2004 28 46.15 -0.0769 
2005 119 50.66 -0.0271 
2006 143 47.83 -0.0234 
2007 180 53.73 -0.0117 
2008 177 51.91 -0.0147 
2009 157 57.93 -0.0600 
2010 223 51.74 -0.0034 
2011 230 57.07 -0.0095 
2012 268 57.26 -0.0867 
2013 274 55.02 -0.0402 
2014 293 53.47 -0.0767 
2015 382 55.93 -0.0710 
Farm Type    
Dairy Farms 831 55.33 -0.0601 
Field Crops 524 53.96 -0.0644 
Horticulture 705 52.80 -0.0171 
Livestock 414 53.21 -0.0381 
Overall  53.03 -0.0432 
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annual distributions of risk balancers is also documented: the proportion of risk balancers 
exceeded 50% in ten out of twelve years. Both the proportion and the coefficients increased in 
magnitude in the post-financial crisis period (2009-2015). 
Figure 3.3 illustrates the distribution of the correlation coefficient measure of risk-
balancing by sector. All farm sectors exhibit fairly similar risk-balancing behavior despite their 
exposure to different business environments, production systems, policy factors, and other 
macro-economic conditions over the period under investigation.  
 
Figure 3.3: Distribution of FR-BR correlations, by farm type 
 
Figure 3.3 further shows a symmetric bimodal, i.e. two-peak distribution with the 
correlation coefficients between lagged business risk and current financial risk clustered 
around 1 and -1, implying a sinusoidality in the response that farms tend to balance (or not) 
their risk in the strong form. A descriptive summary of the mean values of the variables is 
presented in Table 3.10.  
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Table 3.10: Mean values of selected variables per risk-balancing class 
  Non-Risk Balancers Risk Balancers 
Variables (0.75 to 1.00) (0.74 to 0.01) (-0.74 to 0.00) (-1.00 to -0.75) 
Obs. 1,482 695 845 1,629 
NFI 149,115 142,432 143,883 137,301 
ROA 0.050 0.040 0.045 0.049 
Age 52.400 52.800 52.800 52.000 
Leverage 0.268 0.244 0.250 0.266 
Size 14.650 14.750 14.700 14.63 
Diversification 0.174 0.178 0.190 0.180 
Farm Type (%)     
Dairy Farms 0.300 0.350 0.370 0.320 
Field Crops 0.210 0.240 0.200 0.210 
Horticulture 0.310 0.270 0.270 0.290 
Livestock 0.180 0.140 0.160 0.180 
 
The sample farms are classified into four groups based on their correlation coefficients. 
Farms with negative correlation coefficients are classified as risk balancers while those with 
positive coefficients are grouped as non-risk balancers. Sixty-five percent of risk-balancing 
farms exhibit a strong form of risk-balancing. There is no clear trend in the mean values of the 
selected variables. Smaller farms with lower NFI and managed by younger farm operators tend 
to strongly balance their risk. 
A2. Measurement of Risk Exposure in Agriculture 
Four separate analyses are performed using (a) standard deviation as a measure of 
business risk, (b) downside deviation as a measure of business risk, (c) solvency ratio as a 
measure of business risk, and (d) the standard deviation of net farm income without debt 
financing as a measure of total risk. The results are presented through Tables 3.11 and 3.14. 
 
 
 
 
  
99 
A2.1. Standard deviation as a measure of business risk 
 
Table 3.11: Fixed-Effects panel-regression results using standard deviation as business 
risk over the period 2004-2015 
Variable Coefficient SE 
Ln BRt-1 -0.59295** (0.2398) 
Ln I/Dt-1  0.04319 (0.0276) 
Ln ROAt-1 -4.4372*** (0.4074) 
Ln Size  0.5313*** (0.0436) 
Age -0.2468*** (0.0329) 
Farm Type Dummies 
Field Crops -0.5563* (0.1088) 
Horticulture -0.4686 (0.0984) 
Livestock -0.0101 (0.1017) 
Year Dummies   
2005 -0.3237*** (0.0632) 
2006 -0.2706*** (0.0622) 
2007 -0.3061*** (0.0629) 
2008 -0.0162 (0.0662) 
2009  0.0620 (0.0717) 
2010 -0.4431*** (0.0641) 
2011 -0.2722*** (0.0662) 
2012 -0.4875*** (0.0647) 
2013 -0.5060*** (0.0645) 
2014 -0.4595*** (0.0661) 
2015 0 (omitted) 
Constant -7.5847*** (0.6311) 
R2 Within 0.0431  
F 14.38***  
Notes: SE provides the robust standard errors, ***,**, * are significant at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels 
respectively, the dummy reference levels are dairy farms and the year 2004, respectively, and the year 
2015 is omitted due to collinearity 
 
A2.2. Downside deviation as a measure of business risk 
One of the limitations of using the standard deviation is that it is simply a measure of 
variation that does not differentiate between upside and downside risks. To address this 
concern, we ran an additional analysis and plotted a new figure using downside deviation as a 
measure of business risk rather than standard deviation. 
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The downside deviation was calculated as follows: Firstly, we defined the minimum 
acceptable yearly return (ROA). Similar to our calculation of the coefficients of variation, we 
set the target return to a three-year rolling average of farm return on asset. Secondly, we 
subtracted the minimum acceptable (ROA) from the ROA for the year in the return stream for 
all the years that the farm remained in the sample. Thirdly, we reset the value to 0 if the ROA 
remained positive after subtracting the minimum acceptable (ROA) from each year’s ROA. 
Fourthly, we squared the difference, and finally, we took the square root of the number in step 
four to get the downside deviation. We use the following formula: 
√
1
𝑛
∑(𝑟 − 𝑡)2
𝑟<𝑡
                                                                                                                                  [3.25] 
Where 𝑟 and 𝑡 are the farmer’s ROA and minimum acceptable yearly return (ROA), 
respectively.  
 
Figure 3.4: Business risk measured as downside deviation by farm type, 2003-2015 
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Table 3.12: Fixed-effects panel-regression results using downside deviation as business 
risk over the period 2004-2015 
Variable Coefficient SE 
Ln BRt-1 -4.9024*** (1.3468) 
Ln I/Dt-1  0.0304 (0.0299) 
Ln ROAt-1 -5.0133*** (0.5074) 
Ln Size  0.5184*** (0.0473) 
Age -0.2241*** (0.0358) 
Farm Type Dummies 
Field Crops -0.5931* (0.1146) 
Horticulture -0.4663 (0.1065) 
Livestock -0.0376 (0.1093) 
Year Dummies 
2005 -0.2516*** (0.0713) 
2006 -0.2181** (0.0691) 
2007 -0.2540*** (0.0698) 
2008  0.0821 (0.0732) 
2009  0.1524** (0.0771) 
2010 -0.3714*** (0.0706) 
2011 -0.1981** (0.0730) 
2012 -0.3922*** (0.0715) 
2013 -0.4232*** (0.0708) 
2014 -0.3621*** (0.0726) 
2015 0 (omitted) 
Constant -7.5368*** (0.6848) 
R2 Within 0.0421  
F 11.78***  
Notes: SE provides the robust standard errors, ***,**, * are significant at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels 
respectively, the dummy reference levels are dairy farms and the year 2004, respectively, and 
the year 2015 is omitted due to collinearity 
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A2.3. Solvency ratio (total debt/equity) as a measure of financial risk. 
 
Table 3.13: Fixed-effects panel-regression results using solvency ratio as a financial risk 
measure over the period 2004-2015 
Variable Coefficient SE 
Ln BRt-1 -0.0086*** (0.0018) 
Ln I/Dt-1 -0.0379** (0.0053) 
Ln ROAt-1  0.9215*** (0.0714) 
Ln Size  0.0196 (0.0140) 
Age  0.0426*** (0.0065) 
Farm Type Dummies 
Field Crops  0.0181 (0.0403) 
Horticulture  0.0377 (0.0487) 
Livestock -0.0083 (0.0291) 
Year Dummies 
2005  0.0035 (0.0104) 
2006  0.0033 (0.0104 
2007  0.0015 (0.0106) 
2008 -0.0221** (0.0110) 
2009 -0.0179 (0.0113) 
2010 -0.0061 (0.0114) 
2011 -0.0675*** (0.0112) 
2012 -0.0525*** (0.0113) 
2013 -0.0592*** (0.0116) 
2014 -0.0574*** (0.0117) 
2015 0 (omitted) 
Constant  3.8702*** (0.2011) 
R2 Within 0.0518  
F 22.52***  
Notes: SE provides the robust standard errors, ***,**, * are significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels 
respectively, the dummy reference levels are dairy farms and the year 2004, respectively, and 
the year 2015 is omitted due to collinearity 
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A2.4. Using the standard deviation of net farm income without debt financing as a 
measure of total risk 
Table 3.14: Logit-estimates using the standard deviation of net farm income without debt 
financing as a measure of total risk over the period 2004-2015 
 
Fixed Effects 
 
Random Effects 
Variables Estimates SE Estimates SE 
Age -0.0708 (0.0661)  0.0047 (0.0349) 
Size -0.2806 (0.1287) -0.0179** (0.0407) 
Leverage  0.1060*** (0.2216) -0.0678 (0.1104) 
Total Risk -0.0004 (0.0011)  0.0002 (0.0011) 
Cost of Debt  0.2129 (0.2345)  0.2159 (0.2103) 
ROA -1.0910**  (0.6098) -0.0612** (0.4872) 
Investment  0.3702* (0.3206)  0.3645** (0.2847) 
Subsidy  0.0026 (0.0013)  0.0008 (0.0007) 
Diversification -0.4952 (0.2744) -0.2965 (0.1478) 
Farm Type Dummies 
Field Crops -0.4751 (0.3696) 0.2415* (0.0876) 
Horticulture -0.3374 (0.4629) 0.1000 (0.0801) 
Livestock  0.0245 (0.2551) 0.1741* (0.0829) 
Year Dummies 
2005 -0.2311** (0.0972) -0.2404** (0.0936) 
2006 -0.2066** (0.0967) -0.2260** (0.0909) 
2007  0.1500 (0.0974) 0.1103 (0.0897) 
2008  0.0463 (0.0980) 0.0030 (0.0880) 
2009  0.1112 (0.1026) 0.0872 (0.0895) 
2010 -0.0262 (0.1052) -0.098 (0.0885) 
2011  0.1987*** (0.1050) 0.1729** (0.0884) 
2012  0.2929*** (0.1062) 0.2453*** (0.0881) 
2013  0.1204 (0.1080) 0.0566 (0.0872) 
2014 0 (omitted) 0 (omitted) 
2015 0 (omitted) 0 (omitted) 
Constant - - 0.2207 (0.5805) 
R2 Pseudo  0.0757   0.0044  
Log-Likelihood -4053.76  -6705.68  
𝜒2  61.18***   59.31***  
No of Farms  1,092   1,569  
Notes: SE provides the robust standard errors, ***,**, * are significant at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels 
respectively, the dummy reference levels are dairy farms and the year 2004, respectively, and the years 
2014 and 2015 are omitted due to collinearity 
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A3. Accounting for Endogeneity Using the Instrumental Variable Approach  
Estimating the panel fixed-effects regression model is econometrically challenging. We 
suspect that the profitability variable in equation (3.8) is potentially endogenous46. Hence, 
estimating the parameters in equation (3.8) with the standard OLS estimator may lead to 
inconsistency and bias (Greene, 2003).  
The use of an instrumental variable approach is common practice to account for 
endogeneity. In most socio-economic research, it is very difficult to obtain (external) 
instruments that are simultaneously valid from a theoretical and empirical point of view. 
Arellano and Bond (1991) proposed a Difference General Methods Moment (Difference-
GMM) as ‘internal’ instruments approach, in which regression equations are expressed in terms 
of their first difference and endogenous variables are instrumented with lags of their own 
levels. This approach allows for the specification of the endogenous variables and involves 
first differencing that removes the time-invariant farm-specific effects. It has its limitations, 
however, as the lagged levels may be weakly correlated with first differences. Notably, this 
bias is not eliminated by using fixed-effects estimators since the regressors and the error term 
continue to be correlated after such a transformation. This is particularly relevant when the 
lagged levels used as instruments are highly persistent (Roodman, 2015). 
To address this limitation, Arellano and Bover (1995) developed an improved estimator 
known as the ‘Level GMM’, in which regressions are expressed in levels and endogenous 
instruments in terms of their lagged differences. Finally, Blundell and Bond (1998) combined 
both approaches to construct a system of equations known as the ‘System GMM’. It combines 
the set of moments in the difference and level equations to form instrument-endogenous 
                                                 
46 While this chapter deals with the effect of profitability on a farm’s financial risk, a farm’s level of financial risk 
may, conversely, also affect its profitability. Both directions of causality are thus possible: increased profitability 
decreases the level of financial risk farms are facing in their operation, whereas a higher level of financial risk 
limits the available fund for further investment on the farm, hence, lowers farm profit. Accordingly, we run a 
Durbin-Wu-Hausman test, and in the second stage instruments variable regression, a Hausman test for 
endogeneity results a p-value of 0.089 suggesting that we reject the null hypothesis at the 10% critical value that 
the profitability variable is exogenous. Thus, in conformity to our suspicion, there is evidence that the profitability 
variable is endogenous.  
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variables. The difference GMM estimator follows the Arellano and Bond (1991) data 
transformation, where differences are instrumented by levels. The system GMM estimator adds 
to this one extra layer of instrumentation, where the original levels are instrumented with 
differences. 
The system GMM procedure consists of first-differencing the data, as opposed to the 
fixed-effect transformation that demeans them, i.e. subtracts the sample mean. Additional 
orthogonality conditions for both difference and system GMM arise from suitable lags of the 
lagged explanatory variables in levels which can be treated as endogenous, predetermined or 
strictly exogenous. Endogenous variables are then instrumented using their own lagged values. 
The main advantages of these estimators are that they deal with individual-level fixed effects 
without incurring the bias to which standard panel estimators are subject. In addition, with 
System-GMM, instrumentation is not confined to one instrument per parameter to be 
estimated; rather, it is possible to define more than one moment condition per parameter to be 
estimated. Furthermore, the system GMM offers ‘internal’ solutions for dealing with 
endogenous regressors, and its additional orthogonality conditions improve asymptotic 
efficiency (Roodman, 2015). 
The System GMM is particularly suitable as a robustness test for this study because: (a) 
it uses difference equations to instrument endogenous regressors, so that they are also able to 
deal with time-invariant, farm-specific attributes, i.e. heterogeneity and endogeneity can be 
handled with this estimator; (b) it is well-suited to datasets with large numbers of cross-
sections, N, and small numbers of available periods, T; (c) any gaps in a panel – our FADN 
sample is unbalanced - are magnified by the difference GMM (compared to the system GMM), 
indeed a motivating factor for the creation and development of the system GMM (Roodman, 
2009: p.104); and (d), unlike OLS, FE and RE estimation, the GMM estimators do not require 
distributional assumptions, like normality, and can allow for the heteroscedasticity of an 
unknown form (Greene, 2003). 
We ran the analysis using the –xtdpdsys- command on STATA, and Table 3.15 
provides the results. We fit the model using optimal or two-step GMM and report robust 
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standard errors. The variables size and age are treated as strictly exogenous and appear as 
regular regressors. The other variables are treated as endogenous variables and appear with two 
lags, such that maximally two lags are used as instruments. 
The AR(2) tests the null hypothesis that Cov(∆εit,∆εit−k = 0) for 𝑘 = 1,2) is rejected 
at a level of 0.05 if 𝑝 < 0.05. If 𝜀𝑖𝑡 are serially uncorrelated, we expect to reject at order 1 but 
not at higher orders. From Table 3.15, we can see that we reject the hypothesis at order 1 
(𝐴𝑅(1)) because of  𝑝 = 0.0040. At order 2, ∆𝜀𝑖𝑡, and ∆𝜀𝑖𝑡−𝑘 are serially uncorrelated 
because 𝑝 = 0.4258 > 0.05. As desired, there is no serial correlation in the original error𝜀𝑖𝑡. 
A second specification test is the Sargan test of over-identifying restrictions. The -estat 
sargan- command starts the test. The null hypothesis that the population moment conditions 
are correct, i.e. the instruments as a group are exogenous, is not rejected because 𝑝 = 0.9918 >
0.05, which suggests that the instruments used in the System-GMM are valid. These 
specification test results indicate that the key identifying assumptions required for the System-
GMM estimator are satisfied.  
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Table 3.15: System-GMM estimation results 
Variables Coefficient SE 
Financial Risk   
L1. -0.004856*** (0.0005) 
L2. -0.006538*** (0.0004) 
Business Risk (t-1) -0.4224 (0.2369) 
L1. -1.8432*** (0.2929) 
L2. -0.6859*** (0.1999) 
Cost of Debt(t-1)  1.3816 (1.0295) 
L1.  1.4821 (1.1692) 
L2. -2.7646*  (1.1510) 
Profitability(t-1) -11.0746**  (5.2927) 
L1. -8.2162** (4.3582) 
L2. -6.1181  (4.0301) 
Size -1.0983*  (0.5480) 
Age -0.1679 (0.4339) 
Year Dummies   
2005 -0.3383 (0.5058) 
2006 -0.3801 (0.5933) 
2007  0.3508 (0.5588) 
2008 -0.4463 (0.6324) 
2009  0.1489 (0.6716) 
2010  10.222 (0.6173) 
2011  0.7375 (0.641) 
2012  1.7734**  (0.6656) 
2013  0.5593 (0.6546) 
2014  1.3796*  (0.6761) 
2015 0 (omitted) 
Constant  13.599 (8.55400) 
Wald χ²(21)=1028.83          P-value = 0.0000 
Sargan Testχ²(131)=95.33   P-value = 0.9918 
AR(1) Z=-2.8741                 P-value = 0.0040 
AR(2) Z=-0.7964                P-value = 0.4258 
Notes: Numbers in parentheses are robust standard errors, and ***, ** and * are significant at the 1%, 
5%, and 10% levels respectively, and the dummy reference level is the year 2004. Year 2015 is 
omitted due to collinearity. 
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Chapter-4 
 
Do Profit Rates Converge? Evidence 
on the Persistence of Farm Profit 
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4. Chapter Four: Do Profit Rates Converge? Evidence on 
the Persistence of Farm Profit 
 
4.1. Abstract 
Ensuring farm survival and competitiveness requires a better understanding of why 
some farms consistently perform better (worse) than others. This chapter investigates the 
drivers of farm profitability, the degree of abnormal profit persistence, and its determinants 
based on a unique longitudinal data set collected from a panel of Dutch farms between 2001 
and 2015. We apply a quantile regression approach to examine the drivers of farm profitability, 
and a dynamic panel System-GMM to estimate the persistence of abnormal farm profit. The 
results of the quantile regression show that working capital, labor productivity, leverage, 
capital intensity, and investment are important determinants of profitability. The findings 
suggest that working capital is important for farms’ flexibility and their capacity of adapting to 
changing circumstances in environments where they don’t receive regular income from 
agricultural products. Estimates using the dynamic panel model provide evidence on abnormal 
profit persistence. Profit persistence is responsive to farm risk exposure, investment, capital 
intensity, leverage, working capital, and diversification. We show that long-run farm profit can 
be achieved and sustained by ensuring adequate working capital to cope with the cash flow 
mismatch.  
 
Keywords: Dynamic panel model, quantile regression, profit persistence, System-GMM 
estimation.
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4.2. Introduction  
Why some firms persistently earn higher profits that deviate from the average earned 
in the industry? Are these differences random events or driven by resources and capabilities? 
Most of the literature supports the existence of firms that exhibit abnormal profits that persist 
in the long-run (Hirsch, 2018). While most studies consider the manufacturing and service 
sectors, articles focused on the agricultural sector at the farm level are scarce. Exceptions 
include Schumacher and Boland (2005), Hirsch and Gschwandtner (2013) and Hirsch and 
Hartmann (2014) that examine profit persistence in the food industry.  
Unlike the manufacturing and service sectors, agribusiness is characterized by specific 
circumstances, including seasonality of production, different legal forms, smaller decision-
making units, and limited access to equity markets. These unique characteristics increase the 
likelihood of cash flow mismatches, heterogeneous risk profiles, and create different patterns 
of decision making, providing a relevant context for extending the study of profit persistence 
into the agricultural sector. 
Farm profitability has been in the spotlight in recent years because farm income has 
exhibited higher volatility compared to other industries (Burns, Tulman and Harris, 2015; Sol, 
Isabel and Alberto, 2016) and because of major socioeconomic changes, including new land 
use demand, globalization, agricultural policy reforms, and a decline in the number of farms47 
in the developed world. 
In addition to these trends, we observe a different level of farm profitability; some farms 
consistently perform better (worse) than others (European-Commission, 2017). Such variations 
even after accounting for farm size and types raise several questions: are these differences in 
profit level and persistence systematic or random? what are the determinants of these 
                                                 
47 In 2005, the European Union (excluding Croatia) had an estimated 14.5 million farmers. By 2013, this number 
declined to 10.8 million, i.e. a 34.2% decline, equivalent to an average decline of 3.8% per year (Berkhout and 
van Bruchem, 2015). The Dutch farm sector was no exception. Between 2000 and 2014, the number of agricultural 
holdings significantly decreased from 101,550 to 65,500 farms, representing a 35.5% decline and exceeding the 
average EU decline (Eurostat, 2015).  
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differences? and can these determinants be influenced by farmers themselves and by policy 
instruments? From a policy perspective, these questions are relevant since most agricultural 
policy instruments aim to increase farm competitiveness. More importantly, it is critical for 
farms to benchmark their operations in the same sector and relative to other sectors, so they 
can address potential weaknesses and capitalize on strengths. 
This paper contributes to the literature in four ways: first, we extend the understanding 
of profit persistence and its drivers to the agriculture sector. Second, examining the 
determinants of long-run farm profitability provides insights about the distinct farm resources 
and capabilities that help farms to gain and sustain competitive advantages. Third, contrary to 
previous studies, which focused on a single farm type, we use panel data to consider four farm 
types: dairy, livestock, field crop, and horticulture farms. This allows for the analysis of a larger 
part of the farm sector in the Netherlands, while the panel data enables us to provide insight 
into the evolution of farm profit over time and its variation across farm types. Finally, this 
study is based on a dynamic panel model of Blundell and Bond’s (1998) System-GMM 
estimator. This approach is crucial as the dynamics of farm profits can be too complex to be 
captured by the simple AR (1) model often used in the literature and the dynamic panel model 
helps to address potential endogeneity problems common to static models.  
This chapter is structured as follows. The next section provides a theoretical 
background and conceptual framework. This is followed by a description of the variables, data 
used, and methodology applied. Next, the results of the empirical analyses are presented and 
discussed. The final section sets out the conclusion and limitations and provides suggestions 
for further research. 
4.3. Theoretical Background  
The classic perfect competition model considers the deviation of firm profit from the 
industry’s average (norm) as a short-run phenomenon as competition will cause profit to 
converge to the norm in the long-run. However, a substantial number of firms earn profits 
above the norm for sustained periods of time (Gschwandtner and Hauser, 2016), constituting 
an abnormal profit persistence that the classic model fails to explain (Hirsch and Hartmann, 
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2014). Several models have been developed to explain this phenomenon where the Structure 
Conduct Performance (SCP), the Market-Based View (MBV), and the Resource-Based View 
(RBV) are predominant.  
The central premise of SCP is that abnormal profit is determined by the competitive 
dynamics and structure of the industry. That can be assessed by analyzing elements such as 
barriers to entry and exit, product differentiation, the number of competitors, and the number 
of buyers and sellers, which help to determine how firms behave and perform, i.e., gain and 
sustain abnormal profits (Porter, 2008).  
The MBV is an extension of the SCP and argues that superior performance is 
determined not only by industry structure but also by market-positioning strategies, e.g. low-
cost/product differentiation, employed in the target market segments that determine superior 
performance and its sustainability (Wiggins and Ruefli, 2002). The MBV stresses that firms 
design their strategies based on market analysis of the industry 
Recently, the focus in the literature has shifted from industry structure to firm’s internal 
resources and capabilities (Olivier, Howard and Anna, 2008). This shift has made the 
Resource- Based View (RBV) the leading model for analyzing sustained superior performance. 
A central premise of the RBV is that firms compete and choose strategies based on their 
material, financial and human resources and their capabilities (Grant, 1991). Competitive 
advantage can be achieved and sustained by developing and owning resources that are scarce, 
valuable, non-substitutable and inimitable (Barney, 2001). Resources that create competitive 
advantage will also generate superior economic performance that will persist over time. 
The SCP, MBV, and RBV are similar in that they all assume that a firm’s ultimate goal 
is to achieve and sustain a competitive advantage and that above-normal profit is possible. 
They differ as to the sources of competitive advantage and the unit of analysis. Despite the 
relevance of each of these views in explaining abnormal profit, the RBV provides an 
established analytical tool for examining the relationship between farm resources, profit, and 
sustained abnormal profit. Hence, our conceptual framework is based on the RBV.  
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4.4. Conceptual Framework 
Profit persistence is widely studied in the manufacturing and service sectors under the 
lenses of industrial organization and resource-based views (Gompers et al., 2010; McGahan 
and Porter, 2003; Villalonga, 2004). Most studies report a moderate degree of persistence by 
examining the variation of normalized firm-level profit rates over time using first-order 
autoregressive models48. However, the evidence of persistence of profit in the agricultural 
sector is rather rare.  
Griffin, Ibendahl and Stabel (2018) estimate transition probabilities of Kansas arable 
farms across five profitability categories, and find a moderate persistence of farms in their 
initial profitability class. Urcola et al. (2004)) measure yield productivity persistence and show 
that difference in management-skills explains the most and least productive farms. Yeager and 
Langemeier (2016) find that farm size, farm type, and operator age explain efficiency 
persistence. Yet, empirical evidence at farm level is still scarce. Most importantly, 
understanding of the unique resources and capabilities to gain and sustain a competitive 
advantage in farm business remains a major gap in the literature. This study aims to provide 
evidence that explains the level and the determinants of profit persistence at a farm level. 
4.4.1. Determinants of Farm Profit and Profit Persistence 
Figure 4.1 shows the proposed conceptual model. Alongside the literature review, the 
RBV provides an established framework for empirically examining the impact of farm 
resources on long-term profitability and abnormal profit persistence.  
 
 
                                                 
48 See Goddard et al. (2011) for a comprehensive review of profit persistence studies using standard first-order 
autoregressive models. 
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Figure 4.1: Conceptual framework 
In addition to developing risk-bearing capacity, farms may employ diversification as 
one of their risk-management strategies. Diversification can help mitigate different farm risks, 
lower profit fluctuation and optimize production (Kwansoo et al., 2012; Meraner et al., 2015). 
It may also lead to economies of scope, which lowers costs and increases profit (Mishra et al., 
2009). Leverage also explains sustained competitive advantage. In line with the pecking-order 
theory of capital structure, we expect farms with less leverage, i.e. use of internal funds over 
external funds, to gain and sustain profit by reducing financing costs and investing in highly 
profitable investments (Feng, Zhengfei and Robert, 2014).  
The capital spent to produce one unit of farm revenue indicates a farm’s level of capital 
intensity. It includes the assets used in a farm’s production functions. Farms that continuously 
require capital to earn profits are unlikely to earn and sustain abnormal profits in the long-term 
(Gardebroek, Kedir and Wijnands, 2010). Also, farms that rely on capital for their competitive 
advantage are more exposed to imitation risk by competitors, which might cause rapid erosion 
of abnormal returns (Porter, 2008). 
We also include farm size, subsidy, investment, labor productivity, and age in the 
analysis. Farm size is expected to drive profit persistence because large farms have the 
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opportunity to achieve economies of scale and have access to more markets and investment 
opportunities. Alternatively, if a farm scale leads to diseconomies of scale and inefficiencies, 
the size-sustained competitive advantage relationship could be negative. A government 
subsidy49 is included to address the impact of participation in government support programs on 
farm profitability and its persistence. The decision of how to allocate farm cash surplus, i.e., 
investment, is also a crucial factor in the long-term wealth creation of farm businesses. Labor 
productivity is used as a proxy of human capital and shows how farm labor is managed to 
accomplish objectives. If laborers are efficient, we expect the farm to sustain abnormal profits 
in the long-run. Farming experience or age may also influence how farms manage their 
operations. McBride and Greene (2007), for instance, show that age is positively correlated 
with farm production costs.  
As control variables, we include region, soil type, and year dummies in the analysis. 
Soil type addresses the productivity differences between sand, clay and peat. Region dummies 
are included to control for differences in precipitation and farmland value. A set of time 
dummies is included to capture business-cycle impacts in the farm business. The next section 
presents the research design. 
4.5. Research Design 
4.5.1. Farm Profitability 
Annual farm profit as a measure of performance is a well-documented procedure in the 
literature. However, it is not immune from criticism because profit is an absolute amount and 
mostly size driven. Thus, it is not easy to make comparisons across different farm types. To 
                                                 
49 In most developed countries, payments received in the form of subsidies and direct payments represent a major 
portion of farm total income (D'Antoni and Mishra, 2013; El‐Osta, Mishra and Morehart, 2007). For instance, the 
annual European Union Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) budget is about 50 Billion Euros, of which farm 
subsidization absorbs 72% on average. In the Netherlands, roughly 50,000 Dutch farm businesses received over 
805 million Euros in direct payments in 2014 alone. The total amount that Dutch farmers received through the 
CAP between 2007 and 2014 approximates 8.35 Billion Euros (European-Commission, 2017). 
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address such concerns, we use the Modified Return on Asset (MROA). Following Mishra, 
Wilson and Williams (2009), MROA is defined as: 
MROA =
Modified Net Farm Income
Average Total Asset
                                                                                          [4.1] 
where Modified Net Farm Income (MNFI) is calculated as Net Farm Income (NFI50) 
plus interest expense. By adding back interest expense to the calculation, it is possible to 
compare farms with different capital structures. The MROA is useful for determining what the 
assets invested in the farm operation earned. Average market values are considered to 
determine the worth of farm assets51. Hence, it is possible to use the MROA to compare farm 
earnings to those of other businesses across the same time period. This measure of profitability 
eliminates differences in farm size and expenses such as financing, and can be a useful tool for 
assessing true farm profitability. We assume that the profit function of Dutch farms can be 
approximated by a linear panel model: 
Yit = βXit + 𝛼i + 𝜇it,                                                                                                                         [4.2] 
where 𝐘 is the vector of farm profit for each farm 𝑖, and time 𝑡, 𝐗 is the vector of all the 
regressors, 𝛃 is the vector of parameters to be estimated, 𝛼 is the unknown intercept for each 
farm, and 𝜇 is the vector of residuals. 
If OLS is used to estimate equation (4.2) with the presence of unobserved heterogeneity, 
the estimated coefficients are not representative of the entire conditional profit distribution. To 
account for some of the heterogeneity in the sample, observed farm-level characteristics, i.e., 
farm type, region, size, soil quality, can be explicitly included in the regression equation. 
Nevertheless, there may also be other sources of farm heterogeneity that cannot be observed 
and accounted for. For example, in our case, farm characteristics such as risk perception, risk 
                                                 
50We calculate NFI using the FADN principle as Net Farm Income=Operating Receipts -Intermediate Costs- 
Depreciation+ Balance of Subsidies and Tax-Wages-Rent 
51 To obtain a more accurate version of NFI, we take the average total asset as a denominator, i.e. the average of 
the opening total assets at the beginning of the accounting period and closing total assets at the end of the 
accounting period.  
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attitude and managerial ability have not been taken into account in the data although they may 
cause unobserved heterogeneity. Unobserved heterogeneity may render the dependent variable 
and the error term in equation (4.2) to be independently, but not identically distributed across 
farms. When observations are not identically distributed, OLS estimates will be inefficient and 
extreme observations will have a significant influence on the estimated coefficients (Green, 
2003).  
Quantile regression estimates52 are considered robust relative to the traditional OLS 
estimator for a number of reasons: they place less weight on outliers and are robust to 
departures from normality (Koenker, 2004). In addition, it avoids the restrictive assumptions 
that the error terms are identically distributed at all points of the conditional distribution. 
Avoiding this assumption allows us to capture farm heterogeneity in that the slope parameters 
can vary at different quantiles of the distributions of farm profitability. Quantile regression53 
can be illustrated as follows: 
𝐘it = 𝐗𝑖𝑡
′ 𝜷𝜃 + 𝝁it with 𝑄𝜃(𝐘it 𝐗it⁄ ) =  𝐗𝑖𝑡
′ 𝜷𝜃,                                                                           [4.3] 
where 𝑄𝜃(𝐘it 𝐗it⁄ ) denotes the θ
th conditional quantile of 𝐘it given 𝐗it. The θ
th regression 
quantile which is restricted to 0 < 𝜃 < 1,. The model in equation (4.2) is specified as: 
Yit = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽1Levit + 𝛽2Risk − Shortit + 𝛽3Risk − Longit+𝛽4WCit + 𝛽5KIntit +
𝛽6Hcapit + 𝛽7Divrit + 𝛽8Ageit + 𝛽9lnTAit + 𝛽10Investit + 𝛽11Subit + 𝛽12Dsoilit +
𝛽13Dregit + Γt + εit                                                                                                             [4.4]  
 Yit denotes the Modified Return on Asset (MROA); 
 Lev denotes leverage and is measured as the ratio of total debt to asset; 
 Risk-Short denotes farm short-run financial exposure and is calculated as current liability 
divided by total asset; 
                                                 
52 Since the aim is to understand the effects of farm characteristics at different points of the profitability 
distribution, the focus is on quantile regression. Nevertheless, results from the traditional OLS estimation are also 
reported in the results section, for the sake of comparison to previous studies. 
53 See Koenker and Hallock (2001) and Koenker (2004) for a detailed discussion and implementation of quantile 
regression with longitudinal data. 
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 Risk-Long denotes farm long-run financial risk exposure (gearing) and is calculated as 
long-term liability divided by the owner’s equity; 
 WC represents working capital, i.e., current asset minus current liability, and is used as a 
proxy for farm risk-bearing capacity; 
 KInt represents farm capital intensity, i.e., total assets divided by total output; 
 Hcap indicates labor productivity, i.e., total farm output/Agricultural Working Unit 
(AWU), as a proxy to farm human capital; 
 Divr denotes farm diversification, i.e., other farm output/total farm output; 
 Age indicates the age of the farmer; 
 lnTA denotes the natural logarithm of total farm assets; 
 Sub denotes subsidy rate, i.e., total subsidy payments divided by total output; 
 Invest denotes investment ratio i.e., total farm investment divided by total output; 
 Dsoil denotes dummy soil type: 0 for sand, 1 for clay, 2 for peat and 3 for mixed soil 
types; 
 Dreg denotes dummy regions; and 
 𝛤𝑡 denotes year dummies; 𝜀 is the error term, 𝛼 and 𝛽 are the parameters to be estimated. 
4.5.2. Estimating the Degree and Determinants of Abnormal Farm Profit 
Persistence 
Previous studies use average industry profit to gauge the industry norm (McGahan and 
Porter, 2003; Waring, 1996). Following a similar approach, we define abnormal farm profit54 
of farm i at time t (Π̅𝑖𝑡) as the deviation of the profit of farm 𝑖 at time 𝑡 (Πit)from the average 
profit of all other farms in sector 𝑠 at time 𝑡 (Πst ): 
Π̅𝑖𝑡 = Πit − Πst                                                                                                                                    [4.5] 
                                                 
54 Note that, when estimating the quantile regression, the dependent variable is farm profit (Yit), measured as 
MROA in equation (4.1). When estimating the degree and determinants of abnormal profit persistence, however, 
the dependent variable is abnormal profit (Π̅it) as measured in equation (4.5). 
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This normalization removes the variations in farm profit induced by external influences 
and business cycle (Gschwandtner, 2012). To test the hypothesis that competition will erode 
abnormal profit in the long-run, the literature commonly uses a standard first-order 
autoregressive model, given by: 
Π̅𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝜆𝑗Π̅𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡                                                                                                                  [4.6] 
Equation (4.6) yields both short-run and long-run persistence measures. Short-run profit 
persistence is captured by 𝜆𝑗 . It indicates the percentage of total abnormal profit in 𝑡 − 1 that 
remains in 𝑡. The long-run persistence measure is estimated from the long-run average of the 
auto regressive process, ?̂?𝑗: 
?̂?𝑗 =
?̂?𝑖
(1 − ?̂?𝑗)
                                                                                                                                       [4.7] 
Profit persistence studies based on AR models (See, e.g.,Gschwandtner, 2012; 
Yurtoglu, 2004) apply a standard two-step approach: first they estimate equation (4.6) to get 
?̂?𝑗 and 𝛱?̂?. Second, selected variables are regressed on the estimated parameters in step one 
using OLS regression to explain profit persistence. This approach has its limitations 
nevertheless. The dependent variable in equation (4.6) is correlated with the error term, 
suggesting that the OLS estimator is inconsistent and biased (Baltagi, 2008). To address these 
concerns, we specify a dynamic panel model with the General Methods Moment (GMM) 
estimator as follows: 
 Π̅it = 𝛼𝑖 + λΠ̅i,t−1 + ∑ 𝛽j(Xjit)
j
+ Γt + εit                                                                                [4.8] 
Within this framework, 𝜆 indicates the speed of convergence of profits to the long-term 
level. Since 𝜆 reflects the fluctuations of profit from period to period, it can also be interpreted 
as short-term persistence55. The GMM estimator does not produce a long-run persistence 
                                                 
55 The speed of adjustment parameter,𝜆 often takse values between -1 and 1. It shows how quickly a farm’s profit 
rate converges to its long-run level.  
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measure. Yet, the  𝛽𝑗 coefficients capture the impacts of the farm characteristics
56 (𝑋𝑗s) on 
abnormal profit over the entire period analyzed. Hence, through 𝛽𝑗, it is possible to weigh the 
direction of change in long-run abnormal profit for a given change in the variable  𝑋𝑗 (Hirsch 
and Gschwandtner, 2013).  
Arellano and Bond (1991) proposed a Difference General Methods Moment 
(Difference-GMM) in which regression equations are expressed in terms of their first 
difference and endogenous variables are instrumented using lags of their own levels. It allows 
us to specify the endogenous variables and involves first differencing that removes the time-
invariant, farm-specific effects: 
𝑍𝑖 =
[
 
 
 
 
[Π̅𝑖] 0 ⋯ ⋯ 0
0 [Π̅𝑖1, Π̅𝑖2] ⋯ ⋯ 0
⋮ ⋮ ⋱ ⋯ ⋮
⋮ ⋮ ⋯ ⋱ ⋮
0 0 ⋯ ⋯ [Π̅𝑖1, ⋯⋯⋯ , Π̅𝑖,𝑇−𝑝]]
 
 
 
 
                                                          [4.9] 
Where, 𝑍 is the matrix of instruments for individual 𝑖,𝑖 = 1, … . , 𝑛, 𝑝 is the number of 
lags, and 𝑇 is the number of time periods.  
This approach has, however, limitations as the lagged levels may be weakly correlated 
with first differences. Notably, this bias is not eliminated by using fixed effects estimators since 
the regeressors and the error term continue to be correlated after such a transformation. To 
address this limitation, Arellano and Bover (1995) developed an improved estimator known as 
the ‘Level GMM’, in which regressions are expressed in levels and endogenous instruments in 
terms of their lagged differences. Finally, Blundell and Bond (1998) combined both approaches 
to construct a system of equations known as the ‘System GMM’. It combines the set of 
moments in the difference and level equations into instrument endogenous variables. 
The System GMM is particularly suitable for this chapter because: (a) variables such 
as soil type and region are included in our model. These variables vary only across individuals, 
                                                 
56 Note that the same variables (see equation 4.4) are used to explain both the determinants of farm profitability 
and abnormal profit persistence. 
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and identification of the parameters would be inefficient with the Difference GMM (Zhengfei 
and Oude Lansink, 2006), (b) it has better asymptotic and finite sample properties than the 
Difference GMM (Blundell and Bond, 1998), (c) it uses difference equations to instrument 
endogenous regeressors, so that they are also able to deal with time-invariant farm-specific 
attributes, i.e., heterogeneity and endogeneity can be handled with this estimator, and (d) it is 
well-suited to datasets with large numbers of cross-sections, N, and a small number of available 
periods, T.  
Nevertheless, the System-GMM estimator has limitations too. It requires orthogonality 
between lagged levels of the variables used as instruments and the differences of the error terms 
and simultaneously orthogonality between farm-specific effects and the lagged difference of 
the variables used as instruments. Hence, a specification test on over-identifying restrictions is 
required to check the validity of the additional instruments (Roodman, 2009). 
4.6. Data and Descriptive Statistic 
We use a unique longitudinal dataset of farms that participate in the Dutch Farm 
Accountancy Data Network (FADN), and Table 4.1 provides summary statistics.  
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Table 4.1: Summary Statistics 
 
Average farm return on asset for all farms was 2.5% over the 2001–2015 period and 
showed variation by farm type. The average MROAs for dairy farms, field crops, livestock and 
horticulture were 1.9%, 2.7%, 3.4%, and 1.7% respectively, with horticulture being the largest. 
Figure 2 shows the variation in MROA over the years across the four farm types. Note that the 
impact of the financial crisis on farm performance is clearly visible from Figure 4.2.  
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Figure 4.2: MROA by farm type, 2001-2015 
Nevertheless, empirical measures of profit persistence may suffer from survivorship 
bias (Linnainmaa, 2013). In our data set, 323, i.e., 31% of farms, stayed in the sample for the 
entire measurement period, and 1403 farms (70%) remained in the sample for more than five 
years. For a farm to be included in the analysis, firstly, continuous whole-farm data had to be 
available from 2001-2015. Secondly, due to the lag structure of our model, a farm had to have 
remained in the sample for at least three years. Applying these criteria reduced the total number 
of farms to 1,796, and the next section presents the results. 
4.7. Empirical Results  
4.7.1. Determinants of Farm Profitability 
Evaluation of the quantile regressions as shown in Table 4.2 allows examination of the effects 
of selected variables at multiple distributions of farm profitability.  
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Table 4.2: Determinants of farm profitability 
 
***,**,* are significant at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels , respectively. Numbers in parentheses 
are bootstrap standard errors based on 1000 replications, and the dummy reference levels 
are dairy farms, the year 2001, Drenthe region, and clay soil. 
The second column in Table 4.2 shows the parameter estimates57 for the ordinary least 
squares (OLS) regression. The third, fourth, fifth, sixth and seventh columns present the results 
                                                 
57 Note that, in the interest of space, the coefficients for year, region, and soil type dummies are not reported in 
all tables. Bootstrap standard errors are presented in brackets. The bootstrap standard errors retain the assumption 
Table 2 
Determinants of farm profitability.  
ROA OLS q(10) q(25) q(50) q(75) q(90) 
Leverage -0.320*** 
(0.0042) 
-0.1047*** 
(0.0045) 
-0.0810*** 
(0.0022) 
-0.0641*** 
 (0.0020) 
-0.0488*** 
 (0.0024) 
-0.0374*** 
 (0.0038) 
Short-run risk -0.232* 
(0.1287) 
-0.2116 
(0.2642) 
0.0007 
(0.2781) 
-0.2410 
 (0.2517) 
-0.1500* 
 (0.1471) 
-0.0929 
 (0.1484) 
Long-run risk 0. 4127 
(0.448) 
0.3841 
(0.7002) 
-0.1731 
(0.9900) 
 0.7134 
 (0.9056) 
 0.4783 
 (0.6471) 
 0.8028* 
 (0.5587) 
Working capital 0.0045 ** 
(0.0017) 
0.0059 *** 
(0.0010) 
0.0070*** 
(0.0008) 
 0.0099*** 
 (0.0010) 
 0.0146*** 
 (0.0013) 
 0.0155*** 
 (0.0017) 
Capital Intensity -0.3171 *** 
(0.0022) 
-0.1922 *** 
(0.0130) 
-0.2291*** 
(0.0096) 
-0.2846*** 
 (0.0084) 
-0.3149*** 
 (0.0138) 
-0.2860 
 (0.0186) 
Age -0.0434 *** 
(0.0058) 
-0.0103 *** 
(0.0022) 
-0.0073*** 
(0.0015) 
-0.0067*** 
 (0.0014) 
-0.0038** 
 (0.0014) 
-0.0018 
 (0.0020) 
Investment 0.0596*** 
(0.0081) 
0.0001 
(0.0079) 
0.0147*** 
(0.0042) 
 0.0244*** 
 (0.0055) 
 0.0378*** 
(0.0065) 
 0.0702*** 
 (0.0132) 
Subsidy rate 0.0124  
(0.0130) 
0.0183 *** 
(0.0064) 
0.0077 
(0.0053) 
-0.0010 
 (0.0050) 
-0.0089 
 (0.0070) 
-0.0298** 
 (0.0162) 
Diversification 0.0395*** 
(0.0065) 
0.0201*** 
(0.0031) 
0.0212*** 
(0.0027) 
 0.0260*** 
 (0.0021) 
 0.0243*** 
 (0.0026) 
 0.0298*** 
 (0.0056) 
Size 0.0021  
(0.0030) 
0.0070 *** 
(0.0008) 
0.0026*** 
(0.0005) 
-0.0017*** 
 (0.0005) 
-0.0085*** 
 (0.0006) 
-0.0178*** 
 (0.0011) 
Labor Productivity 0.2663 *** 
(0.0176) 
0.0667 *** 
(0.0070) 
0.0601*** 
(0.0055) 
 0.0666*** 
 (0.0050) 
 0.0933*** 
 (0.0096) 
 0.1713*** 
 (0.0230) 
Farm-Field crops -0.0110  
(0.0085) 
-0.0102 *** 
(0.0011) 
-0.0047*** 
(0.0007) 
 0.0002 
 (0.0007) 
 0.0056*** 
 (0.0008) 
 0.0103*** 
 (0.0016) 
Farm-Horticulture -0.0149 
(0.0101) 
-0.023*** 
(0.0019) 
-0.0082*** 
(0.0012) 
 0.0075*** 
 (0.0011) 
 0.0269*** 
 (0.0015) 
 0.0527*** 
 (0.0027) 
Farm-Livestock -0.0151** 
(0.0061) 
-0.0277*** 
(0.0014) 
-0.0220*** 
(0.0010) 
-0.0161*** 
 (0.0010) 
-0.0101*** 
 (0.0012) 
-0.0030 
 (0.0020) 
_cons  0.2538*** 
(0.0548) 
-0.0194 
(0.0131) 
0.0442*** 
(0.0091) 
0.1137*** 
 (0.0086) 
 0.2074*** 
 (0.0098) 
 0.3335*** 
 (0.0163) 
Year Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Region Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Soil Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R
2
(Pseudo R
2
) 0.067 0.219 0.149 0.136 0.197 0.250 
Obs. 15,659      
** , * , * are significant a  the 1%, 5%  0  level resp ctively. Numbers in parentheses are 
bootstrap stand rd e rors based on 1000 replications
1
, nd the dummy reference lev ls are dairy 
farms, the year 2001, D enthe region, and clay soil. 
 
                                                 
1
 The bootstrap standard errors retain the assumption of independent errors but relax the assumption of 
identically distributed errors, hence are analogous to the robust standard errors in linear regression. 
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of the quantile regression at the following quantiles: 0.10, 0.25, 0.50, 0.75 and 0.90. The 
quantile value estimates indicate that there is a significant difference in the parameter estimates 
across the five quantile estimates58. Evaluated at the median, most of the variables are highly 
significant (Table 4. 2), and the coefficients vary greatly across the conditional profit 
distribution. For example, there is more than a 175% difference, in absolute value, between the 
leverage coefficient for the 10th and the 90th quantile.  
Results suggests that a larger proportion of the profit of high-profit farms is attributable 
to their high levels of long-term risk, working capital, investment, diversification and labor 
productivity. Farm size has a negative effect on farms in the highest-profit quantile groups, 
while a positive effect of size is observed in the lower quantiles, which can be due to the lower 
marginal profit obtained from economies of scale for higher-profit farms.  
The regression coefficients for the subsidy rate are positive and significant in the lower-
profit quantile (10%) and negative and significant in the high-profit quantile (90%). The 
underlying economic reason may be tied to subsidies from the government that constitutes the 
major portion of net farm income for farms in the lower-profit groups. A one percent increase 
in farm subsidy increases profitability by 1.83 percent in the 10th quantile while it decreases 
profitability by 2.98 percent in the 90th quantile. This finding contributes to the current debate 
on the relevance of farm subsidies to stabilizing farm income. 
The effect of short-run financial risk exposure is negative but significant in the upper 
conditional distribution of farm profit (75%), suggesting that farms in this range do not benefit 
from taking more risks in the short-run. Conversely, the long-run risk exposure of farms in the 
upper end of the distribution (90%) appears positive and significant. 
                                                 
of independent errors but relax the assumption of identically distributed errors and are hence analogous to the 
robust standard errors in linear regression (Koenker, 2004). 
58 Detailed results of the hypothesis test that evaluates the statistical significance of the differences in parameter 
estimates in all quantiles show that the null hypothesis, i.e. that the coefficients are equal across quantiles, is 
rejected. This indicates that there are statistically significant differences among the estimated quantile regression 
parameters. Hence, it confirms the presence of unobserved heterogeneity and validates the use of quantile 
regression. 
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Farms tend to spread their risk through diversification. The significant and positive 
effect of diversification entails that the addition of non-core activities to the farm enterprise is 
rewarding in terms of revenue (Kwansoo et al., 2012; Mishra, El-Osta and Johnson, 1999). 
Positive financial returns can be expected when diversification is undertaken in a way that does 
not decrease overall farm efficiency, lowers input costs or offsets the risk of low return on one 
product by increasing the profitability of another. Note that these effects become more 
pronounced as we move from the lower to the upper profit quantiles, indicating that 
diversification is systematically associated with high farm profits. 
When investment per total asset increases, farm profit also increases in all quantiles but 
the 10th. Moreover, this increase is more pronounced for higher levels of farm profitability. The 
estimated effects of capital intensity on farm profitability found in Table 4.2, suggests that 
farms that require more capital to earn the same revenue end up making lower profits.  
The same conclusion can be reached for the variable of leverage. Farms that depend 
heavily on external funds over internal funds incur financing costs, which will ultimately 
reduce profitability levels. It is worth noting that farmers as sole proprietors face additional 
credit constraints beyond those faced by partnerships and other legal business forms with 
limited access to capital markets, which may further restrain the expansion of farm enterprises. 
Note that these effects are more pronounced as we move from the upper profit quantiles to the 
lower ones, which further suggests that farms with lower profits will signal lower 
creditworthiness to creditors and end up paying higher interest rates than farms in the upper 
end of the profit-distribution quantile.  
Figure 4.3 illustrates how the effects of leverage, short-run and long-run risk exposures, 
working capital, investment, capital intensity, subsidy ratio, diversification, farm size, and 
labor productivity vary over quantiles and how the magnitude of the effects differs 
considerably from the OLS coefficient. The solid line represents the 5-point estimates of the 
effects of selected variables for quantiles ranging from 0.1 to 0.90. The two dashed lines 
represent the upper and lower confidence bounds. The bold dotted horizontal line indicates the 
ordinary least squares estimates of the mean effects. 
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Figure 4.3: OLS and quantile regression estimates for the farm profitability model 
The coefficient of farm size on profitability, for example, is 100 times lower at the 90% 
quantile than at the median quantile. Finally, the estimated coefficients for the farm type 
dummies indicate a mixed but statistically significant level of profitability compared to the 
reference farm type (dairy farms). Hence, we note how the same variables affect profit 
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differently for each farm type and at different levels of profitability. Table 4.3 reports the 
quantile regression estimation results across the four farm types, and the following paragraphs 
summaries the major findings. 
For dairy farms, similar to field-crop, horticulture and livestock farms, the regression 
estimates of the effects of leverage, capital intensity and age are significantly negative, whereas 
working capital has a positive effect. Note that the effects of investment, diversification and 
labor productivity on profitability are only positive and significant at the middle and upper end 
of the profit distribution. The systematic effects of leverage suggest that the negative role of 
farm leverage becomes less obvious with an increase in farm profitability. While dairy farm 
size, short-run and long-run risks have mixed effect, we do not find any effect of government 
subsidies on profit at any quantile. The relationship of working capital with profitability 
becomes more pronounced as we move from the lower to the upper profit quantile. This can 
be explained by the strong regulation and frequent policy changes experienced by Dutch dairy 
farms, such as the automatic milking system, obligatory manure processing and the abolition 
of the milk quota system (Klootwijk et al., 2016; Samson, Gardebroek and Jongeneel, 2016). 
These changes increase the need for cash to comply with the regulations and new market 
conditions. Hence, having sufficient working capital to fulfill these requirements is expected 
to impact dairy farm profitability. 
For field crop farms, size has mixed effects. While an increase in farm size results in a 
higher profit at the 25th and 10th quantile, it is linked to lower profitability in the higher 75th and 
90th quantiles. As expected, a large farm size contributes to higher farm profit because it 
generates economies of scale, allows for more cash crops to be produced or for the assets to be 
used as collateral for other income-generating materials. However, these economies of scale 
and economies of scope associated with larger size show an adverse effect for farms at the 
upper end of the profit quantile. Note that, unlike for the other three farm types, the association 
between the subsidy and profitability is significant and negative for the upper quantiles.  
Regarding horticulture farms, the effect of investment systematically increases from the 
25th to the 90th quantile, i.e. becomes more pronounced as we move from the bottom to the 
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upper profit quantiles. The Dutch horticulture sector is mostly characterized as innovative and 
technology, capital and energy intensive (Berkhout and van Bruchem, 2015). The result 
provides confirmation that investment in energy-saving technologies and other innovations is 
an important determinant of farm profitability for horticulture farms. Diversification is 
associated with profitability only in the upper quantile. In addition, unlike for dairy and field-
crop farms, both short and long-run financial risks are not associated with farm profitability in 
any of the quantiles. 
Note that the effects of diversification and age are more pronounced in livestock farms, 
unlike in the other farm types. The interdependent nature of livestock production enhances on-
farm diversification, e.g. the demand for beef, poultry, pork and lamb is highly related, which 
further motivates farms to diversify. Thus, farms can increase total livestock production 
through diversifying beyond what could have been produced through specializing on fixed 
land, fencing, building, labor, and machinery or through minimal increases in resources. The 
pronounced effect of diversification on profit is particularly true for livestock farms due to the 
relationship between fixed costs59 and profit. By diversifying, livestock farms tend to lower 
their cash flow risk and increase their profitability. Given that experience accumulates over 
time, one might expect older farmers to be more likely to better manage a farm and achieve a 
higher profitability. Contrary to this expectation, however, age is found to be negatively 
associated with profitability in livestock farms. We could argue that older farmers might be 
less motivated to increase efficiency or tend to believe operations cannot be improved further, 
or they may value other aspects of life over financial success. Another explanation could be 
that age/experience and performance show a linear or exponential relationship and the 
distribution might be expressed as a bell curve.  
In general, the coefficients of working capital, labor productivity, and investment are 
positive and statistically significant for all farm types. This suggests that, in an environment 
                                                 
59 Fixed costs are a major expense in operating a livestock farm in the Netherlands (Samson, Gardebroek and 
Jongeneel, 2016). Not surprisingly, as production increases for a fixed level of resources keeping fixed costs per 
unit lower, the overall farm profitability will also increase.  
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where farms don’t have regular income from agricultural products, working capital is important 
for them to have the flexibility and capacity to adapt to changing circumstances, which 
ultimately helps in earning a profit. The findings also lend support to the premise of the RBV 
that scarce and less imitable resources contribute to superior performance, hence profitability. 
On the other hand, leverage and capital intensity have negative effects on farm profitability. 
Farms that already exhibit high leverage levels and use more capital experience more cash-
flow constraints in their operation due to high financing costs. Farms with a high debt-to-asset 
ratio often maintain less working capital, and their ability to refinance is limited, which impairs 
profits and cash flow positions. The next section discusses the impact of the selected 
characteristics on the persistence of abnormal farm profitability.  
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Table 4.3: Determinates of farm profitability, quantile regression results 
 
Table 3  
Determinants of farm profitability, quantile regression results.   
MROA Dairy Farms Field Crops 
 
q(10) q(25) q(50) q(75) q(90) q(10) q(25) q(50) q(75) q(90) 
Leverage -0.0768*** -0.0725*** -0.0610*** -0.0556*** -0.0525** -0.0880*** -0.0639*** -0.0519*** -0.0409*** -0.0310 
 
 (0.0079)  (0.0052)  (0.0072)  (0.0110)  (0.0160)  (0.0114) (0.0089)  (0.0058)  (0.0080)  (0.0163) 
Short-run risk -0.2889 -0.2298* -0.1029 -0.2667 0.2422 -0.3956* -0.7768  0.5652  0.8315  0.2320 
 
 (0.1767)  (0.1150)  (0.7009)  (0.4927) (0.5795)  (0.1664) (0.1661)  (0.1071)  (0.1189)  (0.1724) 
Long-run risk  0.6127  0.4908*  0.2269  0.6494 -0.3510  0.9401 -0.5738 -0.2951* -0.2111 -0.7946 
 
 (0.3257)  (0.2316)  (0.2555)  (0.3910) (0.5361)  (0.5044) (0.4334)  (0.1379)  (0.2545)  (0.4691) 
Working Capital  0.0092***  0.0098***  0.0128***  0.0141***  0.0144***  0.0015 0.0022  0.0064***  0.0085***  0.0106** 
 
 (0.0017)  (0.0015)  (0.0013)  (0.0015)  (0.0023)  (0.0014) (0.0013)  (0.0014)  (0.0022)  (0.0041) 
Capital Intensity  -0.2681*** -0.2585*** -0.2822*** -0.2992*** -0.3094*** -0.1067*** -0.1553*** -0.2013*** -0.2197*** -0.213*** 
 
 (0.0216)  (0.0134)  (0.0115)  (0.0121)  (0.0163)  (0.0198) (0.0102)  (0.0092)  (0.0158)  (0.0213) 
Age -0.0051* -0.0059*** -0.0061*** -0.0044*** -0.001 -0.0018 0.0002  0.0024  0.0058  0.0056 
 
 (0.0024)  (0.0017)  (0.0012)  (0.0012)  (0.0020)  (0.0037) (0.0026)  (0.0028)  (0.0032)  (0.0049) 
Investment -0.0020  0.0048  0.0172**  0.0278***  0.0449***  0.0005 0.0102  0.0167*  0.0218*  0.03027 
 
 (0.0090)  (0.0068)  (0.0061)  (0.0074)  (0.0116)  (0.0187) (0.0085)  (0.0081)  (0.0107)  (0.0172) 
Subsidy rate  0.0080  0.0080  0.00379 -0.0154 -0.0121  0.0058 0.0030 -0.0073 -0.0273** -0.0480** 
 
 (0.0189)  (0.0106)  (0.0107)  (0.0105)  (0.0163)  (0.0159) (0.0110)  (0.0099)  (0.0102)  (0.0151) 
Diversification  0.0072  0.0079  0.0146**  0.0210***  0.0390***  0.0024 0.0058  0.0029  0.0075  0.0116 
 
 (0.0070)  (0.0051)  (0.0046)  (0.0056)  (0.0073)  (0.0063) (0.0052)  (0.0044)  (0.004)  (0.0101) 
Size  0.0083***  0.0049***  0.0015 -0.0022* -0.0014***  0.0104*** 0.0045*** -0.0010 -0.0091*** -0.014*** 
 
 (0.0016)  (0.0009)  (0.0008) (0.0009)  (0.0012)  (0.0016) (0.0012)  (0.0010)  (0.0013)  (0.0018) 
Labor productivity -0.0378 -0.0102  0.0091 0.0475***  0.1013***  0.0875*** 0.0875***  0.1215***  0.1862***  0.2305*** 
 
 (0.0240)  (0.0128)  (0.0121) (0.0143)  (0.0198)  (0.0172) (0.0160)  (0.0155)  (0.0257)  (0.0293) 
_cons -0.0444*  0.01305  0.0689*** 0.1237***  0.2056*** -0.1161*** -0.0283  0.0528**  0.1722***  0.3148*** 
 
 (0.0218)  (0.0147)  (0.0118) (0.0138)  (0.0175)  (0.0275) (0.0191)  (0.0185)  (0.0203)  (0.0312) 
Year Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Region Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Soil Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Pseudo R2 0.2489 0.2641 0.2833 0.3158 0.3553 0.2267 0.1965 0.2110 0.2669 0.3425 
Obs. 4099     2691     
 
Table 3 Continued……. 
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 Horticulture Farms Livestock Farms 
 q(10) q(25) q(50) q(75) q(90) q(10) q(25) q(50) q(75) q(90) 
Leverage -0.1160*** -0.0924*** -0.0746*** -0.0602*** -0.0483*** -0.1070*** -0.0850*** -0.0658*** -0.0483*** -0.0228* 
  (0.0126)  (0.0056)  (0.0056)  (0.0056)  (0.0059)  (0.0074)  (0.0055)  (0.0048)  (0.0064)  (0.0100) 
Short-run risk -0.0569  0.2104 -0.2085 -0.1107 -0.1634 -0.0999 -0.2992  0.1234 -0.2301 -0.09775 
  (0.2818)  (0.3116)  (0.3279)  (0.2095)  (0.1820)  (0.0169)  (0.1312)  (0.1056)  (0.0933)  (0.1079) 
Long-run risk  0.2234 -0.6955  0.4893  0.4306  0.9957  0.6488  0.2228 -0.04570  0.8037  0.1483 
 -0.1081  (0.9435)  (0.1043)  (0.8028)  (0.6215)  (0.6493)  (0.4921)  (0.3352)  (0.2435)  (0.3448) 
Working Capital  0.0063*  0.0084***  0.0093***  0.0105***  0.0137***  0.0028  0.0051*  0.0070**  0.0134*  0.0312* 
  (0.0029)  (0.0012)  (0.0013)  (0.0018)  (0.0026)  (0.0015)  (0.0025)  (0.0024)  (0.0060)  (0.0129) 
Capital Intensity  -0.2790*** -0.4331*** -0.5361*** -0.5609*** -0.4450*** -0.2758*** -0.3035*** -0.3130*** -0.2780*** -0.1922** 
  (0.0615)  (0.0432)  (0.0516)  (0.0673)  (0.1177)  (0.0424)  (0.0326)  (0.0407)  (0.0447)  (0.0599) 
Age -0.0140 -0.0105 -0.0033 -0.0103 -0.0081 -0.0129* -0.0099* -0.012** -0.0171*** -0.0206** 
  (0.0077)  (0.0055)  (0.0054)  (0.0060)  (0.0079)  (0.0066)  (0.0039)  (0.0047)  (0.0047)  (0.0073) 
Investment  0.0148  0.0389***  0.0477***  0.0631***  0.1445***  0.0004  0.0240*  0.02170  0.0336*  0.1124** 
  (0.0146)  (0.0118)  (0.0105)  (0.0135)  (0.0291)  (0.0199)  (0.0100)  (0.0148)  (0.0149)  (0.0387) 
Subsidy rate -0.0339 -0.0613 -0.0406 -0.0346 -0.0854  0.0068  0.0006  0.0072 -0.0083 -0.0043 
  (0.0456)  (0.0481)  (0.0404)  (0.0508)  (0.0844)  (0.0155)  (0.0093)  (0.0086)  (0.0129)  (0.0142) 
Diversification -0.0169 -0.0170 -0.0030 -0.0042  0.0371**  0.0451***  0.0499***  0.0461***  0.0376***  0.0252*** 
  (0.0115)  (0.0102)  (0.0075)  (0.0093)  (0.0141)  (0.0051)  (0.0035)  (0.0027)  (0.0038)  (0.0055) 
Size -0.0028 -0.0078*** -0.0163*** -0.0230*** -0.0345***  0.0145***  0.0114***  0.0061*** -0.0045** -0.014*** 
  (0.0022)  (0.0013)  (0.0013)  (0.0018)  (0.0023)  (0.0019)  (0.0012)  (0.0014)  (0.0014)  (0.0025) 
Labor productivity  0.2700***  0.3419***  0.4446***  0.5104***  0.5600***  0.0390***  0.0362***  0.0465***  0.0630***  0.1139*** 
  (0.0428)  (0.0392)  (0.0352)  (0.0556)  (0.0769)  (0.0097)  (0.0088)  (0.0110)  (0.0117)  (0.0211) 
_cons  0.0698  0.186***  0.3200***  0.4654***  0.6448*** -0.1285** -0.0916***  0.0081  0.1926***  0.3329*** 
  (0.0364)  (0.0269)  (0.0229)  (0.0284)  (0.0424)  (0.0415)  (0.0211)  (0.0263)  (0.0266)  (0.0463) 
Year Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Region Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Soil Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Pseudo R2  0.2157  0.1852  0.1738  0.1792  0.1912  0.2031  0.1744  0.1456  0.1353  0.1253 
Obs. 5133     3736     
***, **, * are significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively. Numbers in parentheses are bootstrap standard errors based on 
1000 replications, and the dummy reference levels are the year 2001, the Drenthe region, and clay soil. 
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4.7.2. Dynamic Panel Model Estimation  
Table 4.4 shows the estimation results of the System GMM based on equation (4.8). 
The Sargan test, and AR (2) second-order serial correlation, and AR (3) tests are presented to 
gauge the overall model fit. The Sargan test of over-identifying restrictions yields a p-value of 
0.110, which supports the validity of the instruments used in the system GMM. The hypothesis 
of no second and third-order autocorrelation of the disturbance term is not rejected at the 5% 
significance level (p-values 0.605 and 0.525, respectively), implying that there is no serial 
correlation. The model fit tests assure that the key identifying assumption required for the 
GMM estimator is satisfied.  
In Table 4.4, the coefficient on the lagged dependent variable (𝜆), which serves as the 
measure for short-run profit persistence in this model is positive and significant for all farms. 
Supporting the notion that the year-to-year persistence of abnormal profit, and the general level 
of competition in the Dutch farm sector is not sufficiently strong to erode abnormal profit 
within a year. The coefficient is between zero and one, implying that abnormal profit converges 
to the mean over time. From the estimated lagged profit coefficient value of 0.075 for all farm 
types, we infer that farm profitability converges to the mean over time, and the speed of 
convergence is 92.5 %( 1 − λ) per year. This speed of adjustment corresponds to a half-life60of 
profit shocks of about 0.3 years respectively.  
Decomposing the analysis into farm types, we find that the sign and degree of profit 
persistence are farm type specific. We find that dairy, field crops and horticulture farms exhibit 
persistence of abnormal profit. The result is similar to the findings of Hirsch and Gschwandtner 
(2013) who analyzed the persistence of profit in the European food industry and found values 
                                                 
60 Half-life is the time the process needs to close the gap between the average and abnormal farm profit level by 
half (50%), after a one-unit shock to the error term. Half-life is calculated as log (0.5)/log (λ). For example, the λ 
estimate for dairy farms in Table 4.4 is 0.304, which means that a typical dairy farm closes about 69.6% (1-λ) of 
the gap between its current abnormal profit level and the average long-run profit in one year. At this rate, it takes 
approximately 0.6 years for the farm to close half of the gap. 
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between 0.304 for the UK and 0.11 for the Belgian food sector. Dairy farms exhibit the highest 
degree of short-run persistence, i.e. slower convergence to the average profit.  
Table 4.4: Dynamic Panel model estimation results 
Variables All 
Farm 
Dairy  
Farms 
Field  
Crops 
Horticulture 
 Farms 
Livestock 
Farms 
𝑌𝑖,𝑡−1  0.075*** 
(0.013) 
 0.304*** 
(0.189)  
 0.039* 
 (0.021)  
 0.071*** 
 (0.029) 
-0.008 
 (0.016) 
Leverage -0.142*** 
 (0.014) 
-0.024*** 
(0.006) 
-0.036** 
 (0.014) 
-0.228*** 
 (0.014) 
-0.033** 
 (0.010) 
Short-run risk  0.112 
(0.109) 
 0.718** 
  (0.369) 
-0.176 
 (0.214)  
 0.219 
 (0.256) 
-0.200 
 (0.187) 
Long-run risk -0.0984** 
(0.035) 
-0.135** 
 (0.080) 
 0.0203** 
 (0.928) 
-0180** 
 (0.097) 
 0.026 
 (0.093) 
Working Capital  0.010*** 
(0.003 
 0.001*** 
 (0.002)  
-0.005 
 (0.004) 
-0.003 
 (0.005) 
 0.019*** 
 (0.004) 
Capital Intensity -0.254*** 
 (0.068) 
-0.156*** 
 (0.021) 
-0.129*** 
 (0.037) 
-0.101 
 (0.0652) 
-0.355*** 
 (0.041) 
Investment -0.008 
 (0.010) 
 0.005*** 
 (0.004) 
 0.051 
 (0.010) 
 0.041* 
 (0.022) 
-0.042*** 
 (0.012) 
Age -0.022*** 
(0.006) 
-0.008** 
 (0.003)  
-0.001 
 (0.009) 
-0.097** 
 (0.043) 
 0.035** 
 (0.016) 
Subsidy rate  0.002 
(0.003) 
 0.007*** 
 (0.002) 
 0.003 
 (0.004) 
-0.002 
 (0.008) 
-0.010* 
 (0.005) 
Diversification  0.021** 
(0.009) 
 0.056*** 
 (0.005) 
-0.014* 
 (0.011) 
-0.018 
 (0.020) 
 0.051*** 
 (0.005) 
Size  0.044*** 
(0.010) 
-0.012*** 
 (0.024) 
-0.01 
 (0.005) 
 0.097*** 
 (0.011) 
 0.033*** 
 (0.010) 
Labor productivity  0.052*** 
(0.005) 
 0.033*** 
 (0.0024) 
 0.052*** 
 (0.003) 
 0.202*** 
 (0.015) 
 0.045*** 
 (0.020) 
_cons -0.670*** 
(0.198) 
 0.206 *** 
 (0.033)  
 0.101 
 (0.080) 
-1.668*** 
 (0.280) 
-0.544*** 
 (0.129) 
Farm-Field crops -0.008 
(0.008) 
    
Farm-Horticulture -0.005 
(0.010) 
    
Farm-Livestock -0.007** 
(0.004) 
    
Year Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Region Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Soil Type Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N (Obs.) 2,000 
(13,622) 
436 
(3,671) 
370 
(2,356) 
804 
(4,357) 
531 
(3,238) 
Wald Test χ²(42)=115***    
Sargan Test χ²(72)=86.94     P-value=0.110   
AR(1) Z=-9.779           P-value=0.000   
AR(2) Z=-0.516           P-value=0.605   
AR(3) Z=-0.635           P-value=0.525   
***, **, * are significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively. Numbers in 
parentheses are bootstrap standard errors based on 1000 replications, and the dummy 
reference levels are dairy farms, the year 2001, Drenthe region, and clay soil. 
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The results further show that, on average, 30.4%, 3.9%, and 7.1% of the abnormal profit 
earned by dairy, field crops and livestock farms respectively during any prior period is retained 
in the current period. The higher degree of persistence of dairy farms can be associated to the 
lower competition in the sector due to the European milk quota system that has been in place 
for 30 years and was recently abolished on April 1, 2015. The high price of quota rights further 
discourages farm expansion. The intensification of competition in the Dutch field-crop sector 
explains the low degree of short-run profit persistence, i.e. the high convergence to the average 
profit. Furthermore, Table 4.4 shows that the value of λ for the field crops is 0.039, indicating 
a very low level of profit persistence. The persistence level is not only lower than that in 
previous studies analyzing the entire manufacturing sector, but also lower than that of the food 
sector reported by Hirsch and Gschwandtner (2013). Note that the lagged dependent variable 
(𝜆), is negative61 but not significant for livestock farms. 
The impact of short-run risk exposure, for which the ratio of current liabilities to current 
assets is used as a proxy, on long-run profitability is positive for dairy farms only. Findings are 
mixed, however, with regard to the impact of long-run financial risk exposure: it has a 
significant positive effect for field crops and a negative effect for dairy and horticulture farms. 
The positive effect supports the risk theory assumption that taking higher risk results in higher 
returns in the long-run.  
The results in Table 4.4 show that the risk-bearing capacity of farms, i.e. working 
capital, has a significantly positive effect on long-run abnormal profit. Working capital 
represents the amount of funds available to a farm if all current assets were sold and current 
liabilities are paid. This liquidity can provide cash to purchase operating inputs or make capital 
purchases. The results suggest that, in an environment where farms don’t have regular income 
from agricultural products, working capital is important to have the flexibility and capacity to 
adapt to changing circumstances, which ultimately helps to gain and sustain the abnormal 
                                                 
61A negative lambda could be due to high volatility of profit. If a farm swings between positive and negative 
abnormal profits, a negative lambda value is possible. A negative lambda is also not unrealistic if the time series 
is short (Goddard, Tavakoli and Wilson, 2005). 
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profit. In addition, working capital acts as a first-line buffer in case of economic and financial 
adversity. The results are consistent with the findings of Barney (2001) that a higher risk-
bearing capacity of farms helps sustain their competitive advantage. The findings also lend 
support to the premise of the RBV that resources that are scarce and less imitable contribute to 
sustained competitive advantage.  
The effect of leverage is significantly negative for all farms. A one percent increase in 
farm leverage results in an average respective decrease by 14.2%, 2.4%, 3.6% and 3.3% in the 
abnormal returns of dairy, field crops, horticulture, and livestock farms. A possible explanation 
for our finding is that farms that already exhibit high leverage levels have more cash-flow 
constraints in their operation due to high financing costs. Also, the impact of leverage can be 
weakened by other factors beyond the farm’s control, such as interest rates and changes in the 
market value of the collateral.  
The relationship between labor productivity and abnormal return is positive at 
significant for all farm types. This is consistent with findings of Mishra et al. (2009) showing 
that higher labor productivity helps farms earn a profit in the long-run. The increase in labor 
productivity contributes to farm profitability only if the resulting value from productivity is 
greater than the cost of labor. This finding is relevant for Dutch agriculture, where labor costs 
per hour are among the highest in Europe (Eurostat, 2015). 
The negative relationship between capital intensity and long-run abnormal profit is 
consistent with the a priori expectation that using more capital to earn the same revenue makes 
farms unlikely to earn and sustain abnormal profits. In addition, the heavy dependency on 
capital harms farm competitiveness as they are more exposed to the risk of duplication, which 
would lead to quick erosion of the abnormal returns. 
Furthermore, Table 4.4 shows that diversification has a positive effect on abnormal 
profit for dairy and livestock farms. Our finding is consistent with that of Meraner et al. (2015). 
Diversification is one of the ways for farms to minimize income and profit variability 
(McGahan and Porter, 2003). In addition, it may lead to economies of scope, lower costs and 
increase competitiveness to sustain the long-run abnormal profit. Note that we also find a 
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negative relationship between farm diversification and abnormal profit for field-crop farms. 
Our results are similar to the findings of Katchova (2005) that diversified crop farms face a 
diversification discount compared to specialized farms. The results suggest that the evidence 
regarding the impact of diversification on abnormal profit is inconclusive, with some farm 
sector characteristics being more favorable for diversifiers than specialized farms and vice 
versa. Thus, the relationship is contingent on the farm types considered. 
Likewise, farmer age was found to have a mixed effect. Age is negatively and 
significantly related to abnormal profit in the dairy and horticulture sector. Argilés and Slof 
(2003) find a similar relationship. A potential explanation is that, compared to older farmers, 
younger farmers are more educated and are able to adapt quickly to changes in production, 
technology, marketing and the legal status of agriculture. This is notably true for farms in 
dynamic and technology-intensive farm sectors, such as horticulture and dairy. Note, however, 
that the relationship is positive for livestock farms, implying that aging decreases costs due to 
learning effects within the farm and learning spillovers from other farms.  
Similar to Hirsch and Gschwandtner (2013), we find a positive association of size with 
profitability. The finding is consistent with consolidation, which is becoming a trend in the 
Dutch agricultural sectors as farms are getting fewer in number but bigger in size. Another 
possible reason is that large farms exploit the economies of scale and benefit from economies 
of scope. Alternatively, it could be argued that large farms have the better bargaining power 
that they can access capital at a lower cost than small farms and can afford to cope with changes 
in legislation. The results emphasize that (sufficient) scale is a very important matter in Dutch 
agriculture. On the other hand, the effect of size is negative and significant for dairy farms. 
Goddard, Tavakoli and Wilson (2005) also find similar evidence for the inefficiency of larger 
firms.  
Consistent with a priori expectations, the coefficients of subsidy are positive and 
significant for dairy farms. The subsidy that dairy farms receive from the Dutch government 
and the European Union under the Common Agriculture Policy (CAP) framework constitutes 
a significant portion of their profit. The finding also lends strong support to the statement that 
CAP payments make rich farms richer. Note, however, that the effect is negative for livestock 
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farms. Risk-taking farms are more likely to make investments. Therefore, risk exposure and 
farm investment are expected to be positively related to farm profitability. Our finding in Table 
4.4 confirms this expectation for dairy farms. Note also investments might not be always 
productive or take long time to be fruitful (McBride and Greene, 2007), which may explain the 
negative association of investment with profitability for livestock farms. 
4.8. Robustness Checks 
We run additional empirical tests to confirm the robustness of our results. MROA is far 
from being the ideal profitability measurement. To obtain a complete picture of farm 
profitability, and further examine the measurement invariance robustness of our results, a 
separate analysis is done using Profit Margin Ratio (PMR) as an alternative measure of farm 
profitability. PMR is defined as: 
PMR =  
 Modified Net Farm Income − Unpaid Labor
Total Farm output
                                                         [4.10] 
Similar to the interest expense logic in equation (4.1), the inclusion of unpaid family 
labor62 in the calculation enables comparison of farms with different labor structures. PMR is 
a useful measure because: (a) it represents what would generally be accepted as being 
entrepreneurial profit derived from farming, and (b) it corresponds most closely to the concept 
of the profit from farming that is available for consumption, investment and saving.  
The results presented through Tables 4.5 and 4.7 in the appendix show that a change in 
profitability measures does not significantly change our major conclusions about the 
determinants of farm profitability and persistence of abnormal profit.63 Furthermore, to account 
                                                 
62 Unpaid labor is computed using the number of working hours by family members and the average hourly wage 
rate in the Dutch farm sector for each year. 
63 Note that leverage, capital intensity, working capital, diversification and labor productivity still remain the 
major determinants of farm profitability. Running a separate quantile regression for each farm type entails a minor 
discrepancy in the magnitudes and signs of the coefficients (see Table 4.5-4.7). Results from the dynamic panel 
estimation using abnormal PMR suggest similar conclusions, both in terms of signs and magnitudes, to our main 
findings reported in section 4.2. Decomposing the analysis into farm types, the effect of subsidy rate on the long-
run profitability of dairy farms leads to a contradictory conclusion: while the PMR measure shows a negative and 
significant effect, the coefficient estimates are positive and significant with abnormal MROA as a profit measure. 
Whether and to what extent this contradiction is due to the inclusion of unpaid labor in our PMR calculation 
requires further inquiry.  
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for survivorship bias, we ran both the quantile and dynamic panel models only on those farms 
that had remained in the sample for the full 15 years.  
4.9. Conclusions 
In this paper, we aim to estimate the drivers of farm profitability, the degree of abnormal 
profit persistence and its determinants for the Dutch farm sector. We also seek to explain why 
persistence levels differ across farm sectors by drawing on the well-established theory of the 
Resource-Based View (RBV). Hence we contribute to better understanding of the distinctive 
qualities or characteristics that will help farmers gain and sustain their competitive advantage, 
and the areas where policy interventions might give due emphasis. We apply a quantile 
regression approach to examine the drivers of farm profitability, and we use dynamic panel 
System GMM estimation to estimate the persistence of abnormal farm profit. 
Results from the quantile regression show that working capital, labor productivity and 
investment are associated with profitability, regardless of farm type. The findings suggest that, 
in an environment where farms don’t have regular income from agricultural products, working 
capital is important for them to have the flexibility and capacity to adapt to changing 
circumstances. On the other hand, leverage and capital intensity show negative effects on farm 
profitability, meaning that farms that already exhibit high leverage levels face more cash-flow 
constraints in their operation due to high financing costs. Decomposing the analysis into farm 
types, we find that risk and profit is only associated for dairy and field crops and the effect of 
diversification is more pronounced for livestock farms. These results further confirm the 
importance of controlling for farm heterogeneity when analyzing the determinants of farm 
profit.  
After controlling for farm size, soil, region, and macro-economic factors, estimates 
using the dynamic panel model provide evidence that there is a significant degree of abnormal 
profit persistence, with variations between farm types. Dairy farms show the highest and 
livestock farms show the least persistence. We also find that abnormal profit persistence is 
responsive to farm characteristics such as risk exposure, investment, capital intensity, leverage, 
working capital, and diversification. Evidently, farm working capital has a significant, positive 
effect on abnormal profitability. The negative impact of long-run risk exposure on long-run 
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abnormal profit contradicts risk theory, which suggests that risky businesses earn higher profits 
in the long-run. Interestingly, we show that the farms with a sustained competitive advantage, 
i.e. persistently high, abnormal profits, are generally young, highly diversified and large farms 
in particular, which are also characterized by low risk, low leverage level, lower capital 
intensity, as well as farms with higher working capital and labor productivity. In general, our 
results show that the variation in farm profit and the persistence of abnormal profit is systematic 
and, hence, not a product of fortune. In addition, these variations in profitability and persistence 
levels can be attributed to the farm’s resources and capabilities, such as working capital, capital 
intensity, labor productivity, diversification strategy. These findings lend support to the central 
premise of the RBV that resource-based competitive advantages last longer.  
These results have important implications. The positive and significant association of 
risk-bearing capacity, i.e. working capital, and farm diversification with sustained abnormal 
profit underlines the vital role of risk management in farm businesses. The significant negative 
association of farm leverage with long-run abnormal profit requires careful interpretation, as it 
might lead to the wrong conclusion that leverage impedes farm profitability. Rather, 
adjustments towards optimal farm leverage should be encouraged. From a policy viewpoint, 
the result implies that measures to reduce the capital intensity (i.e., improve asset efficiency) 
and short-run financial risk exposure of farms might be beneficial. With farming becoming 
highly competitive, it is crucial that farmers are aware of the factors that could affect their 
overall profitability and persistence. Financial management training might be helpful, along 
with measures to improve farm risk-bearing capacity, human capital management, risk-
management strategies and capital structure.  
This chapter has limitations that motivate further research. More direct measures of 
farm risk and risk-bearing capacity, such as the use of forward contracting and commodity 
futures, would help further understand the impact of risk-management strategies on farm profit 
persistence. Despite using a high-quality, unique panel data, we rely merely on farm accounting 
data. Future research may complement this with behavioral data on, for example, farm risk 
attitude, risk perception and market orientation (Pennings and Leuthold, 2000; Trujillo-
Barrera, Pennings and Hofenk, 2016).  
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4.10. Appendix 
Table 4.5: Determinants of farm profitability (PMR), quantile regression 
  
Table A1 
Determinants of farm profitability, quantile regression 
PMR OLS q(10) q(25) q(50) q(75) q(90) 
Leverage -0.2559*** -0.4013*** -0.3301*** -0.2843*** -0.2685*** -0.2607*** 
 
(0.0102)   (0.0169)   (0.0108)   (0.0096)   (0.0086)   (0.0129)   
Short-run risk 0.0141   -0.3121   -0.2318   -0.1543   -0.4343   -0.6124   
 
(0.3068)   (0.8992)   (0.8725)   (0.6782)   (0.6716)   (0.5784)   
Long-run risk 0.1901 0.61681 0.03927   0.7271   0.2081 0.1655 
 
(0.0683) (0.3432) (0.2097) (0.2079) (0.2016) (0.1697) 
Working Capital 0.0477*** 0.0166*** 0.03077*** 0.0379*** 0.0433*** 0.0395*** 
 
(0.0041)   (0.0045)   (0.0054)   (0.0052)   (0.0039)   (0.0052)   
Capital Intensity  -0.3149*** -0.6507*** -0.1653*** -0.9636*** -0.4547*** -0.08776   
 
(0.0527)   (0.1832)   (0.0867)   (0.0734)   (0.0553)   (0.0958)   
Age 0.0596***  -0.01789  -0.00057   0.0060  -0.0095   -0.0061   
 
(0.0140)   (0.0129)   (0.0094)   (0.0083)   (0.0086)   (0.0109)   
Investment 0.0876*** 0.1661*  -0.04290   -0.0016  0.0778**  0.1204**  
 
(0.0192)   (0.0521)   (0.0322)   (0.0269)   (0.0253)   (0.0369)   
Subsidy rate -0.2097***   0.03523   0.08099   0.05097   0.01518   -0.03802   
 
(0.0311)   (0.0817)   (0.0596)   (0.0331)   (0.0394)   (0.0469)   
Diversification 0.2341*** 0.0909*** 0.0967*** 0.1548*** 0.1812*** 0.2061*** 
 
(0.0156)   (0.0250)   (0.0178)   (0.0126)   (0.0134)   (0.0165)   
Size 0.0655*** 0.0550*** 0.0298*** -0.0138** -0.0022*   -0.0181*** 
 
(0.0072)   (0.0038)   (0.0028)   (0.0024)   (0.0027)   (0.0035)   
Labor productivity 0.6074*** 0.1915*** 0.1611*** 0.1165*** 0.0929*** 0.1166*  
 
(0.0421)   (0.0356)   (0.0244)   (0.0260)   (0.0232)   (0.0526)   
_cons -0.6410*** -0.3219*** -0.08168   0.1272**  0.4405*** 0.6894*** 
 
(0.1306) (0.0625)   (0.0508)   (0.0413)   (0.0502)   (0.0592)   
Farm-Field crops 0.0249 -0.0705*** -0.0343*** -0.0067  0.0203*** 0.0342*** 
 (0.0203) (0.0099)   (0.0075)   (0.0058)   (0.0052)   (0.0070)   
Farm-Livestock 0.1788 -0.1789*** -0.1113*** -0.0776*** -0.0384*** -0.0155   
 
(0.0241)   (0.0126)   (0.0080)   (0.0071)   (0.0066)   (0.0082)   
Farm-Horticulture -0.0981*** -0.2072*** -0.1586*** -0.1315*** -0.1129*** -0.0925*** 
 
(0.0147)   (0.0109)   (0.0073)   (0.0054)   (0.0055)   (0.0090)   
Year Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Region Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Soil Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R
2
(Pseudo R
2
) 0.1029 0.2144 0.1618 0.1586 0.1749 0.1780 
Obs. 15659      
***, **, * are significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively. Numbers in parentheses are 
bootstrap standard errors based on 1000 replications, and the dummy reference levels are dairy farms, 
the year 2001, the Drenthe region, and clay soil. 
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Table 4.6: Determinants of farm profitability (PMR), quantile regression by farm type 
 
Table A2 
Determinants of farm profitability 
 Dairy Field Crops 
PMR q(10) q(25) q(50) q(75) q(90) q(10) q(25) q(50) q(75) q(90) 
Leverage -0.6479*** -0.6421*** -0.5623*** -0.5383*** -0.4638*** -0.5517*** -0.5044*** -0.3861*** -0.3357*** -0.260*** 
 
(0.0748)  (0.0630) (0.0741) (0.080) (0.0762) (0.0918) (0.0579) (0.0434) (0.0372) (0.0436) 
Short-run risk -0.2134 -0.2083 -0.1297* -0.1063* -0.4030 -0.6317 -0.3323 0.4490 0.1674 0.2665 
 
(0.175) (0.1229) (0.5731) (0.4268) (0.3878) (0.9845) (0.7089) (0.4098) (0.2272) (0.3169) 
Long-run risk  0.4448 0.4379 0.2705 0.2256 0.8785 -0.1617 -0.5139 -0.1928 -0.1009 -0.9843 
 
(0.3023) (0.2482) (0.2414) (0.2571) (0.2195) (0.3859) (0.2427) (0.1298) (0.6806) (0.1127) 
Working Capital 0.1164*** 0.1099*** 0.09576*** 0.1104*** 0.1119*** 0.07202*** 0.06610*** 0.07556*** 0.07693*** 0.1015*** 
 
(0.0208) (0.0147) (0.0111) (0.0170) (0.0250) (0.0162) (0.0114) (0.0144) (0.0148) (0.0194) 
Capital Intensity  -2.3314*** -1.7734*** -1.1262*** -0.9177*** -0.5964*** -1.6867*** -1.1591*** -0.6886*** -0.3438*** -0.08121 
 
(0.1931) (0.1243) (0.0820) (0.1151) (0.1164) (0.1963) (0.0975) (0.0881) (0.0930) (0.1383) 
Age -0.02974 -0.04758* -0.0495*** -0.0583*** -0.04694** -0.02353 0.01969 0.04280* 0.03969 0.02695 
 
(0.0233) (0.0188) (0.0128) (0.0121) (0.0169) (0.0433) (0.0230) (0.0182) (0.0212) (0.0227) 
Investment -0.09820 0.02197 0.1266* 0.2094** 0.1765** -0.1920 0.04208 0.06949 0.07391 0.05553 
 
(0.1028) (0.0548) (0.0602) (0.0694) (0.0668) (0.1539) (0.0847) (0.0698) (0.0466) (0.0694) 
Subsidy rate 0.05622 0.02931 -0.03164 -0.1045 0.0007893 0.2567 0.1262 0.1152 -0.02223 -0.1882** 
 
(0.1496) (0.1206) (0.0914) (0.1004) (0.1212) (0.1756) (0.0869) (0.0681) (0.0607) (0.0711) 
Diversification 0.01912 0.04760 0.1218** 0.1939*** 0.2940*** 0.02408 0.06850 0.04918 0.1406** 0.2148*** 
 
(0.0595) (0.0451) (0.0413) (0.0389) (0.0506) (0.0626) (0.0405) (0.0391) (0.0427) (0.0343) 
Size 0.09894*** 0.07892*** 0.05860*** 0.04200*** 0.03444*** 0.09311*** 0.07929*** 0.05977*** 0.03118*** 0.01498* 
 
(0.0122) (0.0078) (0.0058) (0.0071) (0.0070) (0.0116) (0.0081) (0.0060) (0.0063) (0.0074) 
Labor productivity -0.4854* -0.3500** -0.2261* -0.1447 -0.1123 0.7441*** 0.5077*** 0.4711*** 0.3778*** 0.3751*** 
 
(0.2138) (0.1341) (0.0967) (0.1081) (0.1131) (0.1340) (0.0790) (0.0671) (0.0859) (0.1104) 
_cons -0.8047*** -0.4387*** -0.1610* 0.1447 0.2167* -1.0171*** -0.8965*** -0.6924*** -0.2339 0.1123 
 
(0.1628) (0.1259) (0.0802) (0.0961) (0.0943) (0.2022) (0.1492) (0.1127) (0.1205) (0.1277) 
Year Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Region Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Soil Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Pseudo R2 0.2693 0.2630 0.2644 0.2648 0.2705 0.2638 0.2330 0.2140 0.2130 0.2098 
Obs. 4099     2691     
 
Table A2 Continued…….
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 Horticulture Farms Livestock Farms 
 
q(10) q(25) q(50) q(75) q(90) q(10) q(25) q(50) q(75) q(90) 
Leverage -0.2840*** -0.2462*** -0.2223*** -0.2297*** -0.2138*** -0.3820*** -0.3027*** -0.2666*** -0.2455*** -0.1984*** 
 
(0.0257) (0.0140) (0.0135) (0.0120) (0.0186) (0.0281)   (0.0241)   (0.0142)   (0.0170)   (0.0231)   
Short-run risk -0.1053 -0.1365 -0.1893 -0.5157 -0.1492 0.8928   11.204 14.147 -0.4875   0.03571   
 
(0.6966) (0.5974) (0.6667) (0.5050) (0.3677) (0.4087) (0.2253) (0.1578) (0.2189) (0.2413) 
Long-run risk 0.7839 -0.3888 0.1666 0.2146 0.1829 -0.5980 -0.1608 0.4752   0.3859 0.5162 
 
(0.2047) (0.1538) (0.1934) (0.1738) (0.1616) (0.1715) (0.7527) (0.3607) (0.5687) (0.7275) 
Working Capital 0.0150** 0.0219*** 0.0250*** 0.0201*** 0.0197*** 0.0376*  0.0573*** 0.0490*** 0.0585*** 0.0676*** 
 
(0.0052) (0.0045) (0.0044) (0.0031) (0.0047) (0.0186)   (0.0085)   (0.0105)   (0.0136)   (0.0204)   
Capital Intensity  -4.722*** -2.6114*** -0.8340*** 0.1924 0.8460*** -4.7014*** -3.1825*** -2.0764*** -1.6185*** -0.9487*** 
 
(0.6308) (0.3493) (0.2139) (0.1417) (0.2152) (0.2037)   (0.2832)   (0.0793)   (0.1810)   (0.1433)   
Age -0.0038 0.0252 0.0080 0.0155 0.0311 -0.0299  -0.0079   -0.0152   -0.0053   0.00188  
 
(0.0250) (0.0176) (0.0139) (0.0126) (0.0189) (0.0246)   (0.0175)   (0.0160)   (0.0165)   (0.0209)   
Investment -0.0570 -0.0239 0.03059 0.0857* 0.1520* 0.01766   0.03332   0.04542   0.1484**  0.2748*** 
 
(0.0484) (0.0541) (0.0297) (0.0381) (0.0623) (0.0854)   (0.0427)   (0.0434)   (0.0470)   (0.0750)   
Subsidy rate 0.1932 0.1173 -0.06187 -0.1754 -0.2171 -0.1001   0.0227  0.0698   0.1195*  0.0802   
 
(0.1972) (0.1815) (0.1107) (0.1190) (0.1662) (0.1394)   (0.0837)   (0.0588)   (0.0565)   (0.0636)   
Diversification 0.0218 0.0022 0.01883 0.0283 0.05759 0.2918*** 0.2951*** 0.2870*** 0.2738*** 0.2468*** 
 
(0.0390) (0.0286) (0.0212) (0.0233) (0.0310) (0.0280)   (0.0204)   (0.0151)   (0.0142)   (0.0213)   
Size -0.0081 -0.0275*** -0.0431*** -0.0548*** -0.0639*** 0.0833*** 0.0646*** 0.0497*** 0.0268*** 0.0179**  
 
(0.0057) (0.0047) (0.0038) (0.0033) (0.0050) (0.0072)   (0.0053)   (0.0040)   (0.0047)   (0.0065)   
Labor productivity 0.8231*** 0.7992*** 0.8838*** 0.7566*** 0.5678*** -0.007221   -0.0006986   -0.01753   -0.05980*** -0.0850*** 
 
(0.1423) (0.1317) (0.1066) (0.0881) (0.1501) (0.0226)   (0.0203)   (0.0144)   (0.0156)   (0.0251)   
_cons 0.2486* 0.4247*** 0.7475*** 0.9445*** 1.0553*** -0.9103*** -0.6736*** -0.4150*** -0.07068   0.07307   
 
(0.1129) (0.0772) (0.0739) (0.0616) (0.0950) (0.1924)   (0.0900)   (0.0773)   (0.1019)   (0.1404)   
Year Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Region Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Soil Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Pseudo R2 0.2734 0.1950 0.1602 0.1730 0.1925 0.3637 0.2513 0.2157 0.2333 0.2528 
Obs. 5,133     3,736     
***, **, * are significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively. Numbers in parentheses are bootstrap standard errors based on 1000 replications, and the dummy 
reference levels are the year 2001, the Drenthe region, and clay soil. 
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Table 4.7: Dynamic panel regression results (PMR) 
Variables All Sample Dairy 
Farms 
Field 
Crops 
 Horticulture Livestock 
𝑌𝑖,𝑡−1  0.080*** 
(0.014) 
 0.192 *** 
(0.021)  
 0.059*** 
(0.017) 
 0.043** 
(0.014) 
 0.013 
(0.016) 
Leverage -0.279 *** 
(0.044) 
-0.583*** 
(0.056) 
 0.272 
(0.074) 
-0.303*** 
(0.028) 
-0.124*** 
(0.036) 
Short-run risk  0.215 
(0.182) 
 0.372 
(0.029) 
-0.093 
(0.937) 
 0.018 
(0.043) 
 0.021 
(0.061) 
Long-run risk -0.0156** 
(0.066) 
-0.0069 
(0.063) 
 0.041 
(0.093) 
-0.103 
(0.015) 
-0.0240 
(0.036) 
Working Capital  0.044*** 
(0.009) 
 0.094*** 
(0.015)  
 0.064*** 
(0.018) 
 0.004 
(0.009) 
 0.063*** 
(0.013) 
Capital Intensity -0.035*** 
(0.015) 
-0.038*** 
(0.016) 
-0.026*** 
(0.016) 
-0.036*** 
(0.010) 
-0.038*** 
(0.012) 
Investment  0.025 
(0.030) 
 0.244*** 
(0.034) 
 0.036 
(0.040) 
-0.031* 
(0.022) 
-0.007* 
(0.042) 
Age -0.035* 
(0.021)* 
-0.051** 
(0.023)  
 0.070* 
(0.042) 
-0.014 
(0.072) 
 0.056* 
(0.050) 
Subsidy rate -0.007 
(0.008) 
-0.001*** 
(0.076) 
 0.019 
(0.016) 
-0.015 
(0.015) 
-0.023* 
(0.017) 
Diversification  0.183*** 
(0.035) 
 0.385*** 
(0.041) 
-0.039* 
(0.049) 
 0.019 
(0.038) 
 0.337*** 
(0.032) 
Size  0.157*** 
(0.017) 
 0.188*** 
(0.021) 
 0.156*** 
(0.022) 
-0.035** 
(0.018) 
 0.226*** 
(0.022) 
Labor productivity  0.107*** 
(0.013) 
 0.078** 
(0.019) 
 0.213*** 
(0.016) 
 0.478*** 
(0.025) 
 0.103*** 
(0.006) 
_cons -0.670*** 
(0.198) 
-2.366 ** 
(0.053) 
-2.197*** 
(0.374) 
 0.999** 
(0.481) 
-4.475*** 
(0.462) 
Farm-Field crops -0.039 
(0.037) 
    
Farm-Horticulture 0.100*** 
(0.038) 
    
Farm-Livestock  0.059** 
(0.034) 
    
Year Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Region Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Soil Type Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 
(Obs.) 
2,000 
(13,622) 
436 
(3,671) 
370 
(2,356) 
804 
(4,357) 
531 
(3,238) 
Wald χ²(42)=139***    
Sargan Test χ²(72)=90.15  P-value=0.070   
AR(1) Z=-8.274   P-value=0.000   
AR(2) Z=-0.921   P-value=0.357   
AR(3) Z= 1.945   P-value=0.052   
***, **, * are significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively. Numbers in 
parentheses are bootstrap standard errors based on 1000 replications, and the dummy 
reference levels are dairy farms, the year 2001, Drenthe region, and clay soil. 
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5. Conclusions 
A report by the FAO (Food and Agriculture Organization) about the future of 
agriculture underlines that the demand for food will continue to increase amid the scarcity of 
natural resources. In addition, natural disasters are increasing in number and intensity, along 
with climate change-related extreme weather events (Bruinsma, 2017). These rapid changes 
and transitions in the agricultural sector increasingly call for evidence-based and well-targeted 
policy responses. The overarching challenge facing agriculture will be to ensure that the sector 
persistently remains productive and innovative so that it will be sustainable. Risk management 
and financing decisions lie at the heart of many proposed solutions to tackle these challenges. 
Aimed at providing a better understanding and evidence-based input to make informed 
decisions, this dissertation examines the dynamics of farm business in the contexts of capital 
structure, risk, and profitability.  
The frequent policy changes in the European agricultural sector, such as the milk and 
sugar quota abolition, changes in grain intervention policies, mandatory manure processing, 
labeling, and others, have made farm financing decisions very important. For instance, the 
increase in borrowing among Dutch dairy farms can be attributed to the heavy investments 
required to enlarge the scale of production prior to the abolition of the milk quotas on April 1, 
2015 in an attempt to increase the demand for dairy (Samson, Gardebroek and Jongeneel, 
2017). The farm leverage ratio of horticulture farms reached its peak in 2011 and 2012 when 
the cold spring weather sparked the need for extra cash to cover the higher energy bills 
(Berkhout and van Bruchem, 2015). Thus, farm target leverage deserves due emphasis. In 
addition to target leverage, understanding how fast (slow) farms adjust their leverage to the 
target level is also important in order to understand the ability and flexibility of farms in 
adapting to changing legislation, production and finance structures. Chapter 2 of this 
dissertation examines the applicability of the pecking-order and signaling theories in 
explaining the financing decisions in farming, the effects of farm-specific and macroeconomic 
factors in determining the capital structure, and the speed of adjustment to the target.  
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The findings suggest that farms prefer internal to external sources of funding, that 
leverage is negatively related to profit, supporting the pecking-order theory, and, consistent 
with the signaling theory, that farm leverage is positively related to asset tangibility and growth 
opportunity, a relationship that has often been rejected for publicly-listed firms. Thus, signaling 
behavior in the farm-lender relationship nicely fits the pecking-order theory in explaining the 
leverage ratio of farm businesses. 
Farm profitability, asset tangibility, earnings volatility, growth opportunity, and size 
are strongly associated with farm capital structure. When decomposing the analysis into farm 
types, interestingly, I find that all farm types use their growth opportunities to effectively send 
signals to facilitate their access to credit. Farms with substantial growth rates can afford more 
financial leverage since they can generate sufficient earnings to offset the additional interest 
expenses. Growth opportunities, combined with the increase in land value over the years, send 
a positive signal to lenders. They also suggest the presence of a ‘supply effect’, whereby lenders 
might put more emphasis on asset tangibility and growth potential in loan approvals when the 
number of loan requests is high. Not surprisingly, I find that the probability of financial distress 
increases and debt repayment capacity decreases as farm earnings become more volatile, 
resulting in a negative relationship between leverage and risk.  
Yet, there are variations across farm types in these findings: the results suggest that 
dairy farms predominantly follow the signaling theory. Horticulture, livestock and field crop 
farms, on the other hand, appear to follow the pecking-order theory more closely in their 
financing decisions. Though not strongly, macroeconomic factors, such as government debt to 
GDP, inflation and employment in the agricultural sector, also determine farm capital structure 
decisions, suggesting that the capital structure decisions made by farms are not only the product 
of their own specific characteristics but partially also of the macroeconomic environment in 
which farms operate. 
The results show that farms appear to adjust their leverage towards the optimal level 
over time in response to shocks and that lagged leverage is the best predictor of subsequent 
leverage ratios. The speed of adjustment to the target capital, however, is slow and varies 
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according to size and farm type. The speed of adjustment is relatively faster for horticulture 
farms and slower for livestock farms. Horticulture farms need approximately 0.67 years to 
close half of the gap between their current and their target leverage, whereas livestock farms 
take nearly 6 years to do so. This relatively slow adjustment to the target leverage is mainly 
attributed to high adjustment costs. Two factors might explain the high adjustment costs of 
farm businesses in general and the Dutch farm businesses in particular. First, it is not easy for 
farm businesses to gain access to loans. There are only a few financial institutions in the 
Netherlands that specialize in agricultural financing (CBS, 2017). Second, compared to 
corporations, farm businesses are small and medium in size. Hence there is an adverse selection 
issue as a result of information asymmetry, which makes adjustments costly.  
The high adjustment speed of horticulture farms, on the other hand, could indicate the 
ease with which horticulture farms have been able to acquire financing through debt and lower 
the adjustment cost. I also show that the speed of adjustment has a size element in it as the 
speed of adjustment is slow for smaller farms. This suggests that lenders use size as a 
predominant signal of farm creditworthiness. The aforementioned findings in chapter two 
provide a better understanding of the dynamic nature of capital structure and the applicability 
of capital structure theories to farm businesses. Two interesting findings in chapter 2 that merit 
further discussion are the negative relationships of leverage with both earnings volatility (risk) 
and profitability. 
First, a review of the risk management literature suggests that effective risk 
management is expected to stabilize earnings, thereby minimizing the probability of 
bankruptcy and reducing the cost of acquiring capital. Stable earnings ensure that farms can 
promptly repay claims, an indication of lower farm risk. Lower volatility in earnings also 
encourages lenders to grant farms favorable credit terms. The negative relation between 
leverage and earnings volatility may also be consistent with the argument that the default risk 
by farms is priced, i.e. taken into account by lenders when issuing loans, given that an increase 
in leverage ratio may increase the likelihood of default. If this default risk is indeed priced, 
lenders will respond to higher risk with increased interest rates, thus lowering a farm’s access 
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to leverage as well as the amount available in leverage. The take-home lesson from this finding 
is that effective risk management leads to stability in earnings and lower average cost of capital, 
which is ultimately associated with enhanced farm performance.  
Second, while chapter two deals with the effect of profitability on a farm’s capital 
structure, a farm’s choice of capital structure may, conversely, also affect its profitability. Both 
directions of causality are thus possible: increased leverage can positively or negatively affect 
farm profitability, but leverage can also be affected by profitability. On the one hand, highly 
leveraged farms may suffer from financial distress, face conflicts of interest between the 
owners and creditors and incur bankruptcy cost, thus decreasing their profitability. On the other 
hand, the impact of profitability on leverage as described by the pecking order theory is that 
higher profitability results in higher retained earnings and those farms prefer to use these 
retained earnings to finance their investments rather than issue debt. As a result, the relevance 
of farm risk management in agriculture and the existence and persistence of long-run farm 
profitability is further investigated in-depth in chapters 3 and 4 of this dissertation, respectively. 
Chapter 3 of this dissertation deals with risk management in agriculture and provides 
farm-level empirical support to the risk-balancing hypothesis. The results suggest that more 
than half of the farms exhibited risk-balancing behavior over a fifteen-year period: farms make 
strategic adjustments by assuming more (less) debt in response to a decrease (increase) in 
business risk induced by exogenous shocks. The logit panel regression results further show that 
the likelihood of risk-balancing by farms decreases with size, profit, and share of government 
subsidy payments and increases with farm investment.  
The conclusions from the panel fixed effects and logistic regression nevertheless come 
with caveats. Note that farms from different regions or with different production systems may 
face dissimilar economic and policy constraints that might lead to different choices in risk-
balancing behavior. Similarly, farm managers may have different motivations, risk attitudes 
and perceptions. It is, therefore, legitimate to expect this heterogeneity to affect farm risk-
balancing behavior. Also, a Wald test was unable to confirm the statistical significance of the 
farm type dummies, suggesting that the effects of selected farm characteristics on farm risk-
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balancing behavior cannot a priori be assumed equal for all farms. Consequently, using the 
latent mixture logit model, I examined whether all farms could be treated in a similar way or 
whether there were segments of farms that exhibited dissimilar risk-balancing behavior. The 
model, which uses the iterative EM (Expectation-Maximization) algorithm, simultaneously 
identifies segments based on the influence of the selected explanatory variables and estimates 
the effects of these variables on farm risk-balancing behavior for each identified segment.  
The results from the latent mixture model suggest the presence of multiple segments 
that can be interpreted by the risk-balancing hypothesis. Farm profitability, total risk, leverage, 
age, size, and diversification are the factors related to farm risk-balancing behavior. 
Interestingly, these factors are not equally important across the farm sector. To assume 
homogeneity in farms’ responses and to estimate a pooled model or a priori to classify farms 
based on farm type would yield a poor fit and would lead to the misguided conclusion that only 
size, profit, subsidy, and investment are determinants of the likelihood of farm risk-balancing.  
The heterogeneity in the determinants of farm risk-balancing behavior appears to have 
been masked at the farm-type level, i.e. the effect of selected farm characteristics on risk-
balancing behavior is different when using farm type as the basis of the segments than when 
using the latent mixture model to simultaneously classify segments. This is most notable for 
the effects of the most important factors in the risk-balancing hypothesis: farm leverage and 
total risk exposure. The advantage of the segmentation method becomes further apparent from 
the different farm types present in each segment: each of the three identified segments contains 
dairy, field-crop, horticulture, and livestock farms in different proportions. These findings 
provide insights in the interdependence of financial and business risks, spark discussion about 
the linearity of farm risk reduction policies and total farm risk, and underline the relevance of 
considering both observed and unobserved factors in devising relevant risk-management 
strategies. 
Finally, Chapter 4 quantifies the drivers of farm profitability, the degree of abnormal 
profit persistence and its determinants for the Dutch farm sector. In this chapter, I seek to 
explain why long-run profitability and its persistence levels differ across farm types by drawing 
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on the well-established theory of the Resource-Based View (RBV). In doing so, this chapter 
identifies the distinctive qualities or characteristics that help farmers gain and sustain their 
competitive advantages and the areas where policy interventions might give due emphasis. I 
have used a quantile regression approach to examine the drivers of farm profitability, and a 
dynamic panel System GMM estimation to estimate the persistence of abnormal farm profit.  
The results from the quantile regression show that working capital, labor productivity 
and investment are associated with profitability, regardless of farm type. The findings suggest 
the importance of farm working capital for farms to be flexible and responsive to changes in 
the economic and political environment. The findings also lend support to the premise of the 
RBV that scarce and less imitable resources contribute to superior performance and hence 
profitability. Leverage and capital intensity, on the other hand, have negative relationship with 
farm profitability. Farms that already exhibit high leverage levels and use more capital per 
output, experience more cash-flow constraints in their operation due to high financing costs. 
They maintain less working capital, and their ability to refinance is limited, which impairs 
profits and cash flow positions.  
Decomposing the analysis into farm types, I find that risk and profit are only associated 
with dairy and field crops while the effects of diversification and size are more pronounced for 
livestock farms. The more pronounced effect of diversification on livestock farms can be 
explained by the fact that the interdependent nature of livestock production enhances on-farm 
diversification. The pronounced effect of diversification on profit can partly be attributed to 
the relationship between fixed costs and profit. By diversifying, livestock farms tend to lower 
their cash flow risk and increase their profitability. Given that experience accumulates over 
time, one might expect older farmers to be more likely to successfully manage a farm and 
achieve a higher profitability. Contrary to this expectation, however, age is found to be 
negatively associated with profitability. One explanation for this might be that older farmers 
are less motivated to increase efficiency, tend to believe operations cannot be improved any 
further or may value other aspects of life over financial success. These results further confirm 
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the importance of controlling for farm heterogeneity when analyzing the determinants of farm 
profit.  
Estimates using the dynamic panel model suggest that there is a significant degree of 
abnormal profit persistence, with variations between farm types. Dairy farms exhibit the 
highest levels of persistence and livestock farms the lowest. The results show that abnormal 
profit persistence is responsive to farm characteristics such as risk exposure, investment, capital 
intensity, leverage, working capital, and diversification. Evidently, farm working capital has a 
significant, positive effect on abnormal profitability. Working capital represents the amount of 
funds available to a farm if all current assets were sold and current liabilities are paid. This 
liquidity can provide cash to purchase operating inputs or make capital purchases. The results 
are consistent with the notion that a higher risk-bearing capacity of farms helps sustain their 
competitive advantage.  
 The negative association of long-run risk exposure with long-run abnormal profit 
contradicts risk theory, which postulates that risky businesses earn higher profits in the long-
run. An alternative explanation could be that capital costs are nonlinear and that more risk is 
thus not compensated by higher expected returns. These returns are disproportionally punished, 
after all, in that the risk premium on risks and returns is not linear in farming. In conformity to 
the literature, we find a positive impact of size on long-run profitability. This finding is 
consistent with consolidation, which is becoming a trend in the Dutch agricultural sector as 
farms are getting fewer in number but larger in size. Another possible reason is that large farms 
exploit the economies of scale and benefit from economies of scope. Alternatively, it could be 
argued that large farms have a better bargaining power in the supply chain and can access 
capital at a lower cost than small farms and can afford to cope with changes in legislation. The 
results emphasize that (sufficient) scale is a very important matter in Dutch agriculture.  
In general, chapter four shows the variation in farm profit and the persistence of 
abnormal profit is systematic and, hence, not a product of fortune. In addition, these variations 
can be attributed to the farm’s resources and capabilities, such as working capital, capital 
intensity, labor productivity, and diversification strategy.  Note that the positive and significant 
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impact of risk-bearing capacity, i.e. working capital, and farm diversification on gaining and 
sustaining long-run farm profit underlines the vital role of risk management in farm businesses.  
Finally, this dissertation has limitations that motivate further research. Despite our use 
of high-quality panel data, it is merely an accounting data set. Future research may complement 
this with behavioral and demographic data on, for example, education, farm risk attitude, risk 
perception, and farming motivation. More direct measures of farm risk and risk-bearing 
capacity, such as the use of forward contracting and commodity futures, would help further our 
understanding of the impact of risk-management strategies on farm performance. Another 
interesting extension would be to conduct a farm survey to support the accounting data. In 
addition, a (quasi) experimental procedure might constitute an interesting alternative to the 
econometrics methods used in this dissertation to account for endogeneity problems and the 
System GMM used as an internal instrument variable approach. Future research may also test 
for the applicability of other theories of capital structure, such as the market-timing and trade-
off theories, to the farming business and their impact on farm performance in terms of 
profitability, and viability.  
A final promising direction for future research would be to improve our understanding 
of the variations in farm leverage, risk management, and profitability dynamics across 
countries and economies. This dissertation documents a number of interesting variations across 
the four farm types. A better understanding of these variations across economies of, for 
example, developed vs developing countries and across countries with different legal, tax, and 
farm-support systems, such as European countries and the US, could lead to a valuable 
understanding of the dynamics of farm businesses.  
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6. Valorization 
The world has been witnessing major shifts in the agricultural sector in recent years. 
Price volatility has increased, with sharp swings in product and input prices. Global markets 
are highly integrated and hence affected by macro-economic disturbances, disease outbreaks 
and adverse weather events such as floods and droughts. With agricultural policies abandoning 
production and price-supporting schemes, farmers are now more exposed to market forces than 
in the past. Aimed at gaining a better understanding of the dynamics of the farm business in 
the midst of such trends, this dissertation explores capital structure, risk management and 
profitability in farm business. The findings of this dissertation have implications for farmers, 
policy-makers, researchers and the society at large. 
In chapter two, I examine the applicability of the pecking-order and signaling theories 
to farming, the effects of farm-specific and macroeconomic factors in determining the target 
capital structure, and the speed of adjustment to the target. The implications of the findings for 
farms (farm operators) mostly start from their preferences for debt financing. As a higher 
probability of financial distress increases bankruptcy costs, farms should aim to reduce these 
costs by giving higher priority to internal financing. Farms are also encouraged to maintain 
extra capital as a buffer. 
The positive association between farm size, profitability, and the speed of adjustment 
to the target leverage suggests that a stable lending system could help to minimize financial 
distress among farms. As a more stable lending system injects more confidence into the 
agriculture sector, farms can adjust their capital structure much cheaper and faster. Since the 
speed of adjustment to the target capital is a positive function of farm size, a recent trend in the 
Dutch farm sector, i.e. a decline in the number farms but an increase in farm size (scale), fits 
nicely with this phenomenon. The results suggest that farms should adjust their capital structure 
less frequently because the cost of adjustment to the target is higher for smaller farms. 
The results of chapter two could also help policy-makers and lenders to develop 
effective instruments to control and influence the financial leverage of farms. For example, the 
estimate of farm size indicates that the speed of adjustment is slower for smaller farms. This 
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suggests that size is considered a predominant signal of farm creditworthiness. It also suggests 
that policy-makers should consider size when designing policy instruments to facilitate access 
to credit. Governments should put in place prudent regulations that monitor credit allocation 
by lending institutions in the farming business. In economic sectors where banks are major 
capital providers, as is mostly the case in farming, a shift away from lending conditional on 
assets as collateral towards lending based on a farm’s key performance indicators is 
recommended, as this will encourage farms to engage in investments and innovations that will 
enhance their competitiveness in the long-run. Public-policy makers can also encourage a 
cooperative banking model as an alternative to the predominant commercial bank-based 
lending system in the agricultural sector.  
The understanding gained from studying the applicability of the pecking order and 
signaling theories to the farming business benefits both farms and lending institutions. Since 
historical financial performance is used as a valid signal, farms are encouraged to keep accurate 
and detailed financial records. These records also enable lenders to better understand the 
dynamics of farm financing decisions and easily identify creditworthy farm businesses through 
the appropriate signals. The fact that the pecking order and signaling theories of capital 
structure explain the leverage dynamic of farm business suggests that farms rely heavily on 
retained earnings. Specifically, those farms that have higher levels of retained earnings after a 
profitable season are better equipped to reduce their debt obligations during periods of 
operational risk. They may well minimize the risk of bankruptcy costs and financial distress. 
In addition, it is important that universities (research institutions) and banks (alone or in 
cooperation) should engage in discourse to develop tools, e.g. platforms, that offer farmers 
insight in the vulnerability of income in various markets and in capital choice strategies, so that 
they may make timely and informed decisions. An example of such an initiative is the 
Commodity Risk Management Expertise Center (CORMEC), a joint initiative by Wageningen 
University and the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign on topics of market-risk 
management in the agribusiness sector, among other things. 
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From a development-economics point of view, the findings suggest that farms use 
internally generated funds when they go through periods of credit constraint. In periods of 
macroeconomic instability, however, they appear to reduce not only external financing but also 
the use of internal funds in their capital structure. Specifically, this implies that if farms lowered 
their reliance on external financing and reduced their use of internal funds, perhaps they would 
end up also cutting back farm investments and household expenditures. This, in turn, would 
adversely affect the production capacity of farms, negatively influencing economic growth. By 
providing easy access to and availability of further funds, however, banks and other credit 
providers, such as private-equity and crowd-funding initiatives, might cancel or mitigate the 
impact of limited access to finance on farm investments and competitiveness. 
Chapter three presents empirical evidence of the risk-balancing behavior of Dutch 
farms as one of the integrated risk-management tools while accounting for unobserved 
heterogeneity. The findings have implications for farms, financial institutions, and public 
policymakers. The importance of leverage and farm profitability in farm risk-balancing 
behavior has at least two important implications.  First, farms rely heavily on the availability 
of and access to loans. Given the fact that farm businesses have minimal access to equity 
markets or none at all, policies aimed at helping farms manage their risk should make access 
to credit facilities a priority. In addition, the heterogeneity of farm risk balancers suggests that 
financial institutions can use these characteristics, i.e. segment-based heterogeneity, for risk 
profiling and loan evaluation in each segment. Second, farm profitability and risk-balancing 
are strongly related, suggesting that farms use their retained earnings as a buffer when 
exogenous shocks disturb the optimal total risk level. As a result, the effects of farm-support 
programs, such as subsidies and direct payments aiming at stabilizing profit, cannot be easily 
identified. This, in turn, should spark a discussion about the linearity of the relationship 
between risk-management policy instruments and total farm risk.  
Furthermore, with the identification of farm segments and the provision of information 
for profiling each segment, public policymakers will be able to target these segments more 
effectively and design risk-management strategies that best suit each segment. The results also 
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suggest that more attention should be paid to both observed and unobserved factors in 
designing and implementing individual risk-management instruments and in assessing their 
impact on the farm sector. 
At a societal level, the findings also contribute to the on-going debate on the impact of 
farm risk management policies on farm viability. If some of the farm risk exposures are covered 
by government policy, it may reduce the incentive to use other alternative strategies such as 
diversification, price hedging and insurance. The findings thus point to externalities, i.e. 
undesired consequences, of farm risk-balancing, known as ‘the risk-balancing paradox’ in the 
risk management literature: farm policies intended to support farms unintentionally end up 
introducing more risk to farms. From a farm perspective, the level of risk mostly remains higher 
or the same, regardless of government intervention. This suggests that promoting the uptake of 
additional risk-management instruments, such as hedging and commodity futures, is both 
relevant and timely. From a development economics perspective, farms that tend to use their 
level of debt (leverage) to balance their risk will ultimately suffer credit constraints caused by 
their levels of risk, which will hamper their exploitation of investment opportunities. This 
makes it very difficult for these farms to gain and sustain competitive advantages. 
To cope with these negative externalities of farm risk-balancing behavior, I propose 
that farms and policy-makers focus on the introduction and development of alternative risk 
management responses (strategies). These responses could include, but are by no means limited 
to, a production response, i.e. low-risk production, diversifying enterprises and crops, and 
geographically dispersing production, a marketing response, i.e. obtaining market information, 
spreading sales by making several sales during a year, forward contracting, hedging, and 
futures trading, and a financial response, i.e. insuring against losses, maintaining reserves, 
managing the pace of investments, acquiring assets, limiting leverage, and working off-farm.  
It should be highlighted that even though managing agricultural risks is mainly a 
responsibility of farmers themselves, the government irrefutably also has roles to play, ranging 
from designing effective risk-management strategies to support their implementation in 
agriculture. Policy makers, for instance, can devise rural development policies aimed at 
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offering greater off-farm employment possibilities, which may have a far better influence on 
the stability of farm household incomes than policies directed at stabilizing agricultural 
markets. In addition, training activities might be also necessary to sensitize farmers to the need 
for more systematic risk management. Finally, politicians should be aware that their decisions 
are perceived as one of the most important risks in agriculture. Chapter 3 underlines the fact 
that minimum intervention prices or payments triggered when prices or returns are low as a 
result of catastrophic losses may even be counterproductive as they tend to induce more risky 
farming practices. In recent years, the Dutch government has made consistent efforts to shift 
away from ad hoc responses to catastrophes, promoting public-private partnerships and 
supporting the development of plans to deal with catastrophic risks. This includes the operation 
of a livestock veterinary fund and the introduction of several insurance schemes, including a 
recently subsidized multi-peril crop insurance (OECD, 2011). This has to be part of a long-
term strategy as it may take several years for these instruments to prove efficient.  
Finally, chapter four aims to answer what drives long-run farm profitability. The 
question of why differences in profit persistence occur is found to be equally fundamental as 
profit existence and profit persistence could be driven by different factors. Answering these 
questions is important from a managerial, theoretical and public-policy perspective. With 
farming becoming highly competitive, it is crucial that farmers are aware of the factors that 
could affect their overall profitability and persistence. From a farm management perspective, 
much of the available literature on sustained competitive advantage implies that farm managers 
need to invest resources in the search for an advantage, which, if successful, will allow their 
farms to realize consistent rewards over longer periods of time.  
Interestingly, working capital is found to be one of the robust findings that determine 
long-run farm profitability and its persistence. Working capital becomes even more crucial as 
a buffer during periods of financial crisis and credit constraints, when access to external 
funding, mostly bank loans, will typically be difficult. Some of the reasons may include: (a) 
financial crises may cause a credit crunch for agricultural borrowers, which, in turn, disrupts 
the functioning of the loan/credit markets for farms, (b) following an economic crisis, the 
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demand for income-elastic food products may lead to a reduction in income from farming, and 
(c) constraints on public budgets due to the crisis may lead to spending cuts in agriculture. 
Thus, ensuring adequate working capital is most important for farms to survive, gain and 
sustain their competitive advantages. 
The implications of these findings for farm management are that financial and non-
financial resources are important for value creation and generate sustained competitive 
advantages. Financial resources provide farms with assets that are needed to create and 
leverage value. Non-financial resources provide complementary resources, in terms of 
information, control, skill, risk management, etc., that are needed to leverage financial 
resources. Another management implication is that farmers can use the framework of the 
resource-based view to configure how to use their resources (both financial and non-financial) 
to make their farm business model, i.e. their strategies, valuable, rare, inimitable, and non-
substitutable. Resource-based thinking gives a good footing when developing new directions 
for an individual farm. It could, for example, be used as a guiding tool when considering how 
to deploy a farm’s current resources and which other resources to create and make available in 
order to make profitable changes. 
Finally, with the aim of communicating the major findings to the general public, all 
chapters of this dissertation were presented at international conferences in different parts of the 
world, such as the NC-1177 meeting on Agricultural and Rural Finance Markets in Transition 
in 2016 (Denver, USA), the American Agricultural and Applied Economics Association 
(AAEA) conference in 2017 (Chicago, USA) and 2018 (Washington D.C, USA), and the 
European Association of Agricultural Economists (EAAE) congress in 2017 (Parma, Italy). In 
addition, the main findings of this thesis have been used by the Commodity Risk Management 
Expertise Center (CORMEC)64 to educate/train farmers in the areas of risk management, farm 
competitiveness and capital structure.  
                                                 
64 CORMEC is a joint initiative of Maastricht University, Wageningen University and the University of Illinois at 
Urbana-Champaign, among others parties, addressing topics of market risk management in the agribusiness sector 
(https://www.wur.nl/en/CORMEC_Wageningen/Commodity-Risk-Management-Expertise-Centre-CORMEC.htm) 
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